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Abstract 
Lobbying is a vital aspect of democratic governance and is for the most part 
beneficial to society. However, recent high-profile instances of lobbying activity in 
New Zealand have damaged governmental integrity and appear to have diminished 
public confidence in government decision-making processes. The Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill was introduced to the New Zealand Parliament in 2012 in the hope 
that transparency mechanisms could dissuade harmful lobbying without impeding 
ordinary activity. 
The Bill was rejected at the select committee stage due to a number of drafting 
deficiencies. These shortcomings made the Bill difficult to implement, and imposed a 
disproportionate limit on a number of human rights. Despite these failings, it is both 
possible and desirable to regulate lobbying activity in New Zealand. Drawing from 
overseas experiences, this paper suggests modifications to the Lobbying Disclosure 
Bill which would discourage harmful lobbying while also mitigating the concerns 
raised by critics of the Bill. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 38,788 words. 
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PART ONE – LOBBYING IN CONTEXT 
 
I Introduction 
On 5 April 2012, the Lobbying Disclosure Bill
1
 was drawn from the New Zealand 
Parliamentary Ballot. Its provisions were taken, mostly verbatim, from its Canadian 
counterpart, the Lobbying Act 1985.
2
 Its stated intention was to “bring a measure of 
transparency and public disclosure around the lobbying activity directed at members 
of Parliament and their staff, and in so doing to enhance trust in the integrity and 
impartiality of democracy and political decision making.”3  
The drafters of the Bill intended for it to establish a lobbyists’ register, to which all 
paid lobbyists would be obliged to subscribe. Lobbyists would have been required to 
file regular returns with the Controller and Auditor-General, whose responsibility it 
would be to compile the information contained therein and make it available as part of 
the register on a publically-accessible website. Engaging in lobbying activity as an 
unregistered lobbyist could result in fines up to $10,000 for an individual or $20,000 
for a company or organisation.
4
 The Auditor-General would have had the 
responsibility of ensuring that lobbyists comply with the provisions of the Bill via an 
augmentation of the office’s existing investigatory powers under the Public Audit Act 
2001.
5
 The Bill also would have required the Auditor-General to develop a Lobbyists’ 
Code of Conduct,
6
 to which lobbyists would be required to adhere under threat of 
deregistration (and, presumably, a resultant loss of livelihood).
7
 
The Bill received broad support on its first reading, but was ultimately rejected by the 
Government Administration Committee. The committee cited several concerns about 
the Bill. It was chiefly criticised for failing to adequately define who and what type of 
activities ought to be subject to its provisions.
8
 
A Thesis statement and structure 
The central contention of this paper is that it is both possible and desirable to enact 
legislation to effectively regulate lobbyists in New Zealand. 
This contention is developed in this paper in the following manner. Firstly, it 
establishes that unregulated lobbying can be detrimental to governmental integrity and 
public confidence in governmental actors and decision-making processes. It 
demonstrates that lobbying legislation is justifiable and should be actively pursued by 
Parliament. Secondly, it suggests an approach to regulation that could discourage 
unethical lobbying, preserve and legitimise ethical lobbying activity and dramatically 
increase the amount of information available to the New Zealand public about who is 
conducting lobbying activity, and for what purpose. Thirdly, it argues that concerns 
about the impact of lobbying regulation on the rights to freedom of expression and 
                                                          
1
 The Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1) was a member’s Bill introduced former Green Party MP 
Sue Kedgley and inherited by MP Holly Walker. 
2
 Lobbying Act RSC 1985 c44; Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1) (explanatory note). 
3
 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1) (explanatory note). 
4
 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1), cl 19. 
5
 Public Audit Act 2001, Part 4. 
6
 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1), cl 13. 
7
 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1), cl 16. 
8
 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1) (select committee report) at 3. 
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association can be partially mitigated by clarity in drafting, and are otherwise 
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. Accordingly, this paper is 
broken into three Parts: Lobbying in Context, Regulating Lobbyists, and Lobbying 
Legislation as Rights Limitation. 
This chapter explains the scope of lobbying legislation and contextualises the 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill in its international and domestic environment. Chapter II 
takes stock of the benefits and harms of lobbying activity, and Chapter III analyses the 
degree to which these harms are currently mitigated by existing measures in New 
Zealand. 
Chapter IV introduces some of the key measures implemented in regimes where 
lobbyists are regulated, and compares them to the measures suggested in the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill. Chapters V and VI assess the various approaches taken in other 
jurisdictions to define who should be captured by lobbying regulation. Chapter VII 
evaluates which regulatory burdens are most suitable to reduce lobbying harms in 
New Zealand. Chapters VIII and IX deal with matters of enforcement. The former is 
concerned with determining which government agency should be granted oversight in 
the event that regulating legislation is passed. The latter canvasses criminal and non-
legislative methods of compliance and makes suggestions for the New Zealand 
context. 
Chapter X analyses the potential limits imposed by lobbying legislation on the rights 
to freedom of expression and association, and explains how these can be mitigated, 
and otherwise justified. Chapter XI surmises the way in which the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill could be modified to meet the central contention of this paper.  
B  What is lobbying? 
Democracy is a story of competing interests in matters of governance.
9
 In modern, 
liberal democracies, the most recent chapter of democracy has been primarily 
concerned with the distribution of political influence; the settled position is in favour 
of universal suffrage.
10
 However, it would be naïve to believe that the political 
influence begins and ends at the ballot box. Once elected, government representatives 
have a duty to take stock of public opinion and respond appropriately during their 
time in office. To an extent, electoral and post-electoral phases have become blurred 
in many modern democracies, giving rise to a so-called “permanent campaign”.11 This 
on-going participatory aspect of democracy is supplemented by a form of political 
activity which can be very broadly referred to as “lobbying”. 
The Encyclopædia Britannica defines lobbying as “any attempt by individuals or 
private interest groups to influence the decisions of government”.12 This definition 
encompasses activity which has existed in structured political environments for 
thousands of years. For example, we know that lobbying was evident in the 
                                                          
9
 See generally David Held Models of Democracy (Stanford University Press, 2006) at 161. 
10
 Universal suffrage is rarely universal in truth. Common exceptions include minors, the mentally 
disabled and, in some states, criminal offenders. See Liam Williams “Civil Death and Penal Populism 
in New Zealand” (2012) 20 Waikato L Rev 111. 
11
 Dorie Apollonio, Bruce E Cain, Lee Drutman “Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the 
Corruption Paradigm” (2008) 36 Hastings Const LQ 13. 
12
 “Lobbying” (2013) Encyclopædia Britannica 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/345407/lobbying>. 
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administration of ancient Greece and Rome,
13
 and that later kings and queens met 
with petitioners to air their grievances and – if the applicant was successful – receive 
redress. It is thought that if “the barons had not lobbied King John, he would not have 
signed the Magna Carta at Runnymede”.14 
While the activity might date back to the genesis of government, the origin of the use 
of the word “lobbying” to describe it is in an unsettled position. Some believe that it 
originated in Washington in the mid-19
th
 Century, at the Willard InterContinental 
Hotel. There, President Ulysses S. Grant would meet with favour-seekers in the lobby, 
hence the development of the verb.
15
 This is highly unlikely, given that there are 
records which appear to show its use within the United States dating back to 1792,
16
 
and further still in the House of Commons in England.
17
 
In modernity, “lobbying” is a term used to describe the participatory activities of a 
certain group of professionals who specialise in liaising with government 
representatives. Contemporary lobbyists take various forms, delineated either by the 
method of communication employed or by the nature of the relationship between the 
lobbyist and client concerned. To illustrate the diversity between the various actors in 
the modern lobbying environment, three main categories are described below. This 
list is by no means exhaustive and merely reflects one of the many ways in which 
lobbyists may be categorised.  
1 Private citizens 
The most modest lobbyist is the private constituent who undertakes to influence his or 
her political representative. This might occur for a plethora of reasons; for example, 
the owner of a small importing business might wish to raise concerns about excise 
taxes, or a mother might want to encourage an MP to change his or her position on 
maternity leave. These interactions are the lifeblood of democratic representation,
18
 
helping to reduce disconnect sometimes experienced between the elected and their 
electors. They also allow representatives to be “grounded” in their constituencies, and 
thus aware of the concerns of the electorate. 
2 In-house lobbyists 
In-house lobbyists are those employees “whose duties include communicating with 
public office holders on behalf of an employer.” 19  These employers might 
                                                          
13
 Marjorie Jerrard “The Collegium Fullonum, Collegium Centonarium, and CATU: Ancient Collegia 
and Modern Trade Unions – A Comparison of the Roles of Industrial Organisations in their Respective 
Societies” (paper presented to Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New 
Zealand Conference, Wellington, 1998) at 2. 
14
 Lionel Zetter Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion (1st ed, Harriman House, Hampshire, 2008) 
at 6. 
15
 Tom Avermaete and Anne Massey Hotel Lobbies and Lounges: The Architecture of Professional 
Hospitality (Routledge, 2012) at 112. 
16
 Vincent R Johnson “Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy” (2006) 16 Cornell JL 1 at 
11. 
17
 Interview with Jessie Sheidlower, Editor-at-Large Oxford English Dictionary (Liane Hansen, A 
Lobbyist by any other name, National Public Radio, 22 January 2006) transcript provided by National 
Public Radio (Washington). 
18
 Pippa Norris “Democratic Phoenix: Agencies, Repertoires and Targets of Political Activism” (paper 
presented to the Annual American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 August 2002).  
19
 OECD Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 1: Increasing Transparency Through 
Legislation (OECD Publishing, 2009) at 50. 
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conceivably include organisations, corporations, churches, not-for-profits or 
universities. The in-house lobbyist generally has some political perspicacity and the 
ability to convey messages between his or her employer and the appropriate public 
official. In New Zealand, an in-house lobbyist might be expected to make submissions 
to select committees or contact public officials to discuss matters relevant to his or her 
employer. Most significantly, these lobbyists act solely on behalf of their employers 
when conducting lobbying activity.  
An in-house lobbyist can take a variety of forms, and work for a variety of employers. 
Used generally, the term could encapsulate both the government relations team at 
Vodafone New Zealand and a part-time employee of the Kidney Kids charity who 
occasionally emails public officials or makes select committee submissions. What 
might reasonably apply to the former might not be expected of the latter, particularly 
in light of relative influence and resources.
20
 This has led to a number of legislative 
clarifications (between in-house lobbyists employed by corporations and not-for-
profits, for example)
21
 in a range of jurisdictions.  
3 Consultant lobbyists 
Those persons who conduct lobbying activity on behalf of multiple different third-
parties fall into the consultant lobbyist category. A range of professions fall within 
this definition. Dedicated government relations consultants and public affairs 
specialists such as Saunder Unsworth, Glass Tower, Exceltium and Porter Novelli are 
one target of this description. Public law firms, such as Chen Palmer (Australasia’s 
first), Simpsons Grierson and Buddle Finlay would also be captured by such a 
definition.  
C The Lobbying Disclosure Bill in the international context 
For various reasons, lobbying has become associated with influence trading and 
corruption in the public eye. At a fundamental level, this is because lobbying can 
provide interest groups with a degree of political influence unavailable to ordinary 
citizens. As the old argument goes, power in the political world is a zero-sum game.
22
 
An increase in the influence wielded by the lobbyist directly undermines the ability of 
other governed parties to affect change. It is natural, then, for the public to resent 
lobbyists on the basis that they represent a legitimised form of disenfranchisement. 
While this may indeed be at the heart of the negative conceptions held about 
lobbyists, there are a host of other reasons why the practice has come to be held in 
such low regard. 
A number of prominent political scientists have released findings which seem to 
suggest that organised interest groups create irrational or inefficient policies. The 
rationale claims “the universal pursuit of political advantage leads to… perverse 
results… all of which are designed to redistribute rents from unorganized groups 
(consumers and taxpayers) to organised interests.” 23  This is known as Olson’s 
                                                          
20
 See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion about the use of different requirements for different classes of 
lobbyists. 
21
 Lobbying Act RSC 1985 c44, ss5, 7. 
22
 James H Read “Is Power Zero-Sum or Variable-Sum? Old Arguments and New Beginnings” (paper 
presented to the Annual American Political Science Association, California, 2 September 2011). 
23
 William C Mitchell & Michael C Munger “Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory 
Survey” (1991) 35 AJPS 512 at 517. 
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“institutional sclerosis”, and entails the prediction that “special interest groups will 
accumulate over time in stable societies and eventually reduce the economic 
efficiency of the economy in which they operate.”24 
This negative conception is reinforced by lobbying scandals which regularly occur 
throughout the world. These serve to reinforce the worst possible characterisations of 
lobbyists. Perhaps the most well-known recent instance of this was the United States’ 
Jack Abramoff scandal, which was exposed by the Washington Post in 2006.
25
 As a 
prolific Republican lobbyist, Jack Abramoff used his considerable wealth to bribe 
public officials and defraud his clients. He was eventually sentenced to five years and 
ten months in prison, and several of his accomplices have been convicted. Six law-
makers are currently under investigation by the FBI in relation to the scandal, and two 
members of Congress have relinquished their roles. While the scale of this operation 
may be unprecedented, its theme is not. In the most recent scandal to wrack the 
United Kingdom House of Commons, MP Patrick Mercer was exposed by journalists 
who posed as lobbyists as accepting significant sums of money in return for tabling 
parliamentary questions on their behalf.
26
 
Lobbyists have also been criticised for allegedly contributing towards the onset of the 
2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis.
27
 In 2011, three IMF economists from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research released a working paper which provides 
information which appears to draw a connection between bank lobbyists, poor lending 
practices and bailouts.
28
 
These types of scandals have ensured that lobbying has come to symbolise the way in 
which money can buy power in matters political. The facilitator of this arrangement – 
the lobbyist – has borne the brunt of the public ire that has arisen as a result. The 
“ideological baggage”29 that is attached to the practice gives it “roughly the same 
cachet as… ‘deadbeat dad’.”30  It has become “an unsavoury part of the political 
process.”31 A particularly venomous caricaturisation of lobbyists was pronounced by 
reporter Emily Briggs in 1869, “…winding in and out through the long, devious 
basement passage, crawling through the corridors, trailing its slimy length from 
gallery to committee room, at last it lies stretched at full length on the floor of 
                                                          
24
 Jac C Heckelman “Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Fall of Nations after 25 Years” (2007) 74 
Southern Econ J 18 at 19. 
25
 Susan Schmidt, James V Grimaldi and R Jeffrey Smith “Investigating Abramoff – Special Report” 
(2005) The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/linkset/2005/06/22/LI2005062200936.html>.  
26
 “Lobbying Scandal Q&A: What it all means” The Telegraph (online ed, London, 01 June 2013). 
27
 Nicole Gillespie, Robert Hurley, Graham Dietz and Reinhard Bachmann “Restoring Institutional 
Trust after the Global Financial Crisis” in Roderick M Kramer and Todd L Pittinsky (eds) Restoring 
Trust in Organizations and Leaders: Enduring Challenges and Emerging Answers (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 196; Daniel Kaufmann “Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis” (2009) Forbes < 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business-corruption.html>. 
28
 Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra and Thierry Tressel “A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial 
Crisis” (May 2011) The National Bureau of Economic Research 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w17076>. 
29
 Andrew P Thomas “Easing the Pressure in Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to 
Lobby” (1993) 16 Harv JL & Pub Pol 149. 
30
 David Segal “Main Street America Has Advocates Aplenty: On the Hill, Lobbyists for All” 
Washington Post, (A1, Washington DC, 10 July 1995). 
31
 Meredith A Capps “Gouging the Government: Why a Federal Contingency Fee Lobbying Prohibition 
is Consistent with First Amendment Freedoms” (2005) 58 Vand L Rev 1885 at 1886. 
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Congress - this dazzling reptile, this huge, scaly serpent of the lobby."
32
 Similar 
renditions abound in popular fiction,
33
 prominent opinions,
34
 news media
35
 and even 
academic publications.
36
 This perception has implications for the effective and fair 
drafting of legislation to regulate lobbyists. 
In addition to negatively affecting the way that society perceives lobbyists, lobbying 
scandals provide democratic incentives to law-makers to introduce legislation to 
regulate the activity. The number of states implementing lobbying regulations has 
tripled within the last decade.
37
 Many of these states have struggled with lobbying 
scandals of their own.
38
 A strong public and political response to these scandals has 
encouraged reform.
39
 
In 2009, the OECD produced two reports in response to what it identified as 
“impressive mobilisation of private resources” 40  which are devoted to lobbying 
activity in democracies throughout its constituent states. These reports represent what 
is probably the most comprehensive international study ever conducted with respect to 
lobbying activity. It found that many societies believed that lobbying “gives special 
advantages to ‘vocal vested interests’ and that negotiations carried on behind closed 
doors can override the ‘wishes of the whole community’ in public decision making.”41 
Not only does lobbying appear to unfairly distribute political power, but it also seems 
that the way in which this power is exercised may conflict with public interest.
42
 
Three years later, the Lobbying Disclosure Bill was drawn from the New Zealand 
Parliamentary Ballot. It drew heavy inspiration from the recommendations of the 
Public Governance Committee of the OECD.
43
 
In addition to overseas trends and the recommendations of the OECD, New Zealand 
law-makers have domestic incentives to regulate. It is difficult to take stock of the 
                                                          
32
 “’Lobbyists’ September 28, 1987” (2005) United States Senate 
<http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Byrd_History_Lobbying.htm>.   
33
 A recent example of this is the Hollywood blockbuster film Thank You for Smoking (2005). 
34
 Barack Obama, President of the United States “Ethics and Lobbying Reform” (Lobbying Reform 
Summit, Washington DC, 26 January 2006). 
35
 “Editorial: Undue Influence” The New Zealand Listener (online ed, Auckland, 28 November 2013). 
36
 Mancur Olson The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 
(Yale University Press, 2008) at 69. 
37
 “Fighting Corruption in the Public Sector” (2013) OECD: Better Policies for Better Lives 
<www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/lobbying>. 
38
 The Conservative MP for Newark has resigned in the latest of a string of lobbying scandals in the 
United Kingdom. See Claire Newell and Holly Watt “Patrick Mercer MP resigns over lobbying 
scandal” The Telegraph (online ed, London, 31 May 2013); Caroline Lucas “Influence on MPs must be 
exposed and regulated” The Guardian (online ed, London, 22 July 2013). A recent EU lobbying 
scandal has also embroiled officials from Austria, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. See David Hannan 
“The MEP lobbying scandal is worse than anything at Westminster, but it will be largely ignored” The 
Telegraph (online ed, London, 20 March 2011). 
39
 For example, the United Kingdom has passed the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party 
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (UK), and the European Union has begun to 
strengthen its existing framework with the Interinstitutional Agreement 2291/2010 on a Common 
Transparency Register [2009] OJ C 271 E. 
40
 OECD Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 1: Increasing Transparency Through 
Legislation (OECD Publishing, 2009) at 5. 
41
 OECD Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 1: Increasing Transparency Through 
Legislation (OECD Publishing, 2009) at 11. 
42
 Stephen Barley “Corporations, Democracy and the Public Good” (2007) 16 J Manage Inq 201 at 210. 
43
 Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 (15-1) (explanatory note). 
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state of lobbying practices in New Zealand, given that the industry is currently 
unregulated and thus prone to secrecy. Despite this, several instances of lobbying 
have hit headlines for various degrees of underhandedness over the past five years.
44
 
This publicity may have been responsible for unanimous support that the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill received in its first reading. 
A closer analysis of this support makes it abundantly clear that it was tenuous at best; 
each MP who spoke on the Bill made it plain that the Bill would lose support if it was 
not significantly amended at select committee.
45
 The Government Administration 
Committee granted a six month extension to allow MP Holly Walker to amend her 
Bill. Unfortunately, the results were found wanting and the committee eventually 
recommended that the Bill not pass into law. Instead, it advised Parliament to develop 
guidelines for parliamentarians on how to handle lobbying communications, and that 
governments include details to identify those lobbyists consulted in the explanatory 
notes of parliamentary bills. 
46
 
D Conclusion 
The Bill was not rejected because its intentions were unworthy. Instead, it seems that 
the method by which it aimed to achieve its aims were found wanting. Unfortunately, 
the recommendations made by the select committee are comparatively weak, and will 
likely do little to assuage fears of unethical lobbying activity in New Zealand. The 
following two chapters explain why lobbying activity in New Zealand requires 
regulation, and that current public law tools are not up to the task. 
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II The Benefits and Harms of Lobbying 
In its report on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill, the Government Administration 
Committee advised that the Bill was inappropriate for the New Zealand context.
47
 The 
following day, Committee Chair MP Ruth Dyson minimised the need for the 
introduction of lobbying legislation, because “New Zealand is a village. We know 
who the lobbyists are, and what they’re going to talk to us about.”48 This chapter 
assesses the validity of this contention in light of the relative benefits and harms that 
lobbying has provided in New Zealand. 
In order to progress the debate surrounding lobbying legislation in New Zealand, it is 
first necessary to assess the effects of lobbying activity. Such law is primarily drafted 
to address two issues: the tendency for lobbying to damage the integrity of 
government processes, and the related propensity for lobbying to decrease public 
confidence in the integrity of governmental institutions and public officials.
49
 These 
issues formed the basis of the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity of 
Lobbying, which was adopted by member countries in 2010 and prompted the 
introduction of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill. It is fair to say that the presumption of 
harm forms the absolute bedrock principle for lobbying legislation. It is therefore 
absolutely crucial to establish that the harm – or the potential for it to eventuate – 
exists in truth before movements are made to legislate.  
This chapter answers a number of questions. What does the practice really look like 
on a daily basis? What is the nature and severity of the harm caused by lobbying? 
Conversely, to what extent does lobbying activity produce societal gains? It concludes 
that lobbying is, by large, an activity which is beneficial for society. However, 
isolated incidents of lobbying occur which may have a disproportionately large, 
negative impact on government integrity and public confidence in governmental 
decision-makers. It follows that a regulatory system for lobbyists may be advisable if 
it is capable of minimising harmful lobbying without detriment to everyday lobbying 
activity.  
A Benefits of lobbying 
There can be little doubt that lobbying forms an integral part of the democratic 
process. It can be roughly characterised as contributory toward society in three ways.  
Most broadly, lobbying can be rightly seen as a useful tool for political participation.
50
 
An early iteration of this viewpoint was convincingly espoused by Arthur Bentley in 
his seminal text The Process of Government in 1908. He argued that interest groups 
were an essential component of democratic representation because they helped to 
balance interests across the political spectrum.
51
 Political engagement with interest 
groups, organisations, businesses and individuals from relevant democratically-
represented constituencies is clearly a desirable facet of democratic governance. The 
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flow of information between the governed and those who govern ensures that the 
latter can respond to the wishes of the former, as befits proper representative 
democratic practice. The ability for constituents to contribute to political discourse is 
“precisely what distinguishes ‘citizens’ within a democracy from ‘subjects’ of an 
authoritarian regime.”52 In other words, lobbying is part of a broader process which 
guarantees the legitimacy of democratic government.  
Secondly, lobbying can also contribute to society by making insightful contributions 
to policy-making processes. It has been usefully described as a “legislative subsidy”,53 
in the sense that lobbyists can offer valuable expertise to government representatives. 
Legislators are often “generalists”,54 meaning that they have a broad understanding of 
policy areas and methods for implementation. While this is obviously an essential 
characteristic of a skilled policymaker, it does not lend to detailed understandings of 
specific topics. This is where lobbyists step in, performing a crucial educational role.
55
 
For example, the Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand is an organisation of 
professional mental health workers which develops policy advice on policies, systems 
or laws which affect people with experiences of mental illness. It provides evidence-
based advice to government agencies such as Child, Youth and Family, the Ministry 
of Health and the Ministry of Social Development on these areas, helping to inform 
the policy process.
56
 The way in which lobbyists can inform policy agendas in New 
Zealand was exemplified by the expert, influential advice provided by technocrats 
during the deregulation of financial markets, which occurred between 1984 and 
1995.
57
 These lobbyists included the Employers’ Federation, Federated Farmers and 
the Chambers of Commerce, who met regularly and resolved to dissect and promote 
the benefits of market liberalism to the governments at the time. 
Finally, lobbyists can provide a counterbalance to the generally overpowered 
government of the day.
58
 For those public officials who do not have absolute access to 
the civil service and the advice it provides (such as backbench and opposition MPs), 
lobbyists can provide an informed perspective on issues, which can contribute to a 
more balanced political dialogue between representatives. 
That lobbying is irreplaceably valuable is a fact beyond question. Without it, policy 
decisions would be based on an unbalanced representation of perspectives, and in 
isolation from the constituents for whom the policies are intended to apply. Lobbying 
is a legitimate practice, and attempts made to legislate must reinforce that fact. 
However, it is also apparent that lobbying can – from time to time – be rightly viewed 
as harmful. 
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B Harms of lobbying 
As mentioned earlier, allegations of harm levelled against lobbying activity tend to 
fall into two categories. The first is that unregulated lobbying can detrimentally affect 
governmental integrity, by encouraging the misuse of public powers for the 
advancement of private interests.
59
 The second is a corollary of the first; namely, that 
unregulated lobbying activity can undermine public confidence in government 
representatives and decision-making processes.
60
 
1 Governmental integrity 
In one sense, “lobbying is just a special form of corruption focussed on legislative 
bodies or some other rule-making agency.”61 This may be particularly true in cases 
where there is a quid quo pro assumption between the lobbyist and the government 
representative concerned (where there is an expectation held by the lobbyist that his or 
her view on certain issues will be given significant weight). This situation might arise 
where a lobbyist considers making a contribution to election campaign expenses, or 
offers gifts of a pecuniary or otherwise valuable nature.
62
 Harmful lobbying of this 
calibre – which clearly has negative implications for governmental integrity – is rare, 
compared to its everyday counterparts. However, this chapter demonstrates that this 
type of lobbying can cause more harm than the infrequency of its occurrence might 
suggest. 
Some preliminary discussion is necessary before the interplay between lobbying 
activity and governmental integrity can be drawn out. Most essentially, it is necessary 
to consider what is meant by the vague word “integrity” with reference to 
governmental institutions and decision-making processes. In addition to this, the value 
of integrity must be appraised in order to determine the extent to which it merits 
protection. 
(a) Integrity and good governance 
Integrity is not an easily identifiable characteristic of governance. This is in large part 
due to the fact that it is highly subjective, and thus susceptible to various moral 
judgements.
63
 The term is tied up in the value-laden language of ethics and tends to 
vary between societies. One way to identify the degree to which government decision-
making bodies act with integrity is to rate their performance against a number of 
indicators. The OECD Report on lobbying appears to use ‘governmental integrity’ 
almost synonymously with the principles of good governance.
64
 A similar approach 
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has been adopted in other scholarly works.
65
 Brought to prominence by the World 
Bank in the 1990s,
66
 these “elastic” 67  principles usually include “transparency, 
accountability, inclusiveness, effectiveness and impartiality.” 68  These principles 
provide a useful starting-point for the evaluation of governmental integrity. 
(i) Inclusiveness 
Inclusiveness – or participation – refers to “the right to participate in public affairs 
directly or through chosen representatives.”69 This principle has become enshrined as 
one of the most essential for the creation of a legitimate state; many commentators 
believe it is an essential human right, and that “[i]n its absence… all others fall to a 
perilous existence.” 70  It does not merely refer to election mechanisms, instead 
pertaining to the concept that a participatory approach to governance “mediates 
differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the 
group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.” 71  It requires that 
policymakers “follow an inclusive approach throughout the policy chain (from 
conception to implementation) to create more confidence in the result.”72  
Hypothetically, unethical lobbying could result in unbalanced consultation processes. 
This could occur where lobbyists are granted audiences with decision-makers, without 
corresponding input from other members of the electorate. This becomes unbalanced 
when audiences are granted on the basis of financial or political clout, instead of the 
merits of the argument offered or the degree to which the lobbying party represents 
public constituents. Where the former occurs, lobbying harms government integrity. 
The latter demonstrates how lobbying can achieve the opposite. 
 (ii) Transparency and accountability  
Transparency and accountability are regularly discussed in tandem, given their 
relative proximity as principles of good governance. The exercise of public powers 
cannot be held accountable if the process by which they are determined is not made 
transparent.
73
 Governmental practice which adheres to the principles of accountability 
ensures that representatives are “held responsible for carrying out a defined set of 
                                                          
65
 Mark Evans “Beyond the Integrity Paradox: towards ‘good enough’ governance?” (2012) 33 Policy 
Stud J 97; Sam Agere Promoting Good Governance: Principles, Practices and Perspectives 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000) at 4. 
66
 Ved P Nanda “The ‘Good Governance’ Concept Revisited” (2006) 603 Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 
269 at 271. 
67
 Martin Doornbos “’Good Governance’: The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?” (2001) 37 J 
Dev Stud 93 at 95. 
68
 Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Shlosser and Leonardo Morlino International Encyclopaedia of Political 
Science (Sage Publications, 2011) “Governance, Good”. For the sake of balance, it should be noted that 
these characteristics form only the “liberal half” of good governance. Its counterpart – the “statist half” 
– includes authority, order, capability and autonomy. Christophe Béné and A Neiland From 
Participation to Governance (WorldFish, Malaysia, 2006) at 8. 
69
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976), art 25. 
70
 Henry J Steiner “Political Participation as a Human Right” (1988) 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 77 at 78. 
71
 John Graham, Bruce Amos & Tim Plumptre Policy Brief No 15: Principles for Good Governance in 
the 21
st
 Century (Institute on Governance, 2003) at 3. 
72
 Veerle Van Deoveren “Rethinking Good Governance” (2011) 13 Pub Integ 301 at 309. 
73
 Frank Bannister & Regina Connolly “The Trouble with Transparency: A Critical Review of 
Openness in e-Government” (2011) 3 Policy Internet 121 at 124.  
Regulating Lobbyists in New Zealand 
 
19 
 
duties or tasks, and for conforming with rules of standards applicable to their posts.”74 
Transparency is often used interchangeably with “openness”.75 The OECD defines it 
as referring to:
76
 
…an environment in which the objectives of policy, its legal, institutional and economic 
framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to monetary 
and financial policies, and the terms of agencies’ accountability, are provided to the 
public in a comprehensible, accessible and timely manner. 
In the absence of transparency in lobbying, the activity becomes “obscured and an 
environment is created where coercion and corruption can occur.” 77  Without this 
transparency, those government representatives who allow for the influence of harmful 
lobbying activity cannot be held to account.  
(iii) Impartiality 
Impartiality requires decision-makers to act with regard only to those facts which 
suitable for consideration in policy or law.
78
 It means that government representatives 
and institutions must be “unmoved by certain sorts of considerations – such as special 
relationships and personal preferences.” 79  The implications of this principle for 
unregulated lobbying is clear; those lobbyists who have developed relationships with 
decision-makers may secure favourable outcomes for reasons other than those which 
are strictly egalitarian in nature.  
(b) Identifying harm to governmental integrity 
It is no simple matter to ascertain the degree to which lobbying activities detrimentally 
affect governmental integrity. Much of it takes place behind closed doors. It is 
reasonable to assume that most instances of lobbying which fall on the less ethical end 
of the spectrum are less likely to see the light of day (particularly in those jurisdictions 
without relevant transparency legislation), which compounds the issue. Lobbyists have 
specialist knowledge about the workings of outwardly complicated decision making 
processes, which suggests that they might have the ability to manipulate democratic 
procedures for self-interested purposes. This can be concerning where the impact of 
lobbying activity alters the outcome of a process which diverts funding or attention 
from other, potentially more meritorious, causes. The difficulty lies in determining 
whether the lobbying activity had a material impact on the result.    
The OECD points to the amount of lobbying which took place around the United 
States Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) – and the way in which funds were 
subsequently distributed – as an accurate reflection of the dangerous power of 
lobbyists. The report refers to this as an example of how lobbyists can impact the 
outcome of decisions, even where these decisions are of a great deal of consequence. 
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TARP was originally intended to allocate an enormous $700 billion in expenditures to 
bailout the automotive and financial services sectors.
80
 These sectors spent $77 million 
in lobbying during the bailout program, and $37 million on campaign contributions 
during the 2008 Presidential Elections.
81
 In return, they received $295.2 billion in 
assistance, which is an investment return of 258,499%, if it is assumed that lobbying 
had a central role in this allocation. There is some data to suggest that this assumption 
is correct. Those companies which contributed most generously to lobbying and 
election campaigns were also those which received the highest amount of TARP 
investment.
82
 This correlation seems to indicate the prevalence of a “squeaky wheel 
gets the oil” approach to the distribution of asset relief, which has clear and dire 
implications for the notions of impartiality and inclusiveness.  
While this example bolstered the case for reform espoused by the OECD in its 
Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volumes 1 & 2, it does not make one 
specifically for the implementation of such regulations in New Zealand. Despite this, 
the information available on a number of high-profile instances of lobbying in New 
Zealand seem to paint a similar picture – if in a somewhat smaller magnitude – to that 
created by TARP fund distribution.  
(i) “SkyCity deal” 
In recent years, the so-called “SkyCity Deal”83 has thrust lobbying firmly into the 
public spotlight. The Gambling Act 2003 imposes a range of restrictions over the 
gambling industry, including the prohibition of any increase in opportunities for 
casino gambling.
84
 This imposed a restriction on the potential revenue earnings from 
SkyCity Entertainment Group’s gambling interests. SkyCity brought a series of 
unsuccessful cases before the courts to have these provisions interpreted favourably, 
either by reading exclusions into the Act or on the basis of ejusdem generis 
arguments.
85
 Having exhausted this avenue, the company began to lobby the National 
Party minority government following its success in the 2008 General Elections. 
The Crown eventually agreed to grant several concessions to gambling restrictions to 
SkyCity Entertainment Group in exchange for the construction and operation of the 
New Zealand International Convention Centre.
86
 The process by which this agreement 
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was reached was the subject of an inquiry by the Controller and Auditor-General, 
which was published in February 2013.
87
 The report gave the public a rare glimpse 
into the process by which lobbying can occur in New Zealand. It found that there was 
a “range of deficiencies in the advice that the Ministry provided and the steps that the 
officials and Ministers took leading up to that decision [to negotiate with SkyCity].”88 
The report concluded that there was “no evidence to suggest that the final decision to 
negotiate with SkyCity was influenced by any inappropriate considerations”,89 but the 
various concerns raised by the Auditor-General indicate that it is doubtful that the 
Government acted with integrity throughout the process.  
Crucially, the Report questioned the overall robustness of the negotiation process:
90
  
By the time it was expected that SkyCity would put a firm proposal to the Government for 
support, officials should have been working to understand and advise on the procedural 
obligations and principles that would need to govern the next steps. We found no evidence 
that officials were doing so at this stage. 
It is probable that SkyCity’s lobbying activity undermined the even-handedness of the 
expression of interest (EOI) process initiated by the Ministry of Economic 
Development in 2010. The EOI called for proposals to construct an international 
convention centre. The Auditor-General’s report found that SkyCity was “treated 
differently from the others during the evaluation”.91 Suspicions of a strong risk of bias 
going into the EOI process were confirmed when the Auditor-General’s office 
described the prior relationship that existed between SkyCity and the Prime Minister. 
It noted that no considerations were made to ensure the integrity of the tender process 
to offset the risks posed by the pre-existing relationship between the Government and 
SkyCity. One Treasury official remarked that to ensure the application of due process 
and probity, it “would require, at a minimum, an open and transparent assessment of 
other options”,92 but this recommendation was largely ignored. 
The language used by the Auditor-General is unambiguous. The impartiality of the 
process was undermined by the failure to manage the risks posed by SkyCity’s prior 
lobbying efforts. This criticism was magnified by the release of Treasury documents in 
August 2013, which showed that the Treasury doubted the economic benefits of the 
SkyCity tender outweighed the economic costs and social harm that were likely to 
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result.
93
 Further to the lack of impartiality cited in the report, the Office voiced 
concerns over the lack of transparency evident throughout interactions between the 
Government and SkyCity.
94
 By the measure of the principles impartiality and 
transparency, it is apparent that lobbying detrimentally affected the integrity of 
governmental decision-making processes in the determination of the New Zealand 
International Convention Centre agreement. 
(ii) The “Hobbit Law” 
In 2010, California-based film production studios Warner Brothers conducted a highly 
successful lobbying campaign, following conflict which arose between it and the New 
Zealand actors’ guild, New Zealand Actors Equity.  
Earlier that year, New Zealand Actors Equity had unsuccessfully tried to negotiate 
with production companies and directors to secure standard contracts for actors in 
local productions.
95
 New Zealand employment law makes a distinction between 
‘employees’ and ‘independent contractors’. The former receives a range of legislative 
benefits. Employees are protected from unfair dismissal, and are granted a range of 
entitlements, including sick leave, minimum wages and fair annual leave.
96
 
Independent contractors do not receive these benefits. Hypothetically, independent 
contractors are instead granted the right to “be free to choose the nature of their 
employment agreement”,97 and they receive a range of tax concessions and expenses 
rebates.
98
 Some argue that these benefits are negligible, which creates a contractual 
inequality.
99
 This problem is exacerbated by practices followed by the New Zealand 
acting industry, which is almost exclusively operated on an independent contractor 
basis.
100
 
Most crucially, independent contractors are prohibited from almost all forms of 
collective bargaining.
101
 Taking issue with this, and having failed to convince Warner 
Brothers to enter into negotiations, the International Federation of Actors issued an 
industry-wide notice, instructing its members “not to agree to act in the films until the 
company enters into a collective bargaining agreement.” 102  This move stifled the 
casting process for The Hobbit, delaying production work and hurting profits. The 
Hobbit director Sir Peter Jackson issued a press release in September. It mentioned 
that – if made necessary by the ongoing actors’ strike – the filming could be carried 
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out in another country. If this was to happen, Mr Jackson predicted a “long dry big 
budget movie drought in this country.”103 
Soon after this, Warner Brothers and Sir Peter Jackson lobbied Ministers Gerry 
Brownlee and Chris Finlayson directly. The meeting occurred in October 2010, and 
was presumably about seeking a solution to these issues. Soon after this, prominent 
Government MPs began to echo the concerns raised in Sir Jackson’s press release, 
citing the economic advantages that the production could bring to New Zealand.
104
 
The accepted line across Government members was that in the absence of an 
amendment, The Hobbit would go offshore.
105
 That this potential scenario was 
explicitly denied by Sir Peter Jackson weeks before its assent did not stop the 
Government from passing an amendment largely on that impetus.
106
 The Employment 
Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Bill (299-1) was passed into law on 29 
October 2010, flying through Parliament in two days under urgency powers. The 
Amendment declared that all persons engaged in film production work in any capacity 
are independent contractors for the purposes of the Employment Relations Act 
2000.
107
 
One of the key issues presented by the Hobbit Law process was a lack of 
inclusiveness. The Actors’ union, New Zealand Actors Equity and the International 
Federation of Actors aimed to secure access for actors to collective bargaining 
arrangements.
108
 An inclusive process would have involved consultation with these 
groups, the acting industry and the wider public. Instead, the Amendment was passed 
under urgency, which allows Parliament to pass legislation without the usual process 
of consultation and submissions.
109
   
There was a shroud of secrecy over much of the activities which surrounded the 
passage of the Amendment Bill. Media organisations and the Council of Trade Unions 
requested copies of all documents pertaining to deals made between the Government 
and Warner Brothers under the Official Information Act 1982.
110
 Limited disclosure 
resulted, which culminated in an investigation by the Ombudsmen.
111
 It found that 
ministers had failed to adhere to the provisions of the Act by deleting or failing to 
disclose information which was rightfully obtainable.
112
 The information request 
process, which took almost two years, involved two occasions where ministers 
cancelled meetings with the Ombudsman at the last moment. Repeated requests for 
information were denied on the basis that the investigation could “impede [the 
                                                          
103
 Peter Jackson “Statement regarding The Hobbit and claims by MEAA” (press release, 27 September 
2010). 
104
 (28 October 2010) 668 NZPD 14957. 
105
 (28 October 2010) 668 NZPD 15041. 
106
 New Zealand Actors Equity “NZ Actors Equity responds to new Hobbit information” (press release, 
27 April 2012).  
107
 Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Bill (299-1), cl 4. 
108
 A F Tyson “A Synopsis of the “Hobbit Dispute” (2011) 36 NZJER 6. 
109
 Bernard Walker and Rupert Tipples “Voiceless Actors: The Hobbit Affair and the Future of Unions” 
(presented at Voices at Work Australasian Meeting, Melborne, 21 July 2012). 
110
 Helen Kelly “The Hobbit Dispute” (12 April 2011) Scoop Independent News 
<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1104/S00081/helen-kelly-the-hobbit-dispute.htm#ftn>. 
111
 David McGee Requests for information regarding the production of The Hobbit and film production 
generally (Office of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman’s opinion 302561 & 302600, 31 January 2013). 
112
 David McGee Requests for information regarding the production of The Hobbit and film production 
generally (Office of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman’s opinion 302561 & 302600, 31 January 2013) at 
10. 
Regulating Lobbyists in New Zealand 
 
24 
 
Government’s] ability to conduct full free and frank negotiations in the future.”113 This 
result is quite clearly at odds with the good governance principle of transparency.  
In supporting the Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Bill, 
the Government freely admitted that it the main impetus for the change came from 
Warner Brothers.
114
 Despite this, it failed to adequately appreciate and compensate for 
the risks that this type of lobbying can have on the integrity of decision-making 
processes.  
(c) Lobbying and harm to governmental integrity – concluding remarks 
The SkyCity deal and the Hobbit Law do not reflect the mundane and largely 
beneficial daily interactions which take place between government representatives and 
third parties. That being said, these activities do establish that – at its worst – lobbying 
can detrimentally affect governmental integrity and thus has the potential to cause 
harm. 
2 Public confidence 
It is a much more difficult task to determine whether unregulated lobbying can 
detrimentally affect public confidence in government institutions and actors. In the 
absence of polling data or other direct samples of public perception, researchers are 
forced to turn to less certain indicators. Although they do not provide definitive 
evidence, this analysis considers three indicators of public sentiment in search for a 
more reliable foundation for the allegation that lobbying activity may decrease public 
confidence. The first indicator is the limited polling evidence available, most of which 
has been conducted with respect to public perception towards lobbying and the United 
States Congress, the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the European 
Commission.
115
 The second and third indicators consider expressions made by 
prominent news media outlets and public figures, where these expressions link failing 
democratic legitimacy and lobbying activity. 
(a) Polling 
Lobbying is common to all liberal democracies, many of which have witnessed strong 
public opposition to the practice. Although direct polling evidence in regards to 
lobbying and public confidence is not available in New Zealand, recent surveys have 
been conducted in other jurisdictions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the outcomes of these 
polls have consistently reflected a dismal view of lobbying activity held by members 
of the public.  
The most condemning result came from a Taylor Nelson Sofres opinion poll 
conducted in January 2013.
116
 Conducted at the behest of the European Union 
Citizens project, the poll found that over three-quarters of those surveyed thought 
lobbying can undermine public interest and that the practice should be regulated, and 
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70 per cent agreed that “it is widely known that lobbyists have a strong influence on 
European Union policy-making.”117 This demonstrates a strong link between public 
confidence and lobbying in the European Union countries studied. It should be noted 
that some key differences between the European Union and New Zealand contexts 
limit the usefulness of this study. The European Union is frequently characterised as 
being in a state of democratic deficit.
118
 This crisis of legitimacy is compounded by 
the fact that lobbying is an institutionalised process in the European Union. This is 
largely due to two factors. The first is that sheer scale of the European Union requires 
interested parties to form larger groups in order to succeed in their goals. The second 
is because the European Union’s growth of authority has necessitated the growth of 
lobbying activity to provide “information on complex regional economic issues”119 
The particularly potent combination in the European Union – a severe democratic 
deficit and institutionalised lobbying practices – has given rise to a virulent form of 
anti-lobbying sentiment.  
Similarly, a 2004 CBS News/New York Times poll found a majority of United States 
citizens believed that the government will do what is right only some of the time, and 
that “government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves.”120 Further to this, the annual Gallup Honesty/Ethics in Professions poll 
regularly features lobbyists amongst the least-trusted professions. In 2008, lobbyists 
rated as the single least trusted profession in the United States.
121
  
From these polls it is fair to infer that some kinds of lobbying activity can be 
detrimental to public confidence in government institutes and decision making 
processes. However, it is not immediately apparent whether this anti-lobbying 
sentiment is found only where lobbying has regularly been the cause and subject of 
controversy, or whether this harm is omnipresent in democracies, including in states 
such as New Zealand.  
(b) News media and public figures 
The news media has a strong influence on public awareness,
122
 but this relationship 
flows both ways. The news media selectively produce news items based on the degree 
of public interest they are likely to generate. Often, as one study demonstrated, “the 
role of the news media [is] one of reinforcement rather than change.”123 Regardless of 
which is true, it remains true that the perspectives given by news media generally run 
parallel to public opinion (or large demographics therein).  
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Given this relationship, it is illuminating to view the way in which lobbying activities 
are handled in the news. The coverage received by scandals is particularly telling. The 
SkyCity debate garnered massive news media attention. It was (and still is) 
characterised by criticisms of the decision-making processes involved, which were 
allegedly compromised by SkyCity’s lobbying activities. 124  Similarly negative 
responses towards the connection between lobbying and poor decision-making 
practices were produced by news media outlets following the Hobbit Law scandal.
125
 
Another example of this was the news media response to the WikiLeaks cables which 
showed that the United States Government lobbied New Zealand intensely on the 
widely criticised Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2005.
126
 
Despite representing only a small sample size of society, statements made by public 
figures can give some insight into public mood. Greenpeace made a public statement 
about allegations surrounding unethical lobbying practices of Energy Minister Simon 
Bridges in July 2013. It erected a 300 square-metre sign in central Wellington, which 
featured a poster of the Minister and the words “Simon Bridges Pants on Fire”.127 On 
April 9 the Minister introduced Supplementary Order Paper 205 to the Crown 
Minerals (Permitting and Crown Land) Bill (70-2). It introduced an “Anadarko 
amendment” 128  which limited the right to protest in New Zealand’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone. By using an SOP to amend the Bill, the Minister avoided making the 
matter subject to public debate and scrutiny. As two commentators noted, “the 
introduction of significant law changes by way of SOP bypasses the normal vetting 
processes and increases the risk of sloppy law-making.”129 Greenpeace believe that, 
contrary to statements made by the Minister before the House, Simon Bridges and 
Steven Joyce met with oil companies from 4 September 2012. It is alleged that on 
these occasions, the companies expressed “concern about protests at sea and what 
they call the Government’s ‘insufficient legal authority’”.130 If true, then it is possible 
that oil companies have contributed towards the development of policy which was 
passed without due process. This policy prescribes an explicit limitation on a number 
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of human rights, most notably for the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.
131
 
Greenpeace erected the billboard with the view that this potentially harmful lobbying 
activity would cause for concern the New Zealand public. If this anticipated audience 
exists, it is likely that a large number of New Zealanders share the view that lobbying 
can undermine trust in government decision-making processes. 
A notable authority of lobbying has also given a hesitant endorsement for the 
introduction of lobbyist regulations. Prominent public law expert Mai Chen believed 
that the SkyCity scandal demonstrated a need to increase transparency around 
lobbying activity, in order to cater for the “public’s expectation of transparency 
[which is] growing, for both government and business, especially in light of the 
Global Financial Crisis and the various high-profile misdemeanours of professionals 
and advisors.” 132  In addition to this, a number of the submissions made on the 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill expressed a general concern about lobbying practices in 
New Zealand.
133
 
(c) Lobbying and harm to public confidence – concluding remarks 
These sources and indicators of public opinion provide some evidence to suggest that 
lobbying is held in low regard by many New Zealand. Opposition is at its most 
vehement when it appears that governmental representatives have allowed the practice 
to strongly influence decision-making processes. This lends weight the OECD 
suggestion that lobbying can harm public confidence in governmental integrity. 
The significance of trust in government was compellingly espoused by John Locke his 
Second Treatise of Government, in which he stated “by breach of this trust 
[governments] forfeit the power the people had put into their hands… and it devolves 
to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the 
establishment of a new legislative.”134 There is a broad consensus in modern literature 
that “citizens must trust government if government is to work well and that a reputed 
decline in citizen trust of government bodes ill for many contemporary democratic 
society.”135 
If high-profile lobbying events are indeed detrimental to public confidence, then 
recent scandals have come at a particularly bad time. There are links between public 
trust and civic participation; a decline in the former is often reflected as a fall in the 
latter.
136
 In New Zealand, both local and general elections have seen voter turnouts 
drop to record-breaking lows in recent years.
137
 The 2011 General Elections saw 
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under three-quarters of eligible voters cast a ballot, which is the lowest turnout since 
1887.
138
 This number was around a mere 40% for local body elections which took 
place in 2013.
139
 If these trends are even slightly causally related to trust in 
governmental integrity, then it is possible that lobbying is compounding the problems 
caused by already low levels of public confidence. 
C Conclusions 
It is plain that lobbying activity is a desirable and contributory aspect of a functional 
democracy. It can bring legitimacy to decision-making process through the facilitation 
of participation, and helps to inform government representatives on areas of interest. 
However, it is also apparent that the OECD was correct in identifying a number of 
harms which lobbying can cause. In New Zealand, unregulated lobbying practices 
have come at a cost to government integrity and public trust in the integrity of 
decision-making processes. What remains is a need for regulations which discourage 
harmful instances of lobbying without otherwise impeding the wider practice.  
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III Lobbying and Extant Public Law Tools 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill was rejected by the select committee primarily due to a 
variety of perceived drafting deficiencies.
140
 However, the Chair of the Government 
and Administration Committee later explained that it was also because it was thought 
that existing measures were sufficient to regulate New Zealand’s “village” lobbying 
environment.
141
 It is beyond question that tools should only be added to the public law 
arsenal after careful consideration. It follows that new public law tools should be 
tailored to remedy a specific problem or area which is not already covered by 
available tools. If public law mechanisms exist which have some relevance to the 
issue at hand, an additional measure could become counterproductive by “blurring”142 
responsibilities (due to a lack of clarity between instruments) and by causing 
overlapping jurisdictional issues. Those laws that establish a monitoring or 
enforcement agency might also find that it is under-resourced, or that its allocation of 
funding comes at the consequence to the funding of neighbouring agencies.
143
 
On the other hand, the benefits of increased transparency and accountability through 
the proliferation of public law tools are not insignificant. Without freedom of 
information, citizens cannot hope to understand – let alone react to – government 
decision-making processes.
144
 Voters cannot “check or encourage what they were not 
permitted to see”. 145  Sufficiently armed with knowledge, however, citizens are 
enabled to meaningfully contribute to political dialogue. Transparency also 
discourages unethical or corrupt behaviour by ensuring that those who have 
committed transgressions are made publically accountable.
146
  
This chapter canvasses the current relevant laws and rules surrounding the lobbying 
activity in New Zealand in order to highlight areas where this may be lacking. To 
identify these gaps, it is first necessary to determine which concepts are addressed in 
lobbying legislation in other jurisdictions. In its first volume on Lobbyists, 
Government and Public Trust, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development outlined five requirements for a sound lobbying framework:
147
 
- Standards and rules that adequately address public concerns and conform to the socio-
political and legal context. 
- A legislation or regulation that suitably defines the actors and activities covered. 
- Standards and procedures for disclosing information that cover key aspects of lobbying 
such as its intent, beneficiaries and targets. 
- Enforceable standards of conduct for fostering a culture of integrity by, for instance, 
avoiding conflict of interest and providing accurate information. 
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- A coherent spectrum of strategies and practices that secure compliance with standards 
and rules. 
 
These requirements are not exhaustive, but they do provide a useful index for the 
purposes of this chapter. By referring to general objectives instead of prescribing 
model legislation, the OECD requirements for a sound lobbying framework can be 
incorporated into jurisdictions as respective governments see fit. This chapter uses 
these requirements as generalised descriptors of comprehensive approaches to 
lobbying regulation in order to determine whether any of these functions are already 
performed by existing laws and rules.  
If these requirements are already met by existing measures in New Zealand, further 
regulation may be unnecessary. If they are only partially met, proposed regulation 
must meet the unfilled requirements without interfering with the functions of existing 
measures. There are several measures – legislative and otherwise – which already 
apply to the conduct of lobbyists in New Zealand. When evaluated against the OECD 
requirements, the gaps in the current arrangement become evident. 
A Existing measures 
1 Crimes Act 1961 and corruption and bribery offences 
If we accept that lobbying is the act of “seeking to influence members of [the] 
legislature”,148 then the most explicitly unethical form of lobbying is outlawed by 
sections 102, 103 and 105 of the Crimes Act 1961.
149
 These sections deal with bribery 
directed towards Ministers of the Crown, members of Parliament and public officials, 
respectively. If one of these parties “corruptly accepts, or obtains, or agrees or offers 
to accept or attempts to obtain, any bribe for himself or herself or any other person in 
respect of any act done or omitted, or to be done or omitted, by him or her in his or 
her capacity”150 then they are guilty of corruption and bribery under the Act. A bribe 
is defined as “any money, valuable consideration, office, or employment, or any 
benefit, whether direct or indirect.”151 
In the unanimous 2011 Supreme Court ruling of Field v R, William Young J espoused 
two overlapping bases for the presumption that “it is simply wrong to accept money… 
in return for what has been done in an official capacity.”152 First, bribery creates an 
environment which tends to promote corruption.
153
 Second, the exchange of money 
for quid pro quo benefits distorts the decision-making process.
154
 It is clear that 
outright bribery is clear of the blurred line between ethical and unethical lobbying; for 
this reason it has earned a strong legislative response which enforces a blanket ban 
over bribery as a particular lobbying strategy. The nature of commonplace lobbying 
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interactions is much more subtle than out-and-out power-for-sale and thus is not 
regulated by the Crimes Act 1961. These provisions go much further than the 
recommendations of the OECD, but bribery is a particularly harmful form of lobbying 
and thus its criminalisation is rational. 
2 Electoral Act 1993 and political finance 
Political finance is an important tool for lobbyists. It allows them to use their clout – 
which is often financially derived – to influence the passage of legislation and the 
determination of governmental decision-making processes. Almost all established 
democracies have enacted some form of regulation to govern the system of political 
finance.
155
 Approaches vary. Some states endorse a public funding scheme (which 
forces parties to draw from a pre-allocated fund for certain activities), some make 
public subsidies available (which are allocated on a range of bases, but usually with 
the intention of creating an equal electioneering environment), others require funding 
returns to be made to an auditing body (typically to increase transparency), but most 
use a combination of one or more of these techniques.
156
 In New Zealand, the 
Electoral Act 1993 defines two broad ways in which lobbyists can use their funds or 
the funds of their clients in the pursuit of political power: election expenses (campaign 
contributions and advertisements) and donations (towards parties and candidates). 
The broad objective of political finance law is to increase political equality by 
reducing the degree to which wealth might unduly influence policy decisions. By 
taking meaningful steps towards reducing the disparity in political power between 
those who are wealthy and those who are not, governments ensure that political 
liberties “have real value to the people who have them.”157 
It seems patently unlikely that third parties would contribute such vast sums towards 
political coffers without hoping to reap some benefit. That said, care must be taken to 
distinguish this expectation from a description which is analogous to bribery. Third-
party political financing does not commonly produce situations whereby public 
powers are misused in exchange for private profit. The practice differs meaningfully 
from bribery in a number of crucial ways. Most essentially, there are no explicit quid 
pro quo conditions (such as an obligation for an MP to vote against a particular 
legislative proposal in exchange for cash) placed on the public official in question. 
Political funding is more appropriately viewed as a relationship building exercise. In 
this sense, the third-party contributes towards political coffers in the hope that it will 
give the group a greater deal of access to political actors at a later date. It is at this 
later date that the act of lobbying occurs. Prominent lobbying regulation academics 
William Luneburg and Thomas Susman dispute this distinction, pointing to the 
universality of reciprocity expectations and claiming that favours from lobbyists 
“have a tendency to increase access for the lobbyists or favourable consideration for 
legislative or executive action sought by them.”158 Though rather cynical, Luneburg 
and Susman’s argument appears to have merit. However, its strength is eroded by 
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another way in which political finance differs from bribery. Generally speaking, a 
significant donor will be known to the political recipient and thus the recipient will 
have a vague notion of the ways in which the donor would like to influence 
policymaking and decision-making processes. A bribe makes this notion explicit, 
because the benefactor typically asks for the exercise of a specific public power in 
exchange for the favour offered. 
The definitions of lobbying used towards the outset of this paper support the above 
points of distinction. For example, the Encyclopædia Britannica approach considers 
lobbying to be “any attempt by individuals or private interest groups to influence the 
decisions of government”.159 If the lobbyist does not make a request with respect to a 
government decision at the time it makes the donation then there is no possibility that 
their benefaction can achieve these aims. If follows that this action cannot rightly be 
seen as lobbying in its own right. Despite this, third-party political financing is still a 
part of the lobbying process – albeit a preliminary one – and as such is an appropriate 
area for analysis in the context of this paper. As with the other areas of law and 
convention canvassed in this chapter, this section assesses the interplay between 
political finance rules and lobbyists in New Zealand. 
(a) Political finance law in New Zealand 
Elections are important times for lobbyists. Candidates spend the run-up to elections 
consulting third parties for policy advice,
160
 and seeking indications of public 
sentiment from pressure groups (such as workers’ unions). 161  Lobbyists are 
intrinsically involved in each of these events, which provide them with privileged 
access to potential legislators. Electoral campaigns are extremely expensive, which 
allows lobbyists (and their clients) to offer essential financial assistance in the hope of 
cultivating a relationship with the party or candidate concerned. 
Election campaigns are often subject to expenditure caps and disclosure requirements 
for third-party election financiers. Such law is implemented to reduce the differences 
in advertising exposure – and the influence which it brings – between wealthy and 
less wealthy political contestants.
162
 From a rights perspective, this might at first seem 
contradictory; it seems incongruous that the right to freedom of expression (such as 
the use of advertisement time on a television channel) might rationally be limited in 
order to guarantee the free expression of the electorate. However, proponents of third-
party funding caps and disclosure regimes hold that “in a market-based society, 
virtually every form of communication involves some sort of monetary outlay.”163 
They argue that in order for fair elections to take place, the effects of economic 
inequality must be recognised and minimised.
164
 This principle is not without 
controversy and has been the subject of an enormous amount of academic discourse 
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and jurisprudence.
165
 The merits of these perspectives fall well outside the ambit of 
this paper. 
In 1986 the Royal Commission on the Electoral System published its report. The 
Commission recommended that the incoming electoral legislation include rules 
around political finance in order to address a range of concerns. It stated that although 
it is “desirable that those interested in the political process raise and spend money to 
further their political objectives”,166 wealth should not be used to prevent others from 
communicating their views, nor should it be used to disproportionate effect in 
securing the pursuit of certain political objectives, or put to “improper” use to distort 
political process.
167
 These recommendations culminated in a basic requirement that 
third-party advertising must be conducted in an accountable and authorised manner,
168
 
and that campaign expenses must not exceed certain caps.
169
 
In New Zealand, third-party financial backing has been the subject of intense debate, 
particularly since 2005. Of principal concern since that time is the ability of powerful 
and wealthy third-party interests to donate to candidates and parties, and to contribute 
towards electoral advertisement expenses.
170
 This debate led to the assent of the 
controversial Electoral Finance Act 2007, its subsequent repeal 14 months later, and 
the introduction of alternative rules under the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance 
Voting) Amendment Act 2010. 
Those lobbyists who are considering contributing to electoral campaigns must be 
aware of these provisions and the conditions stipulated within the current Electoral 
Act 1993. The two forms of contribution regulated by the Electoral Act 1993 pertain 
to election campaign expenditure and donations. The modern equivalents of the 
electoral finance provisions of the Act are much more detailed and arguably more 
onerous that their original counterparts. The Act now imposes limitations on election 
expenses, advertising costs and promoter expenditure. It also regulates party and 
candidate donations. These measures have implications for lobbyists, and as a 
corollary must also factor in to any discussion surrounding the development of further 
lobbying regulation. 
(i) Campaign expenditure 
Third-party campaign expense contributions were placed under close public scrutiny 
in the aftermath of the 2005 General Election. Perhaps the most notable instance of 
controversy with respect to expense contributions was that caused by the campaigning 
efforts of the Exclusive Brethren Church.
171
 Similar controversy arose with respect to 
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campaign contributions made by trade unions and the racing industry.
172
 Different 
degrees of regulation apply to third-party backers based on the amount of money 
contributed.  
All third party promoters must comply with a range of directives under the Electoral 
Act 1993. Third party promoters must register with the Electoral Commission if they 
intend to spend over $12,000 on election advertising in the three months leading up to 
a General Election. In 2011, the General Election and Referendum saw 21 promoters 
register.
173
 The register is publically available and includes the name of the promoter 
(often an organisation or corporation), address, persons authorised to make the 
application (where the promoter is not an individual), names of persons occupying 
positions similar to directorship where the promoter (where the promoter is not an 
individual or a company) and names of trustees (where the promoter is a trust).
174
 
In many cases contributors must include a promoter statement (including the funder’s 
name and address) and written authorisation from the recommended party or 
candidate.
175
  
Further to this, in the three month period prior to a general election, expenditure is 
capped with respect to both candidates and parties. Candidate expenditure is capped at 
$25,700 for a general election and $51,300 for by-election.
176
 Party expenditure is 
capped at $1,091,000, in addition to $25,700 for each electoral district contested by a 
candidate for the party.
177
 This is significant for lobbyists as it directly impacts the 
amount that third parties may spend on the campaigns of their targets. The cap of each 
group includes contributions made by candidates, party secretaries and registered 
promoters.
178
   
These provisions cover most of the characteristics outlined by the OECD as necessary 
for an effective lobbying regime.
179
 The transparency measures allow the public to 
gain some (admittedly superficial) understanding of some of the key aspects of the 
lobbying activity, thus partly meeting the criteria for “standards and procedures for 
disclosing information that covers key aspects of lobbying”. 180  The financial 
thresholds and relevant regulations are well-defined, and the Electoral Commission 
actively provides further clarity by delivering advice in response to queries about 
proper interpretation of the Electoral Act 1993.
181
 The Commission also is responsible 
for investigating alleged breaches, and for referring these on to the Police.
182
  
                                                          
172
 Andrew Geddis “Rethinking the Funding of New Zealand’s Election Campaigns” (2007) 3 Pol Q 3. 
173
 “Register of Promoters 2011 General Election and Referendum” (1 February 2013) New Zealand 
Electoral Commission <http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2011-general-
election/parties-candidates-and-promoters-2011-general-election-1>. 
174
 Electoral Act 1993, s 204L. 
175
 Electoral Act 1993, s 204E-H. 
176
 Electoral Act 1993, s 205C (1). 
177
 Electoral Act 1993, s 206C (1). 
178
 Electoral Act 1993, s 205A, 206A. 
179
 OECD Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 1: Increasing Transparency Through 
Legislation (OECD Publishing, 2009) at 11. 
180
 OECD Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 1: Increasing Transparency Through 
Legislation (OECD Publishing, 2009) at 11. 
181
 Mai Chen Public Law Toolbox (1st Edition, Lexisnexis, Wellington, 2012) at 141. 
182
 Electoral Act 1993, s 205P. 
Regulating Lobbyists in New Zealand 
 
35 
 
Two enforceable codes of conduct exist for lobbyists who contribute to election 
expenses: the Advertising Standards Authority Code of Ethics (pertaining to the 
honesty and accuracy of advertisements), and the Elections Programmes Code of 
Broadcasting Practice. The most directly relevant to “fostering a culture of 
integrity”183 is the latter, which prevents lobbyists from broadcasting denigrations and 
misleading programmes, and requires a distinction to be clearly made between factual 
information and opinion or advocacy.
184
 For the purposes of a lobbying code of 
conduct, a range of deficiencies exist. For example, it does not require the disclosure 
of any conflict of interest. Another obvious issue is that it only applies to advertising 
(as opposed to broader lobbying activities) and only where these advertisements 
concern general elections or by-elections for members of the House of 
Representatives. 
In short, the Electoral Act 1993 and its associated instruments provide moderate level 
of regulation over some types of lobbying activity. Of course, the foremost 
shortcomings are that these regulations only apply to the regulated period
185
 and only 
for those lobbying engagements where the lobbyist chooses to use campaign 
contributions as a mechanism to encourage favour. 
 (ii) Donations 
Those lobbyists who directly contribute to the coffers of a political party or candidate 
face year-round regulation under the Electoral Act 1993.
186
 This is again on the much-
debated ideal that “the particular uses to which ‘political’ money and resources are put 
should not themselves be unfair or likely to distort the proper working of a 
democracy.”187  
Without regulation, there is a greater potential for regular and damaging money-for-
policy transactions.
188
 The regulation of candidate expenditure in New Zealand dates 
back to 1895.
189
 Political donations have been under particularly hostile public 
scrutiny since 2005. In the intervening years it has become evident that, for almost all 
the major parties, “a large amount of ‘anonymous’ and ‘trust-funnelled’ money [has] 
poured into their coffers.
190
 A range of accusations have been made about the 
legitimacy of these donations.
191
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Donors are subject to similar rules governing those applying to third-party electoral 
campaign expenditure. Donations are subject to a sliding scale of scrutiny 
(predominantly on the basis of the dollar amount contributed) under the Electoral Act 
1993. Section 207(2) of the Act defines donations broadly, including cash, goods, or 
services of over $1,500 to parties and $300 to individual candidates.
192
 
Donations to parties can be made anonymously if they amount to less than $1,500.
193
 
There are a range of reasons why a donor might wish to keep his or her identity 
private, perhaps due to employment in the politically-neutral state sector, or some 
other occupation which requires a degree of political impartiality.
194
 Any donations 
exceeding this amount must be made by a donor who is identifiable by the recipient, 
or the amount in excess of $1,500 must be given to the Electoral Commission.
195
 It is 
unlikely that a lobbyist would wish for his or her identity to be hidden from the 
recipient of a donation, because anonymity omits any possibility of the donation 
generating relationship capital with its recipient. 
Overseas lobbyists are subject to requirements in the event that they wish to donate to 
a party or candidate. Those donors who live overseas and are not New Zealand 
citizens or registered electors, based overseas (for unincorporated bodies) or have 
been incorporated overseas (for bodies corporate) may not donate more than $1,500 to 
a candidate or party in any given year. In addition to this cap, overseas donations are 
subject to similar disclosure requirements to their domestic counterparts.
196
 
Details surrounding party donations totalling over $1,500 are submitted in annual 
returns to the Electoral Commission.
197
 This information includes particulars to 
identify contributors and donors.
198
   
Subpart 3 of the Electoral Act 1993 covers some of the criteria espoused by the 
OECD necessary to limit lobbying harms.
199
 It helps to identify the sources of 
heavyweight political donors, who presumably command more influence than lesser 
donors on account of their substantial financial power. By requiring the disclosure of 
contributors who make up a larger cumulative donation, the Electoral Act helps to 
ensure that sponsors cannot indirectly contribute in order to disguise their identities.
200
 
A Crown Law opinion to the Electoral Commission Chief Executive Helena Catt in 
2007 highlights the major failing in transparency surrounding lobbyists’ ability to 
donate to parties; namely, that the trust funds may legally be used to circumvent 
disclosure requirements, because “there is no requirement to identify the source of the 
trust’s funds.”201 As with rules around election expenses, the intent of the lobbying 
activity may remain shrouded. Those making political donations are not required to 
adhere to a code of conduct. 
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In addition to these issues, the definition of “donations” is narrower than the 
consideration given by lobbyists in some arrangements. While the Electoral Act 
considers donations to include money and assets, it does not incorporate other forms 
of incentives such as the offer of future opportunities (e.g. lobbying firms suggesting 
prospective employment opportunities to government representatives). It also does not 
compensate for concerns expressed about how lobbyists can influence decision-
makers purely by virtue of a pre-existing relationship between the parties, thus 
negating the need for any compensation on the part of the lobbyist. 
(b) Electoral Act 1993 conclusions 
In some ways, New Zealand’s current electoral finance regulatory framework is 
similar to the disclosure regime suggested under the Lobbying Disclosure Bill. Each 
instrument includes provisions which oblige third-party interests to disclose their 
identity in the interest of governmental integrity and public confidence.
202
 This is 
where the similarities end. Two strong distinctions emphasise this dissimilarity. The 
first is readily apparent; with the exception of annual political party donation returns, 
the provisions of the Electoral Act 1993 which pertain to campaign finance are only 
applicable during the regulated election period. The second difference is that – even in 
those situations where disclosure requirements are at their most severe under the 
Electoral Act 1993 – there is no robust mechanism to ensure that lobbyists adhere to a 
standard of ethics. 
3 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2011 and gifts 
There are a number of Standing Orders which govern aspects of lobbying activity in 
New Zealand. The Electoral Act 1993 deals with activity between lobbyists and 
candidates or parties, whereas Standing Orders deal with the lobbying activities which 
may have direct personal benefits for the targeted Member of the House.   
Members are obliged to file annual returns to the Registrar of Pecuniary and Other 
Specified Interests of Members of Parliament.
203
 These returns must include all gifts 
received by parties other than those from family members, whose total market value 
exceeds $500. “Gift” is intended to include hospitality.204 MPs must also divulge the 
details of any debts paid on their behalf that exceeded $500. These disclosures must 
include the name of the benefactor.
205
 
Additionally, MPs must also identify parties who contributed towards overseas 
travelling expenses (except when these have been contributed by the member, family, 
the Crown or other governmental organisations).
206
  
Amongst other obligations, MPs must disclose any form of employment income 
received outside of Parliament, the name of each company in which the member is a 
director or holds more than 5 per cent of voting rights, other pecuniary interests in 
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businesses and companies and the names of trusts for whom the MP is a beneficiary 
or trustee.
207
 While the true purpose of these rules is to avoid conflicts of interest for 
MPs, they also prevent lobbyists from using the outside interests of MPs as leverage. 
Some aspects of the Standing Orders appear to contribute towards the OECD 
principles for effective lobbying regulations. However, inefficiencies in the 
implementation of these rules mean that the Standing Orders only contribute towards 
the OECD principles in a cursory way. Gift-giving may also be distinguished from 
true lobbying activity, which means that those relevant Standing Orders would not 
necessarily have direct implications for potential lobbying legislation. 
(a) Regulatory strength 
The most evident difference between the OECD requirements and the Standing 
Orders is that the latter lacks legal enforceability.
208
 Where investigations indicate 
serious breaches the Registrar of Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament may 
report it to the House of Representatives.
209
 Minor breaches may be resolved by the 
Registrar requiring the member to amend his or her return. Neither of these provisions 
have serious repercussions beyond political consequences. As is the case with 
political donations, MPs have been caught out apparently using trusts to circumvent 
the identification of contributors.
210
  
At no point are gift-givers or recipients obliged to disclose the intention of the gift. 
This is despite the common feature of a reciprocity expectation in political gift-
giving;
211
 “studies have shown [that] the reciprocity rule is pervasive in human 
culture… despite their denials to the contrary, politicians are no less subject to its 
sovereignty than the rest of us.”212 This weakens the effectiveness of the transparency 
that would otherwise be available as a result of the Standing Orders. For example, in 
2011 Hon Hekia Parata (then-Minister of Energy and Resources) received free tickets 
to Rugby World Cup games from NZ Petroleum and Minerals, NZ Oil and Gas and 
international oil and gas company OMV.
213
 Without a provision to require disclosure 
of the benefactor’s intent, it is impossible to know what specific objectives these 
major fossil-fuel companies hoped to accomplish with the Minister of Energy and 
Resources. It is patently unlikely that these gifts affected Hon Hekia Parata’s 
impartiality or integrity. However, the receipt of gifts from major corporate players 
within the ambit of the Minister’s portfolio may appear untoward and thus damaging 
to public confidence in the integrity of governmental decision-making processes. Of 
course, a fundamental problem with this conceptualisation of political gift-giving is 
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that an obligation to disclose intent is essentially a self-incriminating admittance of 
bribery. Instead, gift-giving by lobbyists is more appropriately viewed as an attempt 
to build relationship capital as opposed to an exchange of public powers for private 
goods. This mirrors the approach adopted in earlier in this chapter with respect to 
campaign donations. It must suffice to surmise that while the lack of transparency 
surrounding the intent of gift-givers may be less than ideal, the alternative – 
disclosure – is unworkable. 
(b) Definitional issues 
Problems abound about the meaning of “gift”. For example, recent concerns have 
been raised as to whether a discount of over $500 received by an MP triggers a 
disclosure obligation. The Registrar advised that no disclosure was necessary, because 
the purchased item itself was not a gift to the member.
214
  
Another problematic provision of the Standing Orders relates to interest-rate 
negotiation on debts held by MPs.  Earlier rules required MPs to disclose details to 
identify debt arrangements where members had received a favourable interest rate (i.e. 
less than the market interest rate) in debts over $50,000. Following uncertainty about 
the application of these rules, the Standing Order Committee recommended an 
amendment to restrict the disclosure of these arrangements where the lender is a bank 
or other traditional lending institute.
215
 This was incorporated into the 2011 Standing 
Orders.
216
 One potential outcome of this could be that these excluded lenders could 
offer significantly advantageous rates to MPs with respect to debts such as mortgages 
without the need for incriminating disclosures. Banks conduct extensive lobbying 
activities and this particular avenue for influence is now unregulated. 
(c) Scope 
Further to these concerns, the disclosure of financial interests are only obligatory in 
relation to the passage of law; “if related to asking a question in the House, it would 
be optional… for an MP to declare a financial interest.”217 
Finally, the rules contained within the Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives cover only those members and committees which fall under its 
auspices. The harms of lobbying activity result from activity carried out all over the 
political hierarchy, including officials of ministries, thus severely limiting the 
Standing Orders from performing any major part in the regulation of lobbyists in New 
Zealand. 
(d) Conclusions 
The OECD recommendations used as a basic indicator of comprehensive lobbying 
regulations throughout this chapter include standards to address public concerns, 
legislation which adequately defines lobbying actors and activities, standards for 
disclosing key information about lobbying activity, enforceable codes of conduct and 
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strategies to secure compliance.
218
 Those Standing Orders that pertain to the 
pecuniary interests of MPs overlap slightly with these recommendations. The giving 
of gifts can be meaningfully distinguished from lobbying activity (as the former lacks 
the requisite request for reciprocation) but must be viewed as part of the lobbying 
process, and thus is an appropriate area for regulation. It is clear that the Standing 
Orders lack the scope and robustness of comprehensive lobbying legislation, but these 
provisions are compatible with, and would contribute towards, the development of 
such a law. 
4 The Official Information Act 1982 
The Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) is New Zealand’s most accessible 
transparency law. It empowers ordinary citizens with the ability to request almost any 
information held by governmental departments, Ministers for the Crown and some 
organisations.
219
 It is also the only current avenue by which most interested parties are 
able to discover information about lobbying activity directed at public office holders. 
As legislative instrument to enable public access to information held by government, 
the OIA is inherently incapable of fulfilling all of the various aspects of a lobbying 
regime. Of the OECD recommendations, it has the potential to fill two: those which 
pertain to standards and rules to address public concerns and conform to the socio-
political and legal context, and standards and procedures for disclosing information 
that covers key aspects of lobbying. A brief analysis of the merits of the OIA as a 
mechanism for lobbying transparency is warranted, as any potentially overlapping 
functions must be considered in the drafting of targeted lobbying legislation. 
(a) Analysis 
(i) Accessibility 
A fundamental distinction between the OIA and OECD-compliant lobbying 
legislation lies in the fact that the former does not specifically compile information 
about lobbying activity. The latter requires active disclosure by lobbyists, which 
increases the amount of information available to the public. This is in part because the 
breadth and scope of information covered by the Official Information Act 1982 is 
such that a compilation of all relevant materials is utterly unrealistic. Disclosed 
lobbyists and lobbying activity, by contrast, would be listed in a database, in both 
online and hard-copy formats.
220
 This fundamental distinction would be magnified at 
the information-seeker level, because successful information-seekers using the 
Official Information Act 1982 must be equipped with skills and comprehension above 
that expected from a searchable database. 
Under the Official Information Act 1982, information seekers must take care to define 
the scope of information sought. By necessity, requests must be sufficiently narrow. 
Without this requirement, requests could easily overburden the departments and 
offices subject to its provisions. It follows that requesters should have a working 
knowledge of the processes and demands of the OIA process. They must know to 
whom the request should be directed, the capacity in which the department, Minister 
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or organisation holds the information (for example, which portfolio should a Minister 
consider if he or she is asked for information). 
(ii) Exceptions 
Significantly, the information request can be refused on the basis of four classes of 
reasons enumerated by the Official Information Act 1982.
221
 Conclusive reasons for 
withholding information pertain to matters of national security, foreign affairs, justice, 
individual safety and economic stability.
222
 The less-robust “other reasons” for 
withholding official information encompass a diverse spread of themes including 
privacy, commercial interests, constitutional considerations, improper gain or 
advantage and prejudice to public health or economic wellbeing.
223
 These defences 
for non-disclosure can be problematic for inadequately drafted requests. This can be 
particularly true of requests made with respect to lobbying activity as it often touches 
on these themes. 
It is reasonable to assume that Section 18(f) might play a strong role in inhibiting the 
release of information about lobbying activity. It states that a request can be refused 
on the basis that the “information requested cannot be made available without 
substantial collation or research”.224 From the perspective of the information-gatherer, 
the standards imposed by most lobbying disclosure legislation are burdensome. Those 
interested in Canadian lobbying activity are directed by the Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying online database to search within a 12-month parameter.
225
 
An official information request of a similar nature would require an utterly 
unreasonable amount of collation, which would inevitably put the request foul of 
Section 18(f). The sheer number of lobbyists and the degree and variety of 
information required about them and their activities would be an insurmountable task 
for the office concerned.  
(iii) Errors and omissions  
Official information requests are regularly mishandled by the information-holder. 
This adds significant delay and uncertainty to the retrieval process. Section 28(3) of 
the Official Information Act 1982 empowers information seekers to request that the 
Ombudsmen investigate and review decisions made by information holders. The most 
recent annual report from the Office of the Ombudsman recorded 1,236 complaints 
made about official information requests.
226
 Administrative deficiencies were 
identified in 18% of all cases formally investigated. The Ombudsmen are an effective 
compliance tool, but it requires expertise which would not be necessary under a 
lobbying disclosure regime.  
(iv) Scope 
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As with the other instruments and laws studied as part of this analysis, the Official 
Information Act 1982 deals only with a specific category of lobbying, which 
dramatically minimises its use. It does not apply to lobbying activity where the target 
of the activity was an MP. Members’ diaries, correspondence and other materials 
which belong to an MP acting in that capacity are not considered to be official 
information.
227
 This means it is possible that “Ministers can also decline to provide 
information about meetings they have in their role as an MP, as opposed to in their 
role as Minister.”228 
(b) Requests for information about lobbying under the Official 
Information Act 1982 
Due to these fundamental differences between the two modes of information 
gathering, it is unlikely that the Official Information Act 1982 is capable of 
performing the same function as those described by the OECD. The results of two 
official information requests help to clarify the accuracy of this assertion.  
The Honourable Gerry Brownlee, Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, 
Earthquake Commission and Transport, and the Honourable John Banks, Associate 
Minister of Commerce and Education, and Minister for Regulatory Reform and Small 
Business received the following requests in July 2013. The content of the request was 
modelled closely on the requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill: 
Dear [Minister], 
I wish to test an assertion often made in opposition to the Lobbying Disclosure 
Bill; specifically, that a register of lobbyists is superfluous to the information 
already freely available under the Official Information Act 1982. 
In accordance with my objective, I would like to request all information held 
(including Ministerial Diaries) in relation to: 
All instances between 1-31 May 2013 where the Minister met or otherwise 
conversed with parties who engaged in lobbying activity. 
For the purposes of this request, “lobbying activity” should be considered to mean: 
Communication between the minister and any party (the lobbyist) who is 
paid to represent the views of any person, company, firm or organisation 
(the client), where the principle purpose of the communication was to 
convey the client party’s view on the state or development of: 
Any legislative proposal, Bill, Act, regulation, amendment, policy, 
programme, or the awarding of grants, funding, contracts, or any 
other financial benefit which falls under the auspices of the 
Government of New Zealand to allocate. 
For each instance of “lobbying activity”, I would like to know: 
- The name and business address of the lobbyist 
- The name and business address of the represented client 
- The subject matter(s) discussed 
                                                          
227
 Official Information Act 1982, s 2(1). 
228
 Gareth Richards “Lifting the Lid on Lobbying” NZLawyer Magazine (online ed, Auckland, 1 June 
2012). 
Regulating Lobbyists in New Zealand 
 
43 
 
- The name and business address of the client and any person or body that 
controls or directs the activities of the client and has a direct interest in the 
outcome of the activities undertaken on behalf of the client 
- Where the client is a company, the name and business address of each 
subsidiary of the company that has a direct interest in the outcome of the 
activities undertaken on behalf of the client 
- Where the client is a company that is a subsidiary of another company, the 
name and business address of that other company 
- Where the client is a coalition, the name and address of each person or 
body that is a member of that coalition 
- Particulars to identify the subject-matter in respect of which the lobbying 
activity was undertaken 
- Particulars to identify the communication technique used to communicate 
with a public office holder (e.g.: telephone conversation, internet 
conference etc.) 
 
I appreciate that this is a significant request, involving multiple parties, events and 
resources. I would be grateful for efforts made to provide the requested 
information. Please contact me if you have any queries. 
 (c) Results and evaluation 
The requests were made on 11 July 2013, and responses were received within the 20 
working days mandated by the Act. The window of time with which the lobbying 
official information requests were concerned was limited to a single month. This is a 
much smaller window of time than what would be available under a disclosure 
regime, but a request of a broader nature was more likely to be refused under Section 
18(f) of the Act. 
Unsurprisingly, the information requests yielded far less material than that which the 
OECD believes would ideally be available in order to “cover key aspects of lobbying 
such as its intent, beneficiaries and targets”.229 In total, two instances of lobbying 
activity were disclosed, and neither of these instances of lobbying activity were 
accompanied by the recommended degree of information. 
The Hon Gerry Brownlee rejected the request outright, citing section 18(f) of the 
Official Information Act 1982. The Minister explained that for each instance of 
potential lobbying activity, officials would need to determine the capacity in which 
the Minister attended and whether the instance qualifies as “lobbying activity” with 
reference to the Bill.
230
 
Both parties relied upon Section 18(g) of the Official Information Act 1982, which 
allows requests to be refused on the basis that the information is not held by the party 
who is the subject of the request, provided that the subject has no grounds for 
believing that the information is held by or more closely connected with another 
department, Minister, organisation or local authority.
231
 The Hon Gerry Brownlee 
specified “the names, addresses, the company names or their subsidiary or coalition 
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arrangements”232 as topics which his office did not retain information about. The Hon 
John Banks simply stated, “[m]ost of the information… requested is not held by this 
office”. Despite this, the latter Minister provided information about two instances of 
lobbying activity (from 10 and 15 of May 2013). The disclosed instances were 
accompanied by the name of the lobbyist, the name of the client, the date that the 
lobbying took place and the method of communication employed. The Hon John 
Banks also provided some particulars to identify the subject matter in respect of which 
the lobbying was undertaken (“discuss the Employment Relations Amendment Bill” 
and “small business”), but this was not comparable to common disclosure 
requirements in terms of the level of specificity given. 
B Conclusion – A case for an additional public law tool? 
It is clear that existing measures are not capable of meaningful or comprehensive 
utility as tools to regulate lobbying in New Zealand. This is in large part due to the 
fact that the available tools were not specifically designed to apply to lobbying. The 
practice is a broad and multifaceted attribute that is common to all democratic 
government. The determination of an effective regulatory response would demand a 
thorough analysis of the varied forms of lobbying. 
Existing legal and conventional mechanisms have failed to rein-in the damage caused 
by either of the harms identified in Chapter II, and do not appear to meet any of the 
basic functions of lobbying law such as those outlined by the OECD. There appears to 
be a sound basis for the introduction of some form of regulation. The following 
chapters critically appraise the various avenues open for regulation, considering how 
best to minimise the dual harms of unethical lobbying whilst legitimising and 
promoting lobbying activity as a valid and essential aspect of participatory 
governance. 
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PART TWO – REGULATING LOBBYISTS 
 
IV  Registering Lobbyists and Recording Lobbying Activity 
The modus operandi for states interested in increasing the transparency of lobbying is 
to implement a register of lobbyists. The scope of register legislation varies greatly. 
The register proposed in the Lobbying Disclosure Bill was its weakest point.
233
 It 
poorly defined the parties to which the law was to be subject and imposed an 
unnecessarily complex and hefty bureaucratic burden.
234
   
This part addresses the deficiencies in the register proposed in the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill. Three central issues are engaged. This chapter outlines the main 
characteristics of lobbyists’ registers and explains the concerns raised about the 
register contained in the Bill. Chapters V and VI propose more appropriate methods 
for defining “lobbyists” and those with whom lobbying activity should trigger 
registration obligations. Chapter VII considers the procedural burdens imposed by the 
register of the Bill and suggests alternatives which could achieve greater effect with 
reduced compliance costs. 
A Registers 
Common to all registers is the collection and publication of certain information. This 
information is gathered from registered lobbyists, and typically includes information 
to identify who they are, who they are lobbying for, the subject of the lobbying 
activity and which method of communication is being employed by the lobbyists. 
These registers are made publically available and searchable, mostly on the internet.  
In 1946, the United States Congress enacted the world’s first legislative scheme 
specifically designed to regulate lobbying. The genesis of lobbying regulation began 
with the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (FRLA), enacted by the United States 
Congress in 1946. Along with FRLA came a rudimentary lobbyists’ register, the first 
of its kind to be passed into law.
235
 Among its novel provisions was a stipulation that 
every person who receives compensation for efforts made to influence the status of 
legislation before Congress must:
236
 
register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate 
and shall give to those officers in writing and under oath, his name and business address, 
the name and business address of the person by whom he is employed, and in whose 
interest he appears or works, the duration of such employment, how much he is paid and 
is to receive, by whom he is paid or is to be paid, how much he is to be paid for expenses, 
and what expenses are to be included. 
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Though noble in intent, the first lobbyists’ register was fraught with weaknesses.237 
Many simply ignored the legislation; in 1991, of the 13,500 lobbyists listed in the 
Washington Representatives Phonebook, only 3,700 had registered.
238
  
Despite early difficulties, lobbying registers persist in the United States at both the 
federal and state level. Several parts of the United States, such as California,
239
 have 
imposed their own registers. The United States federal register is empowered by the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995.
240
 Canada also has a mandatory legislative register,
241
 
and a Bill currently before the Parliament of Ireland would be to a similar effect.
242
 
The European Union has a voluntary register,
243
 as does France
244
 and Germany.
245
 
Australia has a register, though it lacks a legislative foundation.
246
 Legislative 
registers exist in Poland
247
 and Austria,
248
 though these are in their infancy and thus 
have an array of deficiencies. Since 2005, eight countries have enacted lobbying 
registers.
249
 
B The register of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill 
The failed Lobbying Disclosure Bill intended to introduce a register as the mechanism 
by which it was to increase transparency in lobbying activities. Some elements of the 
register had significant shortcomings, which eventually formed the basis on which it 
was rejected. This section describes these criticisms, for which Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
offer a number of solutions.  
1 Definitional problems 
The Bill struggled to adequately define the terms “lobbyist” and “lobbying 
activity”. 250  These definitional issues presented challenges to the Bill’s efficacy, 
which is the focus of the present chapter. This definitional issue was compounded by 
alleged human rights limitations, which are discussed in Chapter X of this paper. 
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The Lobbying Disclosure Bill defined lobbyists as parties who, “for payment, on 
behalf of any person… communicate with any public office holder”251 with respect to 
a number of broad topics. Concerns were raised by the Attorney-General that 
“payment” could easily be construed in such a way as to make the definition 
untenably broad. It could include “people working for or owning shares in an 
incorporated farm or small business”,252 that decide to send a one-off email to their 
local MP. The Bill was strongly criticised for failing to exclude ordinary 
conversations between public officials and members of the public in its first reading
253
 
and throughout the select committee process.
254
 
The Bill included a number of pragmatic exceptions for persons acting in their official 
capacity. MPs, public service employees, local authority employees, diplomatic 
agents, consular officers and official representatives of foreign governments were 
granted an exemption from falling into the lobbyist category.
255
 Such exceptions are 
an obvious necessity. A failure to include them could impede open communication 
between government actors. These exceptions did not go far enough; the Government 
Administration Committee expressed concerns that parties such as the parliamentary 
services would still be captured by the Bill’s lobbyist definition, thus incurring 
unnecessary registration and disclosure requirements.
256
 A Supplementary Order 
Paper was proposed by Charles Chuavel, which attempted to provide an amended, 
exhaustive list of exemptions.
257
  
2 Public office holders 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill did not offer a satisfactory definition of who should be 
considered a “public office holder” for the purposes of the law. This definition is 
significant, as lobbying activity with a public office holder would incur registration 
requirements. Both lobbyists and their targets must understand their obligations under 
the law. Evidence of this difficulty can be seen in apparent contradictions within the 
Bill itself. Clause 3 claims that the purpose of the legislation is to “increase the 
transparency of decision making by executive government”.258 However, Clause 7(2) 
states that registration requirements are triggered where the targets are “public office 
holders”,259 who are defined in Clause 4 as:260 
Members of Parliament and any person employed in, or who works under a contract for 
services for, or who is working on secondment to, a member’s office and for the 
avoidance of doubt Includes a Minister of the Crown and any person employed or 
working in a Minister’s office. 
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The select committee submission made by public and employment law specialists 
Chen Palmer drew attention to another flaw in the Bill. They noted that 
communications with public service officials was not included as registerable activity 
under the bill. Due to the influence public service officials have with executive 
government, “the omission of communication with such officials by lobbyists would 
represent a significant ‘loophole’ for lobbyists, and may encourage the behaviour 
which the Bill aims to prevent.”261 
3 Registration and disclosure 
A number of submissions made on the Bill raised concerns about its universal 
approach to lobbying activity. The Bill, unlike some of its international counterparts, 
intended to charge all relevant lobbyists with the same registration and disclosure 
obligations.
262
 Some submitters felt that the Bill should vary the requirements 
expected of different lobbyists. Organisations including Amnesty International 
Aotearoa New Zealand, the New Zealand Disability Support Network and the Service 
and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota recommended that professional lobbyists 
should be subject to more onerous requirements than NGOs and trade unions.
263
 Two 
arguments were made in favour of this distinction: professional lobbyists are more 
deserving of intensive scrutiny than NGOs and not-for-profits with respect to 
lobbying activity due to their increase financial clout, and NGOs and not-for-profits 
lack the resources and expertise to ensure compliance with a lobbyists’ register. 
C Conclusion 
The faults of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill’s register do not negate the possibility of 
the implementation of a similar, more effective regime in New Zealand. Lobbyist 
registers are variable. Between jurisdictions, there are distinctions between which 
lobbyists and what types of activities incur registration requirements, and what degree 
of information these requirements entail.
264
 Registers must be tailored to reflect the 
nature of lobbying practices and the human rights instruments specific to the 
jurisdiction in which they operate. 
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V Who Must Register? Defining “Lobbyists” and “Lobbying 
Activity” 
A Introduction 
Lobbying registration requirements impose a notable burden on many of the actors in 
everyday political interaction. It follows that the regulations that apply must define the 
intended target of its provisions with specificity and clarity to allow for straight-
forward interpretation. Unfortunately, such legislation frequently falls short of 
achieving this objective. Furthermore, approaches taken in different jurisdictions have 
consistently struggled to create legislative definitions which cover the target lobbyists 
while also avoiding the capture of other types of lobbyists. 
As noted in Chapter I, the dictionary form of “lobbying” or “lobbyist” presents a 
much broader definition of the activity than that which is commonly treated by 
legislation and public perception. Given the variety of forms that lobbyists take – and 
the corresponding range of extents to which they might appropriately be required to 
register – it is unsurprising that there is little consistency between approaches to 
determining which lobbyists to regulate. A number of principles dictate the way in 
which the target of lobbying legislation is determined. Most evidently, the way that 
registerable lobbying is defined must effectively capture those lobbyists who 
participate in unethical or otherwise damaging lobbying activity. This requires 
drafters to be intimately familiar with the types of lobbying which occur within the 
jurisdiction concerned, and the different extents to which these require regulation. A 
register must place onuses which accurately reflect the context to which it is to be 
introduced. The scope of the definitional provisions must also be drafted with 
reference to the local legal framework. Registers should not require disclosure from 
lobbyists whose activities are already governed by another effective public law 
tool.
265
  
Clarity is possibly the most essential ingredient in the formulation of “lobbyist” for 
the purposes of the law. Non-lobbyists and those lobbyists who fall outside the ambit 
of the regulation must know that they are not subject to its provisions. Additionally, 
clarity is necessary in those states where delineations are made between different 
types of lobbyists (e.g. between in-house and consultant lobbyists). If poorly drafted, 
the practical application of these categories can cause confusion, or a fear that the 
lobbyist will improperly interpret the provisions of the register. One consequence of 
this scenario could be that lobbyists (or their clients) would refrain from lobbying in 
order to avoid the risk of incurring penalties for non-compliance. It is likely that this 
would mean a resultant drop in civic engagement and in the benefits which lobbying 
can provide.  
This chapter involves a comparative analysis of the relevant lobbyist register 
provisions from Canada, the United States and Australia. The Canadian Lobbying Act 
1985 served as the inspiration of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill and thus has a rightful 
place in this analysis. The United States has the oldest lobbying regulations in the 
world, and thus presumably has valuable insight to offer for similar attempts in New 
Zealand. The Australian register has a number of characteristics which make it 
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distinct from the other two states, which provides the analysis with a degree of 
contrast. 
This chapter suggests a number of alterations to the provisions suggested in the 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill. These suggested provisions could more clearly articulate 
criteria to identify which lobbyists and lobbying activities would fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Bill, thus avoiding the capture of unintended targets. 
B Defining “lobbying” – International approaches at a glance 
1 Federal lobbyists in Canada 
(a) Context 
The 2008 Lobbying Act amendments and associated regulations are the most recent in 
a string of regulatory developments in Canada which have spanned over two decades. 
Although 19 Private Members’ bills had been tabled in the House of Commons 
between 1969 and 1985 in an attempt to broach the issue,
266
 the first lobbying 
regulations were not passed into law until the Lobbyists Registration Act (LRA) in 
1989.
267
 It was passed as a result of a range of reforms introduced by the Progressive 
Conservatives Party, who won a convincing majority in the 1984 Federal Elections on 
the back of a strong anti-corruption line.
268
 
The LRA separated lobbyists into two tiers.
269
 Tier I lobbyists were those who:
270
 
… for payment and on behalf of a client, undertake to arrange a meeting with a public 
office holder or to communicate with a public office holder in an attempt to influence the 
development, making or amendment of any federal law, regulation, policy or program or 
the award of any federal monetary grant or the award of any federal contract. 
In short, Tier I lobbyists were those who were paid to conduct lobbying activities on 
behalf of a client. By contrast, a Tier II lobbyist was “an individual who, on behalf of 
an employer, communicates as a significant part of his or her duties with a public 
office holder in an attempt to influence the same type of activities as apply to a Tier I 
lobbyist”.271 The principal difference between the two is that Tier I lobbyists were paid 
to represent third parties, whereas Tier II lobbyists performed lobbying as a significant 
part of their duties to a single employer. 
Lobbying regulations in Canada have changed significantly since the implementation 
of the LRA, receiving significant amendments in 1997,
272
 2003,
273
 2004,
274
 2005,
275
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2006,
276
 and 2010.
277
 Present-day lobbying legislation in Canada – now known simply 
as the Lobbying Act to “reflect its broader scope”278 – has kept much of the original 
framework that it uses to identify and classify lobbyists. 
(b) Lobbying Act RSC 1985 c44  
The current Lobbying Act 1985 targets two categories of lobbyist: consultant 
lobbyists, and in-house lobbyists. Consultant lobbyists are those who are act on behalf 
of another person or organisation, who undertake to:
279
 
(a) communicate with a public office holder in respect of 
(i) the development of any legislative proposal by the Government of 
Canada or by a member of the Senate or the House of Commons, 
(ii) the introduction of any Bill or resolution in either House of 
Parliament or the passage, defeat or amendment of any Bill or 
resolution that is before either House of Parliament, 
(iii) the making or amendment of any regulation as defined in 
subsection 2(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 
(iv) the development or amendment of any policy or program of the 
Government of Canada, 
(v) the awarding of any grant, contribution or other financial benefit by 
or on behalf of Her Majesty in right of Canada, or 
(vi) the awarding of any contract by or on behalf of Her Majesty in 
right of Canada; or 
(b) arrange a meeting between a public office holder and any other person. 
Consultant lobbyists are targeted on an individual basis. By contrast, the Lobbying Act 
1985 requires the employer of in-house lobbyists to register, instead of the lobbyists 
who are in their employ. In-house registration requirements arise where:
280
 
(a) the corporation or organization employs one or more individuals any part of 
whose duties is to communicate with public office holders on behalf of the 
employer or, if the employer is a corporation, on behalf of any subsidiary of the 
employer or any corporation of which the employer is a subsidiary, in respect of 
(i) the development of any legislative proposal by the Government of 
Canada or by a member of the Senate or the House of Commons, 
(ii) the introduction of any Bill or resolution in either House of 
Parliament or the passage, defeat or amendment of any Bill or 
resolution that is before either House of Parliament, 
(iii) the making or amendment of any regulation as defined in 
subsection 2(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 
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(iv) the development or amendment of any policy or program of the 
Government of Canada, or 
(v) the awarding of any grant, contribution or other financial benefit by 
or on behalf of Her Majesty in right of Canada; and 
(b) those duties constitute a significant part of the duties of one employee or 
would constitute a significant part of the duties of one employee if they were 
performed by only one employee. 
Of course, “significant part” is an ambiguous phrase which required qualification. The 
Act obliges the Office of the Commissioner for Lobbying to develop and implement 
educational programs to ensure that the provisions of the Act are properly 
interpreted.
281
 The Office may issue “advisory opinions and interpretation bulletins 
with respect to the enforcement, interpretation or application”282 of the provisions of 
the Act. One such interpretation bulletin has been issued for the words “significant 
part”. It states that this threshold is met at “20% or more of overall duties.”283 The 
person responsible for filing registration returns on behalf of an organisation or 
corporation must determine whether, across the entire entity, the amount of lobbying 
conducted would amount to 20% of the duties of a single employee if they were 
treated cumulatively. Under the Lobbying Act 1985, lobbying includes time spent 
communicating with public office holders, researching, drafting, planning and 
compiling information for these instances of communication and travel time.
284
  
The Canadian Act also allows a number of exceptions to what might otherwise be 
considered “lobbying activity”, including: requests for information, time spent in 
respect to briefings to parliamentary committees, submissions made to public office 
holders with respect to the application, interpretation or enforcement of existing 
federal legislation
285
 and ordinary interaction with government inspectors and 
regulatory authorities.
286
 
2 Federal lobbyists in the United States. 
The United States introduced legislation to regulate lobbyists shortly after World War 
II.
287
 Since then, Congress has consistently increased the obligations of lobbyists to 
register and to disclose activities, and has broadened lobbying definitions to include a 
wide selection of lobbyists. The complexity of current lobbying requirements in the 
United States – enshrined in the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA)288 – reflects the 
significant concern that has been directed towards the practice for over fifty years.  
The general rule for registration prescribes that:
289
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No later than 45 days after a lobbyist first makes a lobbying contact or is employed or 
retained to make a lobbying contact, whichever is earlier, or on the first business day after 
such 45th day if the 45th day is not a business day, such lobbyist (or, as provided under 
paragraph (2), the organization employing such lobbyist), shall register with the Secretary 
of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
The LDA defines “lobbying contact” as “any oral or written communication to a 
[covered official] that is made on behalf of a client”290 with regard to the formulation, 
modification or adoption of legislation or policy, the administration or execution of 
policy or the nomination or confirmation of persons to the Senate.
291
 
The way in which the LDA distinguishes between non-lobbyists and lobbyists differs 
from the approach taken in its Canadian counterpart. All individuals must consider 
filing a registration upon the assumption of a paid lobbying role for someone other 
than him or herself. Accordingly, if an organisation with an in-house lobbyist needs to 
register, it must only do so once (as the lobbyist is only representing one client – the 
employer), whereas a consultant lobbyist’s activities may necessitate several 
registrations each quarter based on the amount of clients he or she has represented in 
that time.
292
 Potential lobbyists must consider three elements to determine whether 
they are obliged to register: number of lobbying contacts, time spent lobbying and 
expenditure or income received.  
The first threshold is met if the lobbyist makes more than one lobbying contact on 
behalf of his or her client. These instances of lobbying contact need not occur within 
the same quarterly period, but merely for the same client. The definition of “lobbying 
contact” in the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 has a number of explicit exceptions, 
including communications made by a public official operating in an official capacity, 
a church that is exempt from filing a Federal income tax return, those seeking 
information or to arrange an appointment, or parties required to communicate with 
public officials for a range of institutional reasons.
293
 
If the lobbying contact threshold is met, then it must be determined whether the 
lobbyist concerned used at least 20 per cent of his or her time working for the client 
conducting lobbying activity. In addition to lobbying contacts, lobbying activity 
includes “efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning 
activities, research and other background work”.294 The percentage spent on lobbying 
is calculated with reference to the total time spent working for the client; for a full-
time, in-house lobbyist who works a 40-hour week, this would work out to be an 
average of 8 hours a week. For a consultant lobbyist who billed a client for 200 hours, 
this threshold would be met if 40 hours of this work was spent on lobbying activity.  
If these two conditions are met, then insofar as the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 is 
concerned, the relevant party is a lobbyist. However, this lobbyist (or the organisation 
employing him or her) will only be required to register for the quarter if certain 
monetary boundaries are surpassed. For in-house lobbyists, registration is required if 
the organisation or corporation by which the lobbyist is employed expends in excess 
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of $12,500 on lobbying in that quarter.
295
 For consultant lobbyists, registration is 
necessary if income from the relevant client has or is expected to exceed $3,000. 
3 Federal lobbyists in Australia 
The Register of Lobbyists is the most recent attempt to regulate lobbying activity in 
Australia. In 1983 the Lobbying Registration scheme was established via executive 
order, but was abolished in 1996 for a range of reasons. These included the fact that 
the register was not made publically available, and only covered consultant 
lobbyists.
296
  
The current scheme was implemented on 1 May 2008 as part of the Lobbying Code of 
Conduct. Unlike its predecessor, it creates a publically-accessible register, but still 
only targets consultant lobbyists. As one author puts it, “[i]t is hard to see how a 
scheme that does not cover in-house lobbyists in the nation’s top companies and the 
advocacy staff of organised pressure groups can be said to regulate lobbying.”297  
A government representative is prohibited from knowingly engaging with lobbyists 
for the purposes of lobbying activity, unless the lobbyist concerned is on the Register 
of Lobbyists. The Code defines “lobbyist” as “any person, company or organisation 
who conducts lobbying activities on behalf of a third party client or whose employees 
conduct lobbying activities on behalf of a third party client”, 298  with exceptions 
including some not-for-profit organisations, personal representations and trade 
delegations. 
C Defining “lobbying” – What can we learn from other jurisdictions? 
A number of the elements contained in lobbyists’ registers from other jurisdictions 
may find useful implementation for the purposes of defining lobbying activity in New 
Zealand. These must be appraised with reference to the criteria expounded in the 
preceding chapter. The definition determined must effectively target potentially 
harmful lobbying activity whilst leaving legitimate lobbying practices unmolested.
299
 
All law should be easily discernible. For lobbying regulations – which can impose 
criminal sanctions and, as somewhat of a corollary, impact civic engagement – this is 
doubly true. All parties considering entering into communication with government 
representatives must know (or be capable of discovering) whether they are subject to 
registration and disclosure onuses.  
1 Different categories 
The Canadian model has three classes of lobbyist (consultant, organisations with in-
house lobbyists and corporations with in-house lobbyists). Despite drawing heavily 
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from the Act, the Lobbying Disclosure Bill made no distinction between these 
categories. Neither the Member responsible for the Bill nor its original sponsor made 
a public statement to explain this rationale.  
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to drafting different lobbyist 
designations in lobbyist registers. The disadvantage is that it necessitates further 
legislative interpretation to ensure compliance; in other words, the law becomes less 
clear and thus compliance costs increase. The Canadian Lobbying Act 1985 uses a 20 
per cent threshold as a means of determining which lobbyists fall within the in-house 
classification. Despite the fact that this has been the subject of a useful interpretation 
bulletin,
300
 concerns remain about the clarity of this aspect of the law. As one critic 
put it, “a company with 19 employees spending one per cent of their time on 
lobbying, would not have to register. However, if one of those same 19 employees 
were to spend 2 per cent of their time on lobbying, the company would fall within the 
20 per cent threshold”. 301  Calculating how much cumulative time staff spend on 
lobbying activity is a difficult task, and it is likely that an authority investigating 
compliance with this rule would find similar difficulties.  
Dividing lobbyists into different categories can also produce a series of benefits. For 
one, it allows for a more equitable distribution of bureaucratic burdens. It is arguable 
that consultant lobbyists have a greater tendency to produce harm than their in-house 
counterparts, largely due to the fact that they can represent multiple, hidden clients 
simultaneously (whereas an in-house lobbyist is clearly an advocate for his or her 
employer). Additionally, an in-house lobbyist might only spend 21 per cent of his or 
her time on lobbying activities, whereas a consultant lobbyist is dedicated to the task. 
Where regulations make the distinction, they can also impose different duties on each 
category. It seems manifestly unfair to impose onerous disclosure responsibilities on 
in-house lobbyists where less intensive measures are available, so this idea has some 
merit. 
By contrast, the Australian Commonwealth Government’s register does not apply to 
in-house lobbyists at all. Recent findings published in the Journal of Public Affairs 
appear to indicate that this approach fails to alleviate the dual harms that lobbying can 
present. The analysis used the Hired Guns methodology (originally devised by the 
Centre for Public Integrity), which evaluates the effectiveness of lobbying regulations 
against 48 questions and gives a mark out of 100 points.
302
 The Australian register 
scored 33 points, which is one of the lowest scores attained by any lobbying regime 
(beating only the European Parliament and Germany, who each employed registers 
which were merely voluntary at the time).
303
 This view has been echoed by former 
New South Wales liberal leader and prominent lobbyist Peter Collins, who claimed 
that a failure to capture in-house lobbyists meant that much of the related activity “is 
unregulated and invisible and constitutes the vast majority of ministerial diaries and 
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appointments and is where 95 per cent of lobbying happens.”304 This is a valid point. 
Many instances of harmful lobbying – such as the two instances discussed in Chapter 
II – are carried out by in-house lobbyists. 
An effective lobbyists’ register necessitates the inclusion of both in-house and 
consultant lobbyists. While a distinction between the two can help avoid unfair 
burdens on in-house lobbyists, the simplest solution would be to impose one rule for 
all types of lobbyists. 
2 “For payment” 
The inclusion of payment as an essential element of lobbying activity requiring 
registration is advisable. Forcing some unpaid lobbyists to register could detrimentally 
affect civic engagement by imposing procedural burdens on ordinary conversations 
between public officials and private constituents. For example, the distinction 
between paid and unpaid lobbyists makes explicit the intention to avoid capturing 
lobbyists such as individuals consulting with their MPs on personal matters. 
It must be conceded that the inclusion of the requirement for payment will allow some 
lobbyists to slip through the cracks; lobbyists may circumvent it by working on a pro 
bono basis for clients, and unscrupulous lobbyists might contrive to invent other 
methods for their clients to compensate them which fall outside of the legislative 
appreciation of “payment”. The latter may be circumscribed by drafting a legislative 
interpretation of payment as including money as well as any other valuable 
consideration, including contracts and agreements to make such a payment.
305
  
3 Lobbying contacts 
The United States’ Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 is unique in the sense that it only 
requires registration if the lobbyist carries out – or intends to carry out – more than one 
instance of lobbying activity. This provision can be used to eliminate a number of 
concerns held by detractors of lobbying registers. 
A common criticism of lobbying regulations is that they might capture chance run-ins 
between public officials and lobbyists, or one-off representations made by e-mail or in 
person.
306
 A well-crafted lobbying contact provision should include two elements. The 
first qualifies what type of premeditation should be necessary for communications to 
count as lobbying activity, and the second explains how regularly this must occur 
before registration duties are incurred. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill stated that communication would include that which is 
“not limited to communications in a formal of prearranged setting”.307 This wording is 
inadvisable. Lobbying activity should not include chance run-ins with public officials. 
This could cause constituents to be wary of approaching government officials in public 
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situations (including conferences and chance run-ins at supermarkets, for example).
308
 
Lobbying contact should be defined to include only pre-arranged meetings, targeted e-
mails (and other personal digital communications), phone calls and letters. A provision 
which makes this point explicitly would go some way to reducing a potential 
downturn in civic engagement. An exception to the general rule that lobbying activity 
only counts when it is pre-arranged might include instances where lobbyists arrive 
unannounced at the offices or homes of government representatives, which is 
reasonable given that in these instances it was the planned intention of the lobbyist to 
conduct lobbying activity. 
Registers should include both in-house and consultant lobbyists, who are paid to 
lobby. Registration duties should only be imposed where these lobbyists conduct 
lobbying activity which has a certain degree of premeditation or deliberateness. The 
Attorney-General indicated that the Bill should not capture “people who send a one-
off email to their Member of Parliament on behalf of their incorporated farm or small 
business regarding any government policy.”309 His statement is correct; it is likely that 
a requirement to fill out paperwork under threat of criminal sanctions would deter 
these types of communications, which are an essential element of civic engagement.  
This scenario necessitates a further provision with respect to lobbying contacts; 
namely, that registration requirements should only be incurred where lobbyists make a 
second lobbying contact within a certain period of time,
310
 or where a contract or 
retainer is agreed upon whereby the lobbyist will make multiple contacts. This allows 
the register to capture intensive lobbying efforts without detrimentally affecting the 
participatory efforts of ordinary constituents.  
4 Exemptions 
Each of the studied lobbyists’ registers permit that certain types of lobbying activity 
should not incur registration requirements. This is to allow government bodies to carry 
out their ordinary duties when carrying out intra-governmental communications, to 
prevent transparency where it is not suitable (including, for example, sensitive 
commercial negotiations) and also to facilitate input from third parties where 
mechanisms already exist to ensure a proper degree of transparency. 
The Supplementary Order Paper put forward by Charles Chuavel MP suggested an 
amendment to the Lobbying Disclosure Bill which would have broadened the list of 
parties that would not be identified as lobbyists to include (when acting in an official 
capacity): 
(b) any person employed by, or serving in, or working under a contract for services for, or 
working on secondment to— 
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(i) any department of the public service listed in Schedule 1 of the State Sector 
Act 1988: 
(ii) any Crown entity listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 of the Crown Entities 
Act 2004: 
(iii) the New Zealand Defence Force: 
(iv) the New Zealand Police: 
(v) the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service: 
(vi) the Parliamentary Counsel Office; or 
(vii) the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives: 
(viii) the Parliamentary Service: 
(ix) the Reserve Bank of New Zealand: 
(x) any Office of Parliament; 
In addition to this, the Bill provided exceptions for “any oral or written submission 
made to the House or any of its committees in proceedings that are a matter of public 
record” and “any communication which is restricted to a request for information”. 
This is commendable; however, the following Chapter recommends that the scope of 
potential legislation be increased to include public office holders that are not Members 
of Parliament. In keeping with this recommendation, the above exception for 
communications made that are already a matter of public record should be expanded to 
those instances which are similarly transparent that involve public office holders who 
are not part of the House of Representatives. 
D Conclusions 
Lobbying is difficult to define for legislative purposes. There is no perfect way to 
define lobbying activity or lobbyists. Definitional provisions must first ensure that 
they do not hamper legitimate lobbying activity before ensuring that harmful lobbying 
is captured by the register.  
Payment is an essential element of the definitional formulation, because it makes 
discernible the relationship between the lobbyist and the client directing his or her 
actions. Additionally, a provision which requires the performance or intention to 
perform multiple lobbying contacts would remove the possibility of chance run-ins or 
one-off contacts from falling under the ambit of the register, thus leaving constituents 
free to conduct minor lobbying activity before incurring registration responsibilities. 
Having one rule for all lobbyists – as opposed to creating different types of lobbying 
categories with different obligations – would ensure clarity. If this can be achieved 
without imposing undue bureaucratic burdens whilst also guaranteeing a moderate 
degree of transparency, then fears raised about a reduction in civic engagement by 
lobbyists may be somewhat mitigated. Chapter VII discusses the reporting 
requirements of lobbyists, and makes recommendations for how these could be kept to 
a minimum for all lobbyists whilst also ensuring transparency. 
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VI Public Office Holders – Who is Lobbied? 
A Introduction 
The second core element of lobbying disclosure legislation is the determination of 
individuals who might rightly be considered “lobbied” for the purpose of the law. 
Some approaches have been broadly encompassing, including Members of Parliament 
and a full range of public officials and offices, whilst others have specifically targeted 
Ministers and other “key” decision-making individuals. As with other elements of 
disclosure legislation, the balance must be struck between provisions which cover 
enough types of activities to meet the objectives of the law and the need for ethical 
lobbying activity to be fostered and legitimised, through clarity and manageable 
bureaucratic burdens. This chapter assesses the usefulness of the approaches adopted 
in the Lobbying Disclosure Bill and in other jurisdictions. It recommends that an 
exhaustive list of public office holders would be an appropriate strategy for the New 
Zealand context.  
B The Lobbying Disclosure Bill  
As noted earlier in this paper, the Lobbying Disclosure Bill covered only those 
communications which were made with Members of Parliament and their staff.
311
 This 
approach is problematic. Members of Parliament are generally expected to “toe the 
party line”,312 which restricts the extent to which they are able to freely influence 
Parliamentary proceedings.
313
 By contrast, public sector officials are expected to 
provide “free and frank”314 advice to Ministers, “without bias towards one political 
party or another.”315 It follows that public officials may take a broader range of factors 
(such as arguments put forward by lobbyists) into account when drafting influential 
advice to executive government.  
For this reason, lobbyists often target officials. This strategy has been confirmed by 
Chief Executive Officer of Business New Zealand and prominent lobbyist Phil 
O’Reilly.316 Law firm Chen Palmer raised this point while the Bill was in committee, 
claiming that “the omission of communication with such officials by lobbyists would 
represent a significant ‘loophole’ for lobbyists, and may encourage behaviour which 
the Bill aims to prevent.”317 The MP in charge of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill –Ms 
Holly Walker – admitted that “there's a very legitimate case to be made" for including 
lobbyists' meetings with officials, but the bill was "a place to start”.318 
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C Classifying public office holders – International approaches at a glance 
1 Canada 
Canada’s first attempt to enforce a modicum of transparency around lobbying cast a 
very wide net. The Lobbyists Registration Act 1988
319
 mandated registration for any 
lobbying activity where the target was “any officer or employee of Her Majesty in 
right of Canada and includes virtually everyone occupying a position in the federal 
government.”320 The modern Lobbying Act 1985 identifies members of the Senate and 
House of Commons (and respective staff), persons appointed to a position with 
approval of the Governor in Council of a Minister (other than Judges), and officers, 
directors and employees of federal boards, commissions or tribunals, members of the 
Canadian Armed Forces and members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
321
 
2 United States 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 takes a more prescriptive role in determining with 
whom lobbying is a registerable activity. It divides public office holders into two 
broad categories: covered executive branch officials
322
 and covered legislative branch 
officials.
323
  
Covered executive branch officials include: the President, Vice President, officers or 
employees of these positions or in levels I-V of the Executive Schedule, members of 
the uniformed services of certain pay grades and officers or employees who serve “in a 
position of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy-advocating 
character”.324 
Covered legislative branch officials include Members of Congress and elected officers 
of either House, associated staff, and any other legislative branch employee serving in 
a position described under the Ethics in Government Act 1978.
325
 The Ethics in 
Government Act 1978 prescribes “officer or employee of the Congress” as meaning all 
those employed in the legislative branch who are paid at least 120 per cent of the 
minimum rate payable for such positions.
326
 
3 Australia 
The Lobbying Code of Conduct describes “government representatives” as including: 
a Minister, a Parliamentary Secretary, a person employed or engaged by a Minister or a 
Parliamentary Secretary under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, an Agency 
Head or a person employed under the Public Service Act 1999, a person engaged as a 
contractor or consultant by an Australian Government agency whose staff are employed 
under the Public Service Act 1999 or a member of the Australian Defence Force. 
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The Code “does not encompass any other Members of the Legislative 
Assembly.”327 
D Public office holders – What can we learn from other jurisdictions?  
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill was unambitious in its attempt to regulate only those 
lobbying activities which were carried out with respect to Members of Parliament and 
their staff. This deficiency is highlighted by the existing regulations in Canada, the 
United States and Australia. All of the studied instruments included a much more 
broad definition of public office holder or government representative for the purposes 
of registerable activity. These instruments varied significantly, however, which points 
to the need for the relevant provisions to be tailored to the specific jurisdiction in 
which they are to be employed. 
The boundary between public officials with whom lobbying is a registerable activity 
and those with who it is not can become blurred. This is particularly true in cases 
where the law has expanded beyond senior or executive staff. In the United States, this 
blurring has been mitigated by the utilisation of pay-brackets as a means of identifying 
relevant public officials. This is understandable, given that there were over 2.65 
million executive branch employees in the United States after Barack Obama’s first 
year in the White House.
328
  
Due to New Zealand’s drastically smaller state sector, it is feasible that an exhaustive 
list could be drafted which specified which positions would fall under potential 
lobbying legislation. While outside the scope of this paper, it is imaginable that this 
list would be compiled via consultation with relevant public service actors and subject 
to change as positions are abolished or created. Where possible, an exhaustive list is 
preferable to one which is not. This is because an exhaustive list lends a greater deal of 
clarity for lobbyists, clients and public officials. The inclusion of Members of 
Parliament and their staff is certainly a good place for potential legislation to start. The 
provisions should not stop there. As a preliminary matter, the law should also cover 
senior and executive staff of Ministries and other departments of the public service as 
listed under Schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1988. These officials have significant 
clout in decision-making processes and are thus likely to be subject to intensive 
lobbying.  
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VII Registration and Disclosure Requirements 
A Introduction 
While it is clear that the target of lobbying legislation must be identified with 
precision, it is also essential that the disclosure requirements are tailored to meet the 
objectives of the legislation. A successful lobbyists’ register would be probing and 
effective, but it would also only impose such burdens which are necessary to achieve 
its objectives. It would not have a strong deterrent effect on lobbying activity, and it 
would also serve to legitimise lobbying insofar as public opinion is concerned.  
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill prohibited non-registered parties from conducting 
lobbying (activity as defined in the preceding chapter). To register, a lobbyist would 
have been required to submit his or her name, business address, the name and business 
address of any employer related to the lobbying activity and a description of the role 
that he or she performs for this employer.
329
 The Bill would also have required 
lobbyists to file a lobbying return upon registration, and one every three months 
thereafter.
330
 Lobbying returns would have included information to paint a clearer 
picture of lobbying activity undertaken by the registered party. The Bill required these 
to include information to identify the lobbyist’s client, the targeted public office 
holder, any controlling interests of the client, the communication technique employed, 
and the subject matter lobbying activity undertaken.
331
  
Effective registers tell the public a number of useful pieces of information. As a basic 
element, they state the identity of the lobbyist, and that of the client(s) paying him or 
her. The lobbyist’s identity must be known in order for there to be transparency with 
respect to the relationship between the public official and the lobbyist. The client’s 
identity must be disclosed so that potential conflicts of interest and – more generally – 
the overall perspective from which the lobbying activity stems can be determined.
332
 
To be effective, registers must also give information with respect to the subject on 
which public officials are lobbied. Without this information, the public is unable to do 
more than infer the purpose of the lobbying activity with reference to the identity of 
the client concerned. Other information should be required where it could increase the 
amount of relevant information available for the public to understand the nature of 
lobbying activities. These requirements, when fulfilled, constitute what the OECD 
referred to as “meaningful disclosure”.333 
In achieving efficacy, registers must avoid becoming a barrier to lobbying activity. As 
discussed in the preceding section, vague directions and burdensome onuses can 
dissuade lobbyists from engaging with government representatives. The costs and 
expertise required to comply with the stipulations of a register must also be kept to a 
minimum, otherwise these factors may deter potential lobbying activity. Finally, 
registers should avoid becoming invasive by unnecessarily requiring information, as 
this would discourage lobbying activity by lobbyists who seek some degree of 
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discretion. In short, a lobbyists’ register must shine a light on lobbying activity 
without altering the nature or frequency of ordinary lobbying. 
Those states that maintain a register of lobbyists usually require a lobbyist to sign up 
within a short period of time after a “trigger” event. The process by which the lobbyist 
registers differs between jurisdictions, but the process typically involves an initial 
return which is sent by the lobbyist to the responsible department (establishing the 
lobbyist in the register), followed by a series of returns over a given period of time 
which serve to update the information held about the lobbyist’s activity. The following 
analyses are based on this structure. For each jurisdiction, the process (or “trigger 
events”) of registration are described, followed by an analysis of disclosure 
requirements. This is then followed by recommendations for a register of lobbyists in 
New Zealand. It concludes that the disclosure requirements in the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill contained a number of flaws which could have prevented it from fully 
realising its objective. Modifications are suggested to rectify this issue. Additionally, 
this chapter makes recommendations to lessen the bureaucratic burden imposed by the 
registration requirements in the Lobbying Disclosure Bill, without compromising on 
the degree of transparency it could deliver.  
B Registration and disclosure requirements – International approaches at a 
glance 
1 Canada 
(a) Registration 
Under the Lobbying Act 1985, consultant lobbyists and in-house lobbyists are subject 
to registration and disclosure requirements of differing intensity.  
Consultant lobbyists must file a return if he or she “for payment, on behalf of any 
person or organisation, undertakes to… communicate with a public office holder”334 in 
respect of a range of subjects. Registration requirements are incurred for consultants 
on the outset of an “undertaking” to carry out lobbying activity. It is defined as “an 
agreement or contract, written or verbal, between a client and a consultant lobbyist, 
within the context of which the lobbyist will seek to communicate with public office 
holders on behalf of the client.”335 Historically, the Commissioner for Lobbying has 
taken an all-encompassing approach to these agreements, stating, “they may be very 
broad and can refer to a variety of lobbying activities or, alternatively, it may be more 
narrowly focussed.”336 A consultant lobbyist is responsible for filing his or her own 
registration return with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. This 
must be completed within 10 days of entering into an undertaking on behalf of a 
client.
337
 
For in-house lobbyists, the undertaking may be initiated by the lobbyist or the 
government.
338
 Registration duties for in-house lobbyists fall to the most senior officer 
                                                          
334
 Lobbying Act RSC 1985 c55, s 5(1) (emphasis added). 
335
 “Registration Requirements for Consultant Lobbyists” (1 July 2012) A Guide to Registration 
<https://ocl-cal.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00485.html#overview> 3. 
336
 “Registration Requirements for Consultant Lobbyists” (1 July 2012) A Guide to Registration 
<https://ocl-cal.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00485.html#overview> 3. 
337
 Lobbying Act RSC 1985 c55, s 5(1) (emphasis added). 
338
 John Banigan “Lobbying Law” CMA Magazine (Toronto, October 2005) at 46.  
Regulating Lobbyists in New Zealand 
 
64 
 
in the organisation or corporation.
339
 In-house lobbyists have much longer to make 
their initial returns, “not later than two months after the day on which the requirement 
to file a return first arises.”340 
(b) Disclosure 
There are a number of different returns which a lobbyist may be required to complete 
under the Lobbying Act 1985. Initial returns require the most substantial amount of 
information, and other returns must be made on an on-going basis. 
(i) Registration information for consultant lobbyists 
The initial return must include the name and business address of the lobbyist and the 
client, and any controlling interest of the client. If the client is a corporation, a range of 
disclosures must be made with respect to subsidiaries. If the client receives 
government funding, then the agency responsible for this allocation must be identified, 
in addition to the amount that is received. The return must include the subject-matter 
in respect of which the lobbyist intends to communicate about, including relevant 
legislative instruments and policies. The departments or government institutions that 
are to be lobbied must be identified. Communication methods must also be 
identified.
341
 
(ii) Registration information for in-house lobbyists 
In addition to the above requirements, officers filing on behalf of in-house lobbyists 
must also disclose a number of pieces of information about the lobbyist’s employer. 
The name and business address of the employer (regardless of whether it is a 
corporation or organisation) must be disclosed, in addition to a summary of the 
employer’s business activities. A list must also be compiled which includes the name 
of each employee who conducts lobbying activity as a significant part of their duties, 
in addition to a list of all senior officers who lobby in any capacity (without the 
requirement that this constitutes a “significant part”342). 
(iii) Monthly returns 
Once an initial return has been made, both in-house and consultant lobbyists must 
complete returns on a monthly basis. These serve to update the register on the 
activities on the lobbyist, and also provide further information about lobbying 
activities which concern key decision-makers. 
The monthly returns are crucial to the maintenance of an effective register. Initial 
returns are usually filed in anticipation of lobbying activity to be performed in the 
future; if this activity does not occur, or takes a different form, then the register must 
be updated. 
In addition to its function as a means to maintain the accuracy of the register, monthly 
reports provide disclosure about some types of lobbying activity. The reform which 
occurred in 2008 introduced a novel provision which enabled further scrutiny of 
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lobbying activity where the target is a key decision maker. Those decision makers – 
termed “Designated Public Office Holders” – include:343 
(a) a minister of the Crown or a minister of state and any person employed in his or her 
office who is appointed under subsection 128(1) of the Public Service Employment Act, 
(b) any other public office holder who, in a department within the meaning of paragraph 
(a), (a.1) or (d) of the definition “department” in section 2 of the Financial 
Administration Act, 
(i) occupies the senior executive position, whether by the title of deputy 
minister, chief executive officer or by some other title, or 
(ii) is an associate deputy minister or an assistant deputy minister or occupies a 
position of comparable rank 
The Governor in Council also has the power to designate other public office holders if 
he or she believes that this will advance the purposes and provisions of the Act.
344
 In 
monthly returns, lobbyists in Canada must identify the designated public office holder, 
the date on which communications took place, particulars to identify the subject-
matter of that instance of communication and any other information that is 
prescribed.
345
 
If the register remains accurate, and no contact is made with designated public office 
holders, then no monthly return is required. If no monthly return is made over a period 
of 6 months, then a return must be filed to confirm that no update is necessary. Status 
as a registered lobbyist is not terminated automatically; the lobbyist must inform the 
Commissioner of Lobbying if he or she wishes to discharge obligations incurred under 
the Act.
346
 
2 United States 
As noted in Chapter 5, the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 does not make a meaningful 
distinction between in-house and consultant lobbyists. Given this amalgamation it 
should not be surprising that both types of lobbyists are subject to the same 
registration and disclosure requirements. 
(a) Registration 
One of two events can trigger the requirement for lobbyists to register, once it is clear 
that lobbying constitutes 20 per cent of the individual’s workload, and that this 
lobbying has/will result in an income of $2,500 (for consultant lobbyists)
347
 or an 
expenditure of $10,000 (for “organizations whose employees engage in lobbying 
activities on its own behalf”).348 The first event which can trigger an obligation to 
register occurs when a lobbyist makes a second lobbying contact, and the other event 
is where the lobbyist is employed or retained to do so.
349
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The lobbying firm or organisation (or lobbyist, where he or she is self-employed) then 
has 45 days to file an LD-1DS form with the Secretary of the Senate.
350
 This three-
page document can be completed online, and is accompanied by comprehensive 
guidance provided by the United States House of Representatives and the Senate.
351
 
(b) Disclosure 
(i) Initial returns 
In many respects, the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 is similar to its Canadian 
counterpart in terms of the information which must be disclosed by lobbyists upon 
initial registration. It requires registrants to disclose information to identify lobbyists 
and clients and a description of the business activities of the client. General issue areas 
must be identified if they are to be the subject of lobbying activity.
352
 
Registration returns in the United States must also include particulars to identify 
persons or organisations who have contributed more than $5,000 toward lobbying 
activities, and which have a large degree of control or supervisory powers over the 
function of the lobbyist.
353
 Additionally, returns must “contain the name, address, 
principal place of business, amount of any contribution greater than $5,000 to the 
lobbying activities of the registrant, and approximate percentage of ownership in the 
client of any foreign entity”.354  
(ii) Semi-annual reports 
In addition to initial returns, registrants must complete and file reports within 45 days 
of the first day of January and July every year with the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives. As is the case with the monthly returns under 
the Canadian Lobbying Act 1985, the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 includes this 
requirement so that registrants’ details remain current and accurate. 
For lobbying firms, these semi-annual reports must also include a “good faith 
estimate”355 of the amount of income received during the semi-annual period from the 
client. For lobbyists who self-advocate (i.e. in-house lobbyists), the semi-annual 
reports must include “a good faith estimate of the total expenses that the registrant and 
its employees incurred in connection with lobbying activities”.356  
Again, the lobbyist remains registered (and thus responsible for filing returns) until a 
termination notification is given to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives.
357
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3 Australia 
The non-legislative Lobbying Code of Conduct obliges consultant lobbyists to register 
if they wish to communicate with government representatives. Returns are filed with 
the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and must 
include:
358
 
i. the business registration details, including trading names, of the lobbyist including, 
where the business is not a publicly listed company, the names of owners, partners or 
major shareholders, as applicable; 
ii. the names and positions of persons employed, contracted or otherwise engaged by the 
lobbyist to carry out lobbying activities; 
iii. whether a person referred to in clause 5.1(a)(ii) above is a former government 
representative (as defined in clause 3.3), and if so, the date the person became a former 
government representative; and 
iv. subject to clause 5.2, the names of clients on whose behalf the lobbyist conducts 
lobbying activities. 
The Code defines “government representative” as including ministers, parliamentary 
secretaries, persons employed or engaged by these parties under the Members of 
Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, agency heads, employees under the Public Service Act 
1999 and members of the Australian Defence Force.
359
 
C Registration and disclosure – What can we learn from other jurisdictions? 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the OECD espoused three core disclosure 
requirements necessary for the information contained in a lobbyists’ register to be 
meaningful.
360
 This information must enable viewers to identify the interest 
represented (i.e. the “client”), the object of the lobbying activity, and the government 
institutions being lobbied. These categories are “susceptible to expansion”, 361  but 
serve as a good starting-point for effective disclosure requirements. 
1 Minimum requirements 
When compared to its Canadian and United States counterparts, the disclosure 
requirements of the Australian Register of Lobbyists seem rudimentary. This 
perception is reinforced by reference to the afore-mentioned core disclosure 
requirements. The Australian register does not require lobbyists to disclose the object 
of their lobbying activity, nor the government institutions which are to be lobbied. 
This means that interested members of the public are merely left to speculate as to the 
activities of lobbyists around the Commonwealth Government. Given the generally 
low esteem in which lobbyists are held, it is unlikely that such speculation will lead to 
conclusions which engender a positive outlook on the effect that lobbyists have on 
decision-making processes. It is reasonable to conclude that the provisions of the 
Lobbying Code of Conduct are not useful for the purposes of potential disclosure 
requirements in New Zealand. 
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2 Disclosure of controlling interests 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill contained a number of Clauses which sought to make it 
more difficult for controlling interests to conceal their participation in lobbying 
activity. This has been a common feature of lobbying legislation across regulating 
jurisdictions.  
International legislation is yet to surmount a number of issues concerned with the 
proper identification of a lobbyist’s “client”. Returns commonly must include the 
name and business address of the client, and also the name and business address of, for 
example, “any person or organisation that, to the knowledge of the individual, controls 
or directs the activities of the client and has a direct interest in the outcome of the 
individual’s activities on behalf of the client.”362 This provision is open to two avenues 
of abuse. Firstly, the actual client of any given lobbying activity can enlist an 
intermediary to interact with the lobbyist, thus disguising its identity. Secondly, 
lobbyists can remain wilfully ignorant of the true identity of the client who has 
initiated the lobbying activity, seemingly avoiding the need to disclose the information 
that would otherwise be known to him or her. The Office for the Commissioner of 
Lobbying of Canada has identified a trend which seems to be the result of one – or 
both – of these loopholes. In 2011, it noted that:363  
Some consultant lobbyists are being 'sub-contracted' by lobbying firms to undertake 
lobbying activities and represent a specific client. Currently, the Act does not clearly 
indicate that lobbyists should disclose the actual interest they represent. Rather, it asks 
them to disclose the 'client' which could be interpreted as the consulting firm which has, 
in fact, hired the lobbyist. The Office has adopted the practice of requiring lobbyists, 
when listing a consulting firm as the client, to also indicate the actual client whose 
interests they are ultimately representing. 
In cases where the initiating client is a corporation or organisation, controlling 
interests are discernible through the identification of subsidiary status or shareholder 
ownership. This avenue was covered by the Lobbying Disclosure Bill, and it is 
recommended that this approach be adopted in future attempts to regulate lobbyists in 
New Zealand. 
3 Disclosure of income and expenditure 
The United States federal disclosure obligations are at the diametrically opposite end 
of the scale from those imposed by the Australian Code. The Lobbying Disclosure Act 
1995 imposes obligations which are the most comprehensive in the world.
364
 In 
addition to fulfilling the core requirements of the OECD, the LDA includes a number 
of requirements which go beyond the bare essentials of an effective lobbying regime.  
Most notably, the LDA requires lobbyists to disclose the income or expenditure (for 
consultant or self-representing lobbyists, respectively) pertaining to their registerable 
activities. This requirement has provided a great deal of insight into the overall 
expenditures of lobbying activity in the United States; for example, between 1998 and 
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2012, lobbying expenditure rose from $1.45 billion to $3.6 billion.
365
 The 
identification of this trend is undeniably important for policymakers, who must frame 
further lobbying law reform with respect to the pervasiveness of the practice. The 
provision enables the public to discover how much money is being spent by whom, 
and for what purpose. Presumably, this is to shine a light on the extent to which 
money can influence political decision-making. The value of this approach was 
reinforced by the results of the Troubled Asset Relief Program mentioned in Chapter 
II of this paper. The disclosure of lobbying expenditure meant that researchers were 
able to identify a strong relationship between the amounts that parties spent on 
lobbying and their resultant Troubled Asset Relief Program fund allocations in 2008. 
One paper found that “firms that lobbied or had other types of political connections of 
were not only more likely to receive TARP funds, they also received a greater amount 
of support earlier than firms that were not politically involved through lobbying”.366  
It is not clear whether a requirement to disclose lobbying expenditure would be useful 
in New Zealand. In New Zealand, lobbying is not conducted on a financial scale 
comparable to that seen in the United States. Additionally, the LDA requirement was 
implemented following decades of lobbying law reform, which allowed drafters to 
take stock of lobbying practices and regulatory impacts before deciding to add it to the 
list of disclosed information. Without an evident and pressing need for the disclosure 
of lobbying expenditure in New Zealand, drafters would be ill-advised to include a 
similar provision in any forthcoming legislation. As noted elsewhere in this paper, 
unnecessary disclosure requirements may be perceived as invasive, and could result in 
a decline in civic engagement and pose a threat to a number of human rights. 
4 Disclosure of lobbyists who are ex-public office holders 
Money is not the only currency which can have a distorting effect on political 
decision-making. Relationships are a key element of lobbying activity, given that the 
“experienced lobbyist learns that effectiveness and reputation depend in large part on 
an ability to cultivate and nurture long term relationships [with policy makers].”367 
There is a perception that “experience in government allows former officials to 
develop a network of friends and colleagues that they can later exploit on behalf of 
their clients.”368 
Former public office holders often have access to information about policy 
formulation and decision-making which other members of the public do not. This can 
result in an “undue advantage”,369 given that they potentially have access to items such 
as confidential information which gives them an edge over competing interests in the 
political sphere.  
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These advantages have led to a trend known as the “revolving door”370 phenomenon, 
whereby former public officials regularly take up lobbying roles after leaving 
employment in the public service. Recent studies have shown that these ex-officials 
are much more successful than other lobbyists in securing favourable outcomes.
371
 
This gives an impression of undue influence, and warrants disclosure. 
Despite this argument, the Lobbying Disclosure Bill did not include a provision to 
require lobbyists to disclose whether or not they have been a public office holder in 
the past. In the United States, lobbyists are obliged include this information in their 
initial registration returns if they have held one of the covered executive or legislative 
offices described in the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 in the last 20 years.
372
 A 
similar provision exists in the Canadian Lobbying Act 1985.
373
 If the Parliament of 
New Zealand moves to regulate lobbyists in the future, a provision of this nature 
should be considered. 
5 Disclosure of designated public office holder communications 
Theoretically, imposing additional reporting requirements on lobbyists who 
communicate with key decision-makers provides an increased degree of transparency 
over significant lobbying activity. Designated public office holders are those which 
command powerful influence and political decision-making capabilities. A provision 
to this effect has merit, but the Canadian equivalent has been criticised as burdensome 
and difficult to implement. 
As described, the Canadian approach requires reports to be submitted on a monthly 
basis for those lobbyists who carry out this form of lobbying activity. This is a heavy 
administrative burden. In addition to this, the monthly reporting requirement for 
designated public office holder interactions are used more widely for “consultants as a 
marketing tool”374 than they are for increasing the amount of information available to 
the public about lobbying activities. The potential merit of additional designated 
public office holder disclosure provisions must be measured against any extra burdens 
that this would place on registrants. The monthly reporting requirement imposed by 
the Lobbying Act 1985 is burdensome and does not necessarily increase the amount of 
information available on specific instances of lobbying, in large part due to the delay 
between the filing of the report and its later publication on the register.
375
 
As with other areas of lobbying legislation, a lack of clarity in drafting can have a 
detrimental effect on civic engagement.
376
 In Canada, an Interpretation Bulletin was 
published by the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying in 2009 which attempted to 
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remedy this issue.
377
 It gives a list of positions which are to be considered designated 
public office holders, but the list is incomplete. Lobbyists can request public office 
holders to disclose their income or salary bracket to give an indication of designated 
public office holder status, but as one lobbyist said, “I have yet to figure out how to 
slip that into the conversation without seeming rude.”378  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, additional disclosure requirements for lobbyists 
interacting with designated public office holders have merit. Lobbying regulation 
attempts to shine a light on decision-making processes, so it is logical that a greater 
degree of scrutiny should be given to those actors with a great deal of decision-making 
power. It is possible to modify the Canadian provisions to the New Zealand context in 
order to mitigate issues raised in the above criticisms. For example, New Zealand is 
comparatively small and thus it is feasible that an exhaustive list could be devised 
which included all positions which would fall under the designated public office 
holder classification. This would remove ambiguity. Such a list should include 
Ministers and their staff, members of certain committees and executive staff of 
Ministries and other public service bodies. Additionally, reducing the frequency with 
which lobbyists must file returns pertaining to lobbying activity with these officials 
would deal with the criticism that they impose an unfair administrative burden. 
D Suggested Provisions 
Chapter 5 surmised that, if possible, lobbying legislation in New Zealand should apply 
equally to all lobbyists who come under the ambit of the law. This would increase 
clarity and decrease the possibility of a downturn in civic engagement. However, this 
should only be attempted if these rules could achieve the transparency necessary for 
the law to be effective, without unduly burdening any party with bureaucratic burdens. 
Legislation that could achieve these aims should include the following elements. 
A lobbyist should be defined as someone who, for payment, communicates with a 
public office holder in relation to the development or status of Bills, legislation, 
amendments or policies, the awarding of financial benefits, or the awarding of 
contracts, or arranges a meeting between a public office holder and a third party. 
Public office holders should include Members of Parliament and senior and executive 
staff of the bodies listed under Schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1988.  
A lobbyist should register if he or she undertakes to carry out two instances of the 
afore-mentioned type of communication with a public office holder. To avoid doubt, 
these instances would include e-mails, phone calls, pre-arranged meetings, office 
drop-ins and any other situation where the lobbyist carries out lobbying 
communications in a premeditated manner.  
Registration would be achieved by the filing of a return with the lobbying authority, 
which must be received within one month of the commencement of the undertaking. It 
should include particulars to identify the lobbyist(s), and public offices held by the 
lobbyist within the past 10 years. It should also include particulars to identify the 
client, including – to the knowledge of the lobbyist – any controlling interests and 
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(where the client is a company) the name of subsidiaries, or companies who own a 
significant share of the client. The return should also include particulars to identify the 
subject matter of the communication, the methods used to communicate and the 
identity of the target of the lobbying activity. 
 
Returns should then be required every three months thereafter, except in situations 
where no lobbying activity was conducted in that time. If activity was conducted in 
accordance with the original registration, a return must be filed simply stating that the 
original return remains accurate. If activity is conducted in this time that differs from 
the original return, then the return should include information to rectify the register. If 
activity is conducted within the three months which involved contact with designated 
public office holders, then the return must include the name of this public official, and 
the date and subject of the communications which took place. Designated public office 
holders should include Ministers of the Crown, and executive staff of the bodies listed 
under Schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1988. 
E Conclusion 
The hypothetical provisions described above require lobbyists to complete a one or 
two page document every three months. In situations where lobbying was conducted 
in keeping with the original  return, lobbyists need only tick a single box when making 
a quarterly return. In situations where no lobbying was conducted in the relevant 
quarter, the lobbyist does not need to file a return at all. Amendments must be made to 
registers where lobbyists have conducted activity which is different than originally 
specified, which is clearly necessary in order to maintain the accuracy of the register.  
Where contact has occurred with a designated public office holder, the lobbyist must 
give additional details about this interaction. This is the most onerous component of 
these recommendations, but still only requires minimal record-keeping and some 
paperwork. The benefits of this are manifest. As mentioned earlier, designated public 
office holders are key-decision makers. It follows that designated public office holders 
are able to make decisions with limited oversight, which increases the need for 
transparency where these decisions may have been influenced by lobbying activity. 
Designated public office holder returns are included in quarterly returns, and must 
include the date, subject and target of the lobbying activity. This would provide 
greater transparency over instances of lobbying with key decision-makers, without 
imposing onerous reporting requirements such as the monthly designated public office 
holder reports required by the Canadian Act. 
The recommendations for reform contained in this conclusion arguably meet three of 
the five criteria for a sound lobbying framework, as espoused by the OECD. It defines 
actors and activities to be covered, introduces standards and procedures for disclosing 
information which covers key aspects of lobbying and these go some way to 
addressing public concerns. The following chapters deal with the two aspects which 
are thus-far unresolved; namely, enforceable standards of conduct and methods of 
ensuring compliance.  
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PART THREE – ENFORCEMENT  
As stated elsewhere in this paper, the OECD has espoused five requirements for a 
sound lobbying framework. Again, these are:
379
 
- Standards and rules that adequately address public concerns and conform to the socio-
political and legal context. 
- A legislation or regulation that suitably defines the actors and activities covered. 
- Standards and procedures for disclosing information that cover key aspects of lobbying 
such as its intent, beneficiaries and targets. 
- Enforceable standards of conduct for fostering a culture of integrity by, for instance, 
avoiding conflict of interest and providing accurate information. 
- A coherent spectrum of strategies and practices that secure compliance with standards 
and rules. 
Part II gives a response to the first three of these requirements. In order to achieve the 
latter two, any potential lobbying legislation in New Zealand must have an effective 
lobbying authority to oversee its administration, a code of conduct to which lobbyists 
are expected to adhere, and suitable sanctions to be imposed on those who do not 
comply with the register and its associated provisions. These three elements form the 
basis of the present Part, which is divided accordingly. It is first proposed that a new 
Office of Parliament should be established to perform the role of Lobbying Authority. 
A number of suggestions are given as to what form a potential Lobbying Code of 
Conduct should take. Finally, a range of sanctions are suggested to increase 
compliance with the proposed lobbying law which achieve this outcome without 
undue severity.  
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VIII  Lobbying Authority 
A Introduction 
The most superbly-drafted lobbying legislation will be ineffective in the absence of an 
appointed authority to oversee its administration. Lobbying is a multi-faceted, subtle 
and technical form of political activity, which means that lobbying legislation must 
provide for the establishment or appointment of an authority which can put its 
provisions into effect. Lobbying authorities have a number of common duties. These 
duties require the authority to act in a capacity which is entirely independent from 
those who are involved in lobbying activity; specifically, the authority must be 
insulated from the Executive and the Legislature. 
This chapter identifies a number of parties in New Zealand who could potentially 
fulfil the lobbying authority role, and assesses whether any of these appointments 
would be suitable. It concludes that an Officer of Parliament would be the best-placed 
to fill this role. It leaves the question open as to whether an existing officer could act 
as a lobbying authority, or whether lobbying legislation would necessitate the creation 
of an additional Office. This chapter argues in favour of the latter, but concedes that 
this proposition may not find popularity, given the nature of budgetary constraints.  
B Lobbying Disclosure Bill 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill proposed to increase the transparency of governmental 
decision-making by “establishing a Register of Lobbyists, which is administered by 
the [Controller and] Auditor-General”. 380  As part of this administrative duty, the 
Auditor-General was to be charged with establishing and maintaining a Register of 
Lobbyists that was made available in full to the public on a website (and in other 
manners and forms deemed appropriate).
381
 In addition to this, the Auditor-General 
was to be obliged to conduct an investigation into instances of lobbying activity where 
there is reason to believe that the Lobbying Code of Conduct has been breached.
382
 
Finally, the Bill was to give the Officer the power to “issue advisory opinions 
concerning the enforcement, interpretation or application of [the Bill].”383 
C Necessary characteristics of lobbying authorities 
Lobbying authorities must have certain characteristics if they are to be effective. Most 
crucially, they must be independent. Regulatory bodies should be independent of 
“each other, from executives (such as presidents and governors who may have 
appointment authority); from legislatures (who may have confirmation, policy, and 
oversight authority); from political parties, factions and interest groups… ancillary 
interests… and, of course, from those regulated”.384 This independence must stretch to 
cover all aspects of the authority’s existence. It should be granted autonomy and 
discretion in terms of how it achieves its objectives. The authority must be free from 
actual and perceived interference, which means that those responsible for position 
appointments and budgetary decisions must also be detached from the listed parties. 
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In short, the lobbying authority must be capable and willing to carry out probing and 
controversial investigations of high-ranking Ministers and public officials without fear 
or favour.  
Independence is clearly necessary for authorities charged with investigating 
governmental conduct. This necessity has been seemingly overlooked in a number of 
past and present regulating jurisdictions, which has been the cause of controversy and 
criticism. For example, the original lobbying law in Canada – the Lobbyists 
Registration Act 1989 – gave investigatory powers to the Ethics Counsellor, who 
reported to the Prime Minister. This ultimately meant that investigations were 
“subject to the direction of the government of the day.”385 Similarly, the Australian 
Code of Conduct is overseen by a government department (the Secretary of the 
Department of the Prime Minister of Cabinet).
386
 This has obvious implications for 
the impartiality of the enforcement of the Code. 
In modernity, the Canadian Lobbying Act 1985 is overseen by the Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying. The Commissioner is appointed by Parliament as an 
independent Agent of Parliament.
387
 In the United States, the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act 1995 is administered by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate.
388
 
These offices lack the independence of the Canadian commissioner, but their 
performance is audited by the Government Accountability Office as part of a wider 
annual review of the Act.
389
 This helps to ensure that the Clerk of the House and 
Secretary of the Senate carry out their respective duties with diligence and 
impartiality. 
D Officers of Parliament as lobbying authority candidates 
It was the intention of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill to give the supervisory function 
of the register to the Controller and Auditor-General. The Auditor-General is one of 
three Offices of Parliament. These Offices are rarely created, currently including only 
the Controller and Auditor-General, the Ombudsmen and the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment.
390
 The suitability of these Offices to act as a 
lobbying authority depends on a number of considerations. Firstly, are Offices of 
Parliament sufficiently independent? Secondly, are any of the existing Offices of 
Parliament capable of performing the functions of a lobbying authority? If not, is 
there a case to be made for the establishment of a fourth Office? 
1 The Officers of Parliament Committee 
A number of mechanisms exist to ensure that Offices of Parliament retain their 
independence from the legislature and the executive. These include the process by 
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which officers are appointed, their ability to conduct investigations at will and the 
way in which the respective budgets are allocated. 
The independence of the officers of Parliament from the Executive and Legislature is 
in large part due to the functions of the Officers of Parliament Committee. The 
creation of that Committee was recommended in a report by the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee in 1989 as part of a raft of reforms to government 
oversight.
391
 The Finance and Expenditure Committee had been instructed by the 
House to determine what measures could be taken to “put the Controller and Auditor-
General… on the same constitutional basis as the Officers of Parliament” and to 
“ensure the independent and effective discharge of their duties by the Officers of 
Parliament”.392 To achieve this, it recommended the creation of a new committee, one 
which would “both safeguard the impartial position of the Speaker and provide 
freedom from the Executive”.393 
As a select committee, the Officers of Parliament Committee was charged with a 
range of responsibilities pertaining to the operation of officers of Parliament. It is 
responsible for the Annual Votes of the Officers of Parliament, which gives it some 
degree of control over the budgetary parameters of the Offices. It is responsible for 
the appointment of Officers, and is consulted when a proposal arises for the creation 
of a new Office. The Officers of Parliament Committee is also required to arrange 
independent audits of the Offices, and scrutinise the way in which the Officers 
discharge their functions.
394
 In short, the Committee is responsible for the 
administration of the Offices of Parliament and for insulating them from political 
influence. For this arrangement to have integrity, the Officers of Parliament 
Committee must also be independent.  
The independence of the Committee is guaranteed through the way in which it is 
structured. The Officers of Parliament Committee is chaired by the Speaker.
395
 The 
Speaker is elected by a personal vote of the House, and is expected to act without 
prejudice (despite having been elected to the position as a Member of Parliament).
396
 
The 1989 Finance and Expenditure Committee also recommended that the Committee 
should be composed of three members from each side of the House, and that the 
government’s representatives should not also be members of the Executive.397 The 
current practice is that all parties are invited to take a role in the Committee.
398
 
Though merely a combination of conventions, the structure of the Officers of 
Parliament Committee is indispensable to the independence of the Offices it 
administers. However, in order to determine whether one such office could act as an 
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independent lobbying authority, it is necessary to determine whether the Committee 
has demonstrated an ability to discharge its functions independently and effectively.  
2 The appointment of officers 
Officers must have the full confidence of the House to act impartially and with 
competence. To achieve this, a stringent appointment process has been established. In 
2002, the Officers of Parliament Committee set out a procedure intended to “be a 
guide”399 for making appointments. It requires the Speaker to begin consultations with 
all parties represented in the House six months before a term of an existing Officer is 
due to end. 
Members of Parliament can put forward names for appointment, which are ultimately 
sorted through by the Committee with consultation with the responsible Government 
Minister (the Treasurer for an Auditor-General, the Minister of Justice for an 
Ombudsman, and the Minister of the Environment for a Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment). A proposal for the appointment of an Officer will not go before 
the House until it receives the unanimous support of the Committee members. In the 
event that a full quorum cannot be attained, the Speaker can consent to an 
appointment if it is seen as in the public interest and that the opposing parties 
represent a “small minority of the members of Parliament.”400 The Acts responsible 
for the creation of the three offices also impose rules over appointment processes. 
These include stipulations that candidates cannot be MPs or members of local 
authorities, and cannot hold other offices of trust or profit.
401
 
As is the case with the structure of the Committee, these processes are only as strong 
as the convention which underlies most of them. Despite this, Officer of Parliament 
framework is fairly robust and independent. It is unlikely that the functions of a 
lobbying authority would be limited by shortcomings in the processes involved in the 
appointment of Officers of Parliament. 
3 Funding 
Government departments present statements of intent at the outset of each year. These 
are presented to the House and include “detailed financial information on the 
department containing properly prepared forecast financial statements and statements 
of forecast service performance.”402 The process for Offices of Parliament is slightly 
different. The offices submit their draft statements to the Speaker. These are then 
considered by the Officers of Parliament Committee, who consider evidence from the 
Officers and from the Treasury. The Committee then provides comments to be taken 
into consideration before the final statements are drafted.
403
 Following this, the 
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statement is recommended for inclusion in a vote in an Appropriation Bill. By 
convention, the estimates given by the Committee are adopted by the House.
404
 
Funding is not always a simple matter for parliamentary offices. A notable example in 
2012 culminated in a desperate plea by the Chief Ombudsmen Beverly Wakem for an 
increase in funding for her office, to avert what she described as workload “crisis”.405 
Submitting to the Government Administration Committee, Ms Wakem noted that her 
office was established to process between 800 and 1,000 cases at any given time. 
Current complaints were around double this amount, which was affecting the ability 
of her office to operate effectively and – in one case – even coming to the serious 
detriment of the health of her staff.
406
 She asked for an increase of $1 million in 
addition to $8.6 million already granted to her office. She received $960,000 and a 
direction to employ six more investigators (having requested eight). It is likely that 
this will not meet the shortfall. During this time the Auditor-General and the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment each requested increases to their 
respective offices’ budgets, citing increasing workloads and difficulties in retaining 
experienced staff. The former had her request denied, whereas the latter was granted a 
small budgetary increase of $100,000.
407
 
4 The independence of Offices of Parliament 
To date it appears as though the Offices have operated with independence from the 
executive and legislature. This is despite the fact that most of the mechanisms 
supporting this system are merely conventional and thus lack the strength of 
legislation. The creation, appointment and performance of Offices have been 
unmolested since their inception. Funding can be problematic, but there is no reason 
to suggest that Offices have received insufficient funding as a result of lack of 
independence. In this respect, it is clear that Offices of Parliament are capable of 
acting as an independent lobbying authority. 
E Considering existing Offices of Parliament for a lobbying authority role 
1 Controller and Auditor-General 
The Controller and Auditor-General was originally to be given lobbying authority 
responsibilities under the Lobbying Disclosure Bill.
408
 The Office describes its 
purpose as “assurance work” that “improves the performance of, and the public’s trust 
in, the public sector.”409 However, its primary function is to establish whether public 
money is being spent appropriately,
410
 and its responsibilities only cover the public 
sector. 
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This position was reiterated by the Office of the Auditor-General’s submission to the 
Government Administration Committee on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill. Deputy 
Auditor-General Phillippa Smith raised two broad concerns with the proposal: that the 
role would be inconsistent with the Auditor-General’s constitutional position, and that 
it could not perform this function without a significant increase in resources.
411
  
As noted, the administration of lobbying legislation requires intimate knowledge of 
lobbying practices and expertise in terms of how the law is implemented. The roles 
that the Auditor-General’s office plays do not bear any relation to those expected of a 
lobbying authority, aside from the fact that each office has investigatory powers.
412
 
The similarities end there. Most significantly, a lobbying authority would have the 
power to enforce provisions of the law (such as the ability to strike non-compliant 
lobbyists from the register) which “is not consistent with the role of an auditor”.413 It 
would also be required to investigate alleged breaches committed by private citizens 
and the private sector, which is well outside of the ambit of the Office as drafted in 
the Public Audit Act 2001. The Auditor-General may only audit public entities
414
 or 
other entities if they exist for a public purpose and where they ought to be publically 
accountable.
415
 
The sheer dissimilarity between the roles makes the Office of the Controller and 
Auditor-General a poor choice for a lobbying authority. In the event that it was 
charged with these responsibilities, the Office believes it would require a significant 
increase in funding and more inquiry resources.
416
 Although possible, it seems 
counter-intuitive to pour funding and personnel into an Office which is ill-suited to 
the role if alternatives are available. 
2 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment can be ruled-out 
as a potential lobbying authority for patently obvious reasons. It was set up to 
“maintain or improve the quality of the environment by providing robust independent 
advice that influences decisions.”417 This clearly bears no relation to the role of a 
lobbying authority.
418
 
 
 
 
                                                          
411
 The Office of the Controller and Auditor-General “Submission on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill” at 
1. 
412
 Public Audit Act 2001, ss 14-19. 
413
 The Office of the Controller and Auditor-General “Submission on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill” at 
2. 
414
 Public Audit Act 2001, ss 14-18. 
415
 Public Audit Act 2001, s 19. 
416
 The Office of the Controller and Auditor-General “Submission on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill” at 
2. 
417
 “Values” (2010) New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
<http://www.pce.parliament.nz/about-us/>.  
418
 Additionally, the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment has only 17 staff, 
which is insufficient to perform its current functions in addition to those suggested by the Bill. 
Regulating Lobbyists in New Zealand 
 
80 
 
3 Ombudsman 
The Ombudsmen “enhance government accountability to the public”419 and provide 
“a safety net when something goes wrong in public administration.”420 A large portion 
of the Office’s work concerns the proper use of the Official Information Act 1982.421  
As is the case with the other two Offices, the Ombudsman was designed to deal with 
complaints against public agencies.
422
 This means that it is not particularly well-
placed to investigate breaches of lobbying regulations on the part of private third 
parties.  
There are significant administrative and financial burdens associated with the duties 
of a lobbying authority. If given to the Ombudsmen, these duties may overwhelm the 
Office. This is particularly true given the current workload which the Ombudsmen 
face. In its 2011/12 statement of intent, the Ombudsmen asked for an extension of 
additional funding to deal with a growing backlog of inquiries. This backlog has been 
particularly severe following the Christchurch earthquakes and the Pike River mining 
disaster.
423
 
There is no particular reason to recommend the Ombudsman as a suitable lobbying 
authority. The Office has investigatory functions and has the same level of 
independence as its counterparts, but has no particular expertise in lobbying or with 
private actors. If it was to assume the role it would require a significant increase in 
funding and a broadening of expertise. 
F Contemplating a Parliamentary Commissioner for Lobbying  
It is conceivable that another officer of Parliament could be created to fill the role of 
lobbying authority. As noted earlier, this approach was taken in Canada with the 
establishment of the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada in 2008 
(replacing the Registrar of Lobbyists). The creation of an Office is no small matter, 
however. The Finance and Expenditure Committee suggested that five criteria be 
considered during deliberations to determine whether an office should be created:
424
  
1.  An Officer of Parliament must only be created to provide a check on the arbitrary use 
of power by the Executive. 
2. An Officer of Parliament must only be discharging functions which the House of 
Representatives itself, if it so wished, might carry out. 
3. Parliament should consider creating an Officer of Parliament only rarely. 
4. That Parliament review from time to time the appropriateness of each Officer of 
Parliament’s status as an Officer of Parliament.  
5. That each Office of Parliament should be created in separate legislation principally 
devoted to that office. 
 
The Cabinet Manual stipulates that Ministers who are considering developing a bill to 
establish a new officer of Parliament must consult with the Committee at an early 
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stage.
425
 Although this is a clear direction, on one occasion the Committee was not 
consulted before a plan to create an Office reached bill form.
426
 Having received 
notification of the proposal, the Committee then deliberates on the matter and makes 
recommendations to the House.
427
 
As noted in the 1989 report, the creation of offices is a rare event. Only one office has 
been created since the inception of the Officers of Parliament Committee, and this 
was largely treated as a long-overdue amendment.
428
 Before the amendment was 
made, the Auditor-General was an Officer of the Crown, which was a “major statutory 
anomaly”429 recognised by all parties in the House at the time, given that it was 
required to independently audit on behalf of the public. For this reason there is little 
guidance available as to how the 1989 criteria for the creation of an office might be 
interpreted. 
One of the greatest deterrents for the creation of an additional Office of Parliament 
comes about as a result of budgetary constraints. While a full appraisal of the costs 
associated with the establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Lobbying is 
beyond the scope of this paper, some insight can be gleaned from the total budgetary 
expenditures for international equivalents. The 2013-14 estimates for the Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada is currently $4.42 million, involving 28 full-
time equivalent employees.
430
 To put this in perspective, the New Zealand 2013-14 
Vote Ombudsmen secured $10.17 million from the annual budget.
431
 It is submitted 
that the expense incurred for the establishment Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Lobbying is tolerable, in light of the fact that its establishment could increase 
government integrity and improve public confidence in government decision-making 
at a time where it appears that the latter is particularly low. 
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IX Enforcement: Codes of Conduct and Criminal Sanctions 
Included in the OECD’s recommendations for effective lobbying frameworks is a 
requirement for “enforceable standards of conduct for fostering a culture of integrity 
by, for instance, avoiding conflict of interest and providing accurate information” and 
a “coherent spectrum of strategies and practices that secure compliance with standards 
and rules.”432 These typically take form as non-legislative and legislative measures. 
A Code of conduct  
Codes of conduct are a useful non-legislative means of contributing towards the 
objectives of lobbying legislation. They encourage ethical lobbying practices in 
accordance with a number of core values. In theory, codes can simultaneously help to 
ensure reputable lobbying activity whilst also reassuring the public that efforts are 
being made to achieve this. The Lobbying Disclosure Bill would have required the 
Auditor-General to develop a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, which would have 
espoused the behavioural expectations required of lobbyists and a provision to 
suspend or remove lobbyists from the Register of Lobbyists as a consequence of non-
compliance.
433
 
1 Self-regulation 
In most countries, the lobbying profession enforces some degree of self-regulation, 
which often includes the imposition code of conduct. For example, the Public 
Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) employs a Code of Ethics to regulate 
client-practitioner relations and to impose obligations in relation to the public.
434
 In 
the United Kingdom, the Public Affairs Council (UKPAC) performs a similar role, 
and has also implemented a register since June 2012.
435
 The International Public 
Relations Association has a number of codes which relate to the conduct of its 
members.
436
 
These attempts to self-regulate are commendable. Unfortunately, self-regulation 
naturally precludes independent oversight and enforcement, which are necessary 
elements of a lobbying framework that is capable of simultaneously increasing 
governmental integrity and enhancing public confidence. Perhaps the biggest problem 
with self-regulatory codes of conduct is that they are voluntary and difficult to 
enforce; “even if [lobbyists] do choose to subscribe to such a code and subsequently 
are found to have acted contrary to its provisions, they may be required to leave the 
relevant representative body but can still then continue to practice.”437 Expulsion is a 
weak form of enforceability and in some cases it may even be counterproductive as 
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some lobbyists find increasing popularity with potential clients as their infamy 
rises.
438
 
2 Principles and rules 
There are few differences between the content of state-mandated codes of conduct and 
their industry-enforced counterparts. Similar values resound throughout international 
variants. 
(a) International Public Relations Association Code of Conduct 
The majority of domestic public relations associations derive their codes of conduct 
from the one employed by the International Public Relations Association. Containing 
eighteen provisions, those of relevance to lobbying legislation are those which pertain 
to integrity, dialogue, transparency, conflict of interest, confidentiality, accuracy of 
information provided, and the avoidance of falsehood and deception, financial 
inducement (bribery) or improper influence (threats and aggressive behaviour).
439
 
(b) Canadian Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct 
The Canadian Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct consists of a set of principles, and a 
number of derived rules. It requires lobbyists to act with integrity, honesty, openness 
and professionalism. It has three categories of rules: those pertaining to transparency, 
confidentially and conflict of interests. The first ensures that lobbyists convey 
accurate information and disclose their true identity and the identity of their clients.
440
 
It also imposes an obligation for lobbyists to divulge their obligations to the public 
office holder (with respect to the Code and the Lobbying Act). The second requires 
lobbyists to respect confidentiality and to not use insider information to the 
disadvantage of their client.
441
 The final category of rules requires lobbyists to avoid 
conflicts of interests, to disclose them when they arise, and to not attempt to exert 
improper influence over public office holders.
442
 
(c) Australian Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct 
The Australian code prescribes a number of rules with respect to “principles of 
engagement with Government representatives.” 443  These principles are broadly 
similar to those contained within the Canadian code. They require lobbyists to be 
truthful and accurate with information given to Government representatives,
444
 and to 
disclose relevant identities and their obligations under the Code.
445
 In addition to this, 
the Australian code contains a broad provision prohibiting lobbyists from acting 
corruptly, dishonestly or illegally.
446
 The Australian code also includes a novel clause 
which requires lobbyists to abstain from making “misleading, exaggerated or 
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extravagant claims about… the nature or extent of their access to Government 
representatives”.447 
(d) European Commission Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives 
The rules of the Commission’s code are typical of the other lobbyist codes mentioned 
above. It includes seven rules, including requirements that the lobbyist be truthful and 
transparent, and to respect confidentiality requirements.
448
 The only meaningful 
contribution that the Commission’s code makes to this comparison is Rule 6, which 
instructs lobbyists to “not induce EU staff to contravene rules and standards of 
behaviour applicable to them”.449 
(e) Principles and rules – evaluation of international standards 
Values pertaining to truthfulness and transparency in lobbying codes of conduct are 
omnipresent for good reason. These should be included in a New Zealand equivalent 
to ensure that public officials know with whom they are dealing, and that the 
information they are being given is accurate. A clause prohibiting improper influence 
is also advisable; lobbyists cannot ethically resort to methods such as bribery, 
extortion or blackmail to achieve their ends. A requirement for lobbyists to disclose 
their obligations under the relevant law and codes and to inform public office holders 
of their status therein firmly places with the lobbyist the requirement to monitor his or 
her compliance with the relevant instruments. This would help to avoid situations 
whereby public officials feel that they need to provide compliance guidance, which 
can lead to a number of complications. In Canada, this trend has produced over-
reporting and the presentation to lobbyists of an “unattractive dialectic choice – 
disagree with the [public office holder’s] interpretation and risk not meeting with the 
MP, or acquiesce to their requests despite the fact that they are not grounded in the 
law or regulations.” 450 
Finally, the Australian provision stipulating a prohibition on the exaggeration of 
influence between lobbyists and their targets touches on a broader topic which could 
benefit from some attention in a code of conduct. One of the consistent themes of this 
paper – and of lobbying commentary generally – is about the relationship between 
lobbying and public confidence. The Australian provision goes some way to 
discouraging behaviour which would damage public confidence in government 
integrity. It is arguable that this provision, though well-intentioned, is not broad 
enough. Instead, more general provision prohibiting conduct which would bring the 
government or the lobbying industry into disrepute would be well-suited to 
contributing towards the achievement of the goals of lobbying legislation. 
3 Enforcement of codes of conduct 
Regulating jurisdictions must balance the need for effective and robust standards 
while also having regard for the possibility that unduly strict rules may not cater for 
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the realities of the industry, and could deter civic engagement for fear of harsh 
punishment. Enforcement provisions for codes of conduct are useful because they 
allow for the implementation of “soft” sanctions for lobbyists who have engaged in 
unethical lobbying activity, as opposed to a default criminal penalty. In any event, 
most codes of conduct are non-legislative, which naturally constrains the methods of 
enforcement open to the lobbying authority charged with administration. The 
exception to this trend is Canada, which has legislated for a code of conduct.
451
 
Several sanctions have been made available in regulating jurisdictions as punitive 
measures to be taken against non-compliant lobbyists. These range in severity and 
thus can be tailored to the degree of non-compliance with codes and the lobbyist’s 
individual circumstances.  
 (a) Suspension and deregistration 
If a lobbying authority discovers serious misconduct on the part of a lobbyist, the 
lobbyist may be temporarily or permanently removed from the register. This means 
that the lobbyist can no longer legally lobby public office holders.
452
 This is the most 
obvious form of punishment, and has clear implications for those who rely on 
lobbying as an important aspect of their occupation. 
(b) Reporting 
Some codes authorise the lobbying authority to read its findings to Parliament, thus 
increasing the severity of consequence for those lobbyists found to be in breach of 
standards of conduct.
453
 The rationale behind this sanction is that it is likely to make 
public office holders reluctant to deal with the lobbyist in the future. The effectiveness 
of this sanction is partially undermined by a point made earlier in this chapter. 
Specifically, that notoriety has increased the popularity of lobbyists with potential 
clients in other jurisdictions. Despite this reservation, the overall effect of a reporting 
clause would likely be a deterrent to lobbyists who would otherwise engage in 
harmful lobbying activity. 
Lobbyists must be given an opportunity to speak to their side of an investigation 
before the lobbying authority before a decision is made. This helps to guarantee a 
modicum of fairness.
454
 
B Criminal sanctions 
Deliberate and severe circumvention of lobbying legislation is rightfully a criminal 
offence. Parties who knowingly avoid registration are most likely to be those that the 
legislation was designed to capture; acting in secrecy and without regard to the law, 
these lobbyists present a threat to governmental integrity and public confidence in 
government decision-making processes. 
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It follows that there must be some criminal sanctions available to prosecutors to deter 
this type of behaviour. However, as noted earlier, undue severity may reduce civic 
engagement if parties fear that they may find themselves subject to harsh legal 
retribution for minor mistakes.  
1 Offence severity – a comparison 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill stipulated that an unregistered individual conducting 
lobbying activity would be subject to a fine not exceeding $10,000, and a company or 
organisation in a similar situation would be charged with a fine not exceeding 
$20,000.
455
 These fines seem insignificant compared to the possible benefits of 
undetected unregistered lobbying activity; for example, SkyCity stands to make $42 
million dollars a year with the concessions it secured through the deal it secured with 
the National Government in 2013.
456
 
Under the Canadian Lobbying Act 1985, lobbyists who fail to make returns or provide 
misleading information are subject to much more onerous punishments. A summary 
conviction can lead to a fine of up to $50,000 and/or a prison term of up to six 
months, and an indictment can lead to a fine of up to $200,000 and/or a prison term of 
up to two years.
457
 The United States Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 imposes a 
$50,000 fine for lobbyists who knowingly fail to comply with any of the provisions of 
the Act.
458
 
2 Offence severity – discussion 
It is clear that the fines imposed by the Lobbying Disclosure Bill were insufficient for 
the purposes of dissuading unethical lobbying activity. Research produced in North 
America suggests that there is no evidence to suggest that the heightened severity of 
offences imposed in the States therein have had a detrimental effect on civic 
engagement.
459
 For this reason it is advisable that any forthcoming lobbying 
legislation in New Zealand contain – at a minimum – fines of a much greater 
magnitude than those originally suggested. Provisions imposing prison sentences may 
be unnecessary at this point. 
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PART FOUR – LOBBYING LEGISLATION AS RIGHTS LIMITATION 
Legislation introduced to regulate lobbying practices often runs afoul of a variety of 
fundamental rights. Those jurisdictions which feature lobbying legislation with the 
same core characteristics as the Lobbying Disclosure Bill (i.e. a compulsory register 
for lobbyists, and a lobbyists’ code of conduct) struggle chiefly with three rights: 
freedom of expression,
460
 association,
461
 and privacy.
462
 The individual characteristics 
of the lobbying regime in question and the protection that these rights are afforded in 
the State concerned alter the degree to which these rights are infringed.  
This Part analyses the Lobbying Disclosure Bill with the modifications recommended 
in Part II in the context of the New Zealand human rights framework. It specifies how 
the latter part of the paper statement may be achieved. It concludes that the impacts of 
such regulation on affected rights can be partially mitigated by clarity in drafting, and 
are otherwise demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. 
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X Analysing Rights Limitations: the “Proportionality Test” 
A Reconciling lobbying legislation with obligations under the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 
New Zealand has no central, codified constitution. Instead, it has an “unwritten 
constitution”463 whereby rights and constitutional protections exist within “a mass of 
legislation, judicial decisions, conventions, and sundry other sources”.464 The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) is the central rights document. Most of 
the rights contained within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 are set forth in 
very broad terms. 
An established process exists for determining the compatibility of draft Bills with the 
rights affirmed by the NZBORA. Government Bills are delivered to the Ministry of 
Justice or the Crown Law Office, where they are vetted for NZBORA compatibility 
before being sent onwards to the Attorney-General.
465
 The Attorney-General then 
determines whether Bills are consistent with the NZBORA, pursuant to Section 7 of 
the Act. The rights affirmed by the NZBORA may be limited by law “as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”466 Various judicial rulings 
have expounded this basis for limitations, providing a useful framework for the 
justifiability of legislative restrictions on human rights in New Zealand.
467
 
The NZBORA is largely derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,
468
 with the notable absence of a judicial inconsistency power in the 
former.
469
 In drafting the NZBORA White Paper, Geoffrey Palmer noted that this 
heritage would allow New Zealand courts to “take advantage of the developing 
jurisprudence of the Canadian Courts.”470 Geoffrey Palmer was correct; the approach 
of the New Zealand judiciary to rights limitation closely mirrors the Canadian 
equivalent. The test used in the Canadian courts was first comprehensively espoused 
in R v Oakes,
471
 and is described as “a demanding test of justification.” 472  One 
contemporary framing of this test in New Zealand reads as follows:
473
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1.  The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom; it must relate 
to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society 
before it can be characterized as sufficiently important. 
2.  Assuming that a sufficiently important objective has been established, the 
means chosen to achieve the objective must pass a proportionality test; that is 
to say they must: 
(a)  be 'rationally connected' to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair 
or based on irrational considerations; 
(b)  impair the right or freedom in question as 'little as reasonably 
possible'; and 
(c)  be such that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms are 
proportional to the objective.  
Essentially, the test asks whether “a justified end is achieved by proportionate 
means.”474  
Attorney-General Chris Finlayson, in his report on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill 2012 
(15-1), concluded that the Bill was inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
1990.
475
 His analysis – conducted on the basis of the proportionality analysis 
described above – found that the Bill unjustifiably restricted the right to freedom of 
expression in New Zealand. With respect, this analysis was incomplete; insofar as 
NZBORA is concerned, the Bill also had implications for the right to freedom of 
association. 
B Preliminary matters 
Before the proportionality of limiting measures of lobbying legislation can be 
evaluated, it is first necessary to identify the rights in question, and the way in which 
they are limited. Of the affected rights identified, some effort must be made to 
ascertain their scope, and the values upon which they are based.
476
 This has been 
emphasised by the New Zealand courts in a wide range of cases.
477
  
1 The right to freedom of expression 
(a) Scope 
The right to freedom of expression is affirmed in Section 14 of the NZBORA. It is 
defined as “including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
opinions of any kind and in any form.”478 The section was intended to be “basic and of 
broad scope”.479  It deliberately avoids providing an exhaustive list of the various 
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actions protected by the right, which leaves a great of space for interpretation.
480
 In 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, the forms and kinds of expression 
which may have protection under s 14 of NZBORA were considered to be “as wide as 
human thought and imagination.”481  
(b) Values 
Of the many core values of the right to freedom of expression, two are of relevance to 
mandatory lobbying disclosure regimes: the discovery of truth, and democratic 
integrity. 
The conceptual “Marketplace of Ideas”482 is often attributed to John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty.
483
 It describes a largely hypothetical scenario whereby all ideas are 
considered – notwithstanding the extent to which the idea is truthful, valuable or 
obscene – by the audience, which discovers the “truth” 484  by varying degrees of 
consensus. The notion is based on a “classic image of competing ideas and robust 
debates”, 485  which “presupposes that the right conclusions are more likely to be 
gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative 
selection”.486 The merits of the pursuit of truth are self-evident, and were described by 
Holmes J of the Supreme Court of the United States. He contended, “every year if not 
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge.” 487 There is no level of human life that does not rely on the accuracy of 
knowledge gained. As a prerequisite for the successful operation of the marketplace of 
ideas, speakers must be free to express their ideas without fear of retribution. 
Although the marketplace of ideas is a useful metaphor for understanding how the 
right to freedom of expression enables the discovery of truth, readers should be aware 
of its limitations. In 1984, Stanley Ingber made a compelling case for the inadequacies 
of the marketplace in its natural form. Most importantly, he suggested that the model 
assumes a degree of rational decision-making which is “implausible in modern 
society.” 488  This is because a true marketplace requires an open society, which 
appraises various viewpoints on a purely egalitarian basis. Ingber suggested that this 
does not occur, and that the values of perspectives are distorted or even overridden by 
entrenched power structures and ideology.
489
 If true, this would mean that “the 
dominant ‘truth’ discovered by the marketplace can result only from the triumph of 
power, rather than the triumph of reason”.490 In addition to this, “form or style of 
presentation can be very important, and there is absolutely no assurance that the truth-
teller rather than the false-speaker is the superior rhetorician.”491 These criticisms 
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aside, the concept has remained one of the central values of the right to freedom of 
expression.
492
 
The second relevant value underlying the right to freedom of expression is less 
abstract – but somewhat related to – the first. The ability of constituents to freely 
express opinions and information is “indispensable for the formation of public 
opinion… political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies and, in 
general those who wish to influence the public”.493 It enables members of democratic 
societies to come to informed decisions. Politically, this allows for robust and 
informed debate on the composition and direction of democratic government. It is also 
central to the protection of rights, which helps to provide the “stability necessary for 
society to develop in a peaceful and relatively prosperous manner.”494  The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights surmised these points stating, “a society that is not 
well informed is not a society that is truly free.”495 
(c) Accepted limitations 
Though it is often given primacy over other considerations, the right to freedom of 
expression is not absolute. Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides a useful rule of thumb for determining the legitimacy of 
restrictions on free speech.
496
 It specifies three criteria which must be met: the 
limitation must be provided by law (i.e. as a result of formal law-making processes), 
and necessary (“on a scale between ‘useful’ and ‘indispensable’, ‘necessary’ should 
be close to ‘indispensable’”)497 and exist to achieve a legitimate aim (including for the 
protection of other rights, national security and public order).
498
  
In practice, freedom of expression is limited in a range of situations. The ICCPR 
explicitly provides for a limitation on speech which incites war, discrimination, 
hostility or violence.
499
 “Hate expression”500 is prohibited by the Human Rights Act 
1993 (HRA). Section 61 of the HRA makes it a criminal offence for any person to 
express threatening, abusive or insulting content if it is likely to excite hostility 
against persons on the basis of their colour, race, or ethnic or national origins.
501
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Another commonly accepted form of expression limitation is the practice of 
censorship.
502
Other areas which involve a legitimate restriction on the right to 
freedom of expression include laws around defamation
503
 and privacy.
504
 Despite its 
much-vaunted presumption of supremacy, freedom of expression is limited in New 
Zealand for myriad reasons. 
(d) Lobbying legislation as a limit on the right to freedom of expression 
Lobbying legislation limits freedom of expression in two broad manners. These 
limitations arise as a result of the registration and disclosure requirements of typical 
lobbyist registers. Lobbying is a form of expression, as it involves the imparting of 
information or opinions between a lobbyist and a public official. The exercise of the 
right in this manner is afforded some protected under the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990.
505
 
(i) Bar on political expression 
Mandatory lobbyist registers prohibit certain types of lobbying activity by 
unregistered parties. For example, the drafters of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill 
intended for it to be an offence to “engage in lobbying activity… without being 
registered as a lobbyist”.506 The Attorney-General noted that this limited “the ability 
to express information freely.”507 It follows that the requirement to register is a prima 
facie restriction on the right to freedom of expression.
 508
 
 (ii) Chilling effect 
Prominent academics and public figures have raised concerns about the potential for 
lobbying legislation to chill the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.
509
 Two 
arguments are raised in support of this contention. 
The first is made in relation to the privacy of expression. As a stand-alone right, 
privacy is not enshrined in the NZBORA. However, it is possible that speakers may 
be deterred from having conversations if their contents were made public. In this 
respect, disclosure mechanisms could infringe on the right to freedom of expression. 
The second argument for the existence of a chilling effect caused by lobbying 
registers is made on the basis of the “self-censorship”510 phenomenon. As mentioned 
elsewhere in this paper, lobbying legislation regularly struggles to espouse clear 
parameters to accurately define the types of expression which should be subject to its 
provisions. “The law cannot be vague, undefined, and totally discretionary: it must be 
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ascertainable and understandable.”511 If lobbyists are unable to ascertain which forms 
of communication constitute lobbying activity, and which roles are deemed 
“lobbyists” for the purposes of the Bill, they will be disinclined to communicate in 
order to avoid the consequences of non-compliance.  
These arguments are fully evaluated in the final element of this analysis. The degree 
to which they reflect a tangible limitation on the right to freedom of expression is 
determined, and then the proportionality of these limitations is considered. For now it 
is enough to note that the implementation of a mandatory registration system for 
lobbyists would be a prima facie restriction on the right to freedom of expression, 
because it would affect lobbyists’ ability to express information and opinions 
freely.
512
 
2 The right to freedom of association 
(a) Scope 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms the right to free association under 
Section 17. The right is typically understood in instrumental terms, as an enabler and 
protector of trade unions, professional bodies, political parties and countless other 
groups.
513
 It has an intrinsic relationship to the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and freedom of speech.
514
  
(b) Values 
Broadly, the right to freedom of association is “integral to a free human life, to being 
a free person. Picking one’s company is part of living as one likes.”515 It is valuable in 
itself, because “[a]ssociations of every form provide accommodation for experience, 
much of it pleasurable.”516 
Effective representation is the most relevant value of the right to freedom of 
association.
517
 The right allows individuals to group together to present a unified 
perspective to any given audience; this is a particularly valuable ability for minority 
groups who would otherwise risk being marginalised in decision-making processes. 
The right is intrinsic to representation in all forms of life, particularly at a public 
policy level and in employment matters. It “empowers groups of people who 
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generally do not have a voice to be heard by the public” 518  The reality of 
representative democratic government is such that groups who are organised around a 
coherent perspective are more likely to secure recognition than distinct perspectives 
put forth by single individuals.  
(c) Accepted limitations 
The majority of current limitations pertain to criminal activity. Under the current 
Immigration Act 1987, individuals who are members of organisations which have 
committed acts of terrorism can be deported by orders signed by the Minister of 
Immigration.
519
 The Sentencing Act 2002 gives courts the power to impose non-
association orders if it is satisfied that “the making of the order is reasonably 
necessary to ensure that the offender does not commit further offences”. 520 
Additionally, the Summary Offences Act 1981 makes it an offence to habitually 
associate with convicted thieves, violent offenders and serious drug offenders where 
this association gives a reasonable inference that it will lead to the commission of a 
related offence.
521
 Contemporary restrictions generally focus on criminality, though 
not exclusively. For example, the Commerce Act 1986 prohibits associations created 
which substantially reduce competition in the market.
522
 
(d) Lobbying legislation as a limit on the right to freedom of association 
Lobbying registers involve a potential limit on the right to associational privacy; the 
extent to which this occurs depends on the specific disclosure requirements that apply. 
As noted in Chapter V, among the basic provisions necessary for an effective register 
of lobbyists is the disclosure of information pertaining to the identity of lobbyists, 
clients and relevant controlling interests. The identification and disclosure of these 
associations does not amount to a limitation of its own accord. However, if the 
disclosure of this information was likely to reflect unfavourably on parties involved, 
they may be disinclined to associate. This would have a detrimental impact on the 
ability of these parties to form associations for effective representation. 
This line of reasoning suggests that lobbying disclosure mechanisms amount to a 
breach of the right to freedom of association by reducing the extent to which lobbyists 
can associate freely. The final section of this analysis considers the proportionality of 
this harm against the benefits that it may bestow. 
C Is the objective of the impugned provision of sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom? 
In order for an encroachment into the rights to freedom of expression and association 
to be defensible, it must “relate to concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society.”523 Little guidance can be taken from the courts in regard to 
what might qualify as “substantial” or “pressing”. New Zealand judges have 
substituted inferential reasoning, or common sense, in determining what is substantial 
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or pressing.
524
 In R v Hansen, Blanchard J contended that the magnitude of harm 
caused by the misuse of drugs “is sufficiently well known to be taken into account by 
a Court without evidence on the subject”.525 In other cases evidence that “reflects the 
assertion of general abstractions has sufficed.”526 
The objectives of lobbying legislation are fairly consistent between jurisdictions. They 
commonly include two interrelated elements, which involve increasing the integrity 
of, and public trust in, government decision-making processes and actors.
527
 These 
objectives reveal the concerns that such legislation is designed to remedy; 
specifically, a deficit in either integrity or trust. 
Chapter II provided a number of examples where unregulated lobbying activity has 
caused damage to governmental integrity and public confidence. In order to determine 
whether a limit may be justifiably placed on NZBORA rights, it is necessary to 
determine whether these dual mischiefs are pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society. 
1 Governmental integrity 
How fundamental is governmental integrity to free and democratic society? Earlier in 
this paper – in keeping with the approach adopted in recent OECD reports – the 
concept was used interchangeably with the notion of “good governance”. This method 
is continued here. 
The importance of good governance in democracies is often highlighted with 
reference to the characteristics of poor governance. Governments who fail to meet the 
principles of good governance regularly reflect a number of undesirable outcomes: a 
tendency towards the misuse of public resources, a lack of predictable government 
behaviour, an absence of the rule of law and the crippling of markets.
528
 There is a 
general consensus that a lack of governmental integrity is “corrosive of economic and 
social development.”529 It is reasonable to conclude that detractions from government 
integrity are concerns which are substantial and pressing in a free and democratic 
society. 
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2 Public confidence 
In addition to the erosion of public confidence that results from unregulated lobbying 
which was identified in Chapter II, there appears to be a more general “dissatisfaction 
with, and lack of confidence in, the functioning of the institutions of democratic 
government” 530  in modern states. Such a loss of confidence in governmental 
institutions indicates “public disaffection with the modern world”, 531  which is 
concerning given that these institutions are the “basic pillars of society.”532 Without a 
moderate degree of trust in government actors by the constituents that they are elected 
to represent, the functions of the state are curtailed and discontent – even unrest – can 
result.
533
 These outcomes are undesirable. It follows that any deficit in public 
confidence in government actors and decision-making processes is both substantial 
and pressing in a free and democratic society. 
It is clear that the dual objectives of lobbying legislation are commendable and related 
to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. Few 
instruments fail this step of the test.
534
 It demonstrates that “some”535 rights limitation 
is justifiable on this basis.  
D The second part of Hansen – the proportionality test 
1 Rational connection 
The first prong of the second element of the analysis seeks a rational connection 
between the means employed and the objective sought. There is a divergence of views 
on how this step should be approached in New Zealand. In R v Hansen, Tipping J was 
of the view that the instrument must simply logically tend to contribute towards its 
objective.
536
 He advocated the approach adopted in the courts of England, which 
impose a simple threshold criteria to satisfy the rational connection requirement.  
In the same case, Blanchard and McGrath JJ supported the process adopted in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which asks whether the means are arbitrary, irrational or 
unfair.
537
 This subjects the provisions in question to a greater degree of scrutiny, and 
for this reason it is used in this analysis. It is in keeping with the belief that “the 
requirement of rational connection calls for an assessment of how well the legislative 
garment has been tailored to suit its purpose.”538  
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This part of the analysis comprises three components. Firstly, are the provisions 
recommended in this paper carefully designed? Secondly, do these provisions impose 
a certain and unacceptable degree of arbitrariness? Finally, do they contribute in some 
general way to the dual objectives of lobbying legislation? 
(a) Are the provisions carefully designed, and not arbitrary? 
Lobbying disclosure legislation has been thoroughly criticised for being unclear, 
which may indicate that it has not been carefully designed. A notable example of this 
took place in October 1953, when a claim against the Federal Regulation of Lobbying 
Act 1946 was heard in the United States Supreme Court, which was made on the basis 
that the law was unconstitutionally vague.
539
 This concern over vagueness is reflected 
in many of the submissions made during the Select Committee process of the 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill.
540
 
At a legislative level, the solution to this issue must come from articulate drafting. It 
can also be supplemented by the advisory role of a lobbying authority. Careful design 
must include clear elucidation of to whom the law would apply and what the duties of 
these persons would entail. The law must not capture parties who are not incidental to 
its objectives. 
The thrust of the provisions recommended by this paper are described in Chapter VII, 
but are repeated here for quick reference. A lobbyist is someone who, for payment, 
communicates with public office holders (MPs and senior and executive staff of 
bodies listed under Schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1988) with respect to a number 
of defined topics. Explicit exceptions should include activities of a number of public 
bodies, including departments of the public service, Crown entities, Parliamentary 
Counsel Office and any Office of Parliament and also interactions which are 
transparent already, such as select committee submissions. It is recommendable that 
these lobbyists must register on the occurrence or intention of a second instance of 
premeditated lobbying activity within a three-month period. Registration involves the 
filing of a return with the lobbying authority, which includes particulars to identify 
relevant parties and controlling interests, the subject matter discussed and the 
communication method employed. Once registered, lobbyists should be obliged to file 
quarterly returns which update their status on the register of lobbyists, and also 
indicate whether they have carried out such activity where the target has been a 
Designated Public Office Holder (Ministers of the Crown and executive staff of the 
bodies listed under Schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1988) and what these instances 
entailed. 
These recommendations target the relevant lobbying parties with precision. This is 
achieved with limited legal jargon or complicated rules. Lobbying activity is simply 
defined and excludes ordinary interactions between constituents and representatives. 
The careful design of these provisions allows the register to capture parties who 
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conduct lobbying as a professional activity whilst avoiding the inclusion of ordinary, 
occasional political participation by constituents. 
(b) Contribution towards objectives 
To establish whether lobbying legislation contributes towards its objectives (i.e. to 
increase public confidence and governmental integrity), this section is broken into 
three sections. The first establishes whether lobbying legislation makes lobbying 
activity more transparent. Having established this, the second and third sections 
determine whether this increased transparency would contribute to the dual objectives 
of lobbying legislation. 
(i) Does lobbying legislation make lobbying activity more transparent? 
It may seem intuitive to the reader that increased disclosure would by definition 
increase transparency. This is not necessarily the case. For example, poorly drafted 
disclosure requirements might make false disclosures possible, which would amount 
to misinformation and would negate the possibility of increased transparency. It is 
therefore imperative that the link between lobbying activity and transparency is 
explored. 
In 2006, Raj Chari and Gary Murphy produced a comprehensive study of lobbying 
law Canada, the United States, the European Union and Germany. They found that a 
majority of elected representatives, public sector administrators and lobby groups 
believed that higher regulatory approaches to lobbying activities contributed towards 
transparency.
541
 In a sweeping overview of mechanisms to increase public trust in 
government, Pierre-Marc Daingneault concluded that lobbying disclosure provisions 
“contribute to rendering the bureaucracy more transparent” 542  The United States 
Government Accountability Office believes that recent lobbying legislation reform 
has led to “more transparency”.543 There appears to be a general consensus between 
lawmakers, academics and public agencies that lobbying disclosure legislation tends 
to make lobbying more transparent. 
(ii) Does increased transparency contribute towards increased government 
integrity? 
Insofar as governmental integrity is concerned, transparency is arguably effective for 
“prophylactic purposes”544 against corruption and unethical conduct; “[s]unlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”545 This 
is a foundation principle of freedom of information policy, and is based on a 
presumption that parties are less likely to engage in unethical behaviour if they have 
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reason to suspect it will be made open to public scrutiny. It allows decision-makers to 
be held to account.  
The “SkyCity Deal” scandal serves as an example of how mechanisms to improve 
transparency in lobbying activities could improve governmental integrity. Pursuant to 
the provisions recommended in this paper, SkyCity would have had an obligation to 
register and disclose information pertaining to its lobbying activities, which began 
well before the Ministry of Economic Development called for expressions of interest 
with respect to its intention to build a convention centre. As noted in Chapter II, this 
lobbying activity had a corrosive effect on the integrity of the expression of interest 
process. If the prior relationship between SkyCity and the New Zealand Government 
was made public before the tendering process, this would have provided a strong 
political incentive to ensure that it was conducted impartially and inclusively, to avoid 
a perception of unethical conduct. 
(iii) Does increased transparency contribute towards increased public 
confidence? 
The OECD argues that transparency can reassure citizens that “the government is 
indeed their government, and is not the private preserve of those who can afford to 
pay for access.”546 Where transparency serves to highlight the fact that governmental 
decision-making processes are fair and representative, then this is likely to be the 
case.  
However, transparency can – somewhat counterintuitively – decrease public 
confidence. This is a phenomenon which can result from ethics laws generally. There 
is a tendency for ethics laws to draw attention to issues perceived to be detrimental to 
governmental integrity, thereby undermining public trust in institutes and actors. 
Mackenzie and Hafken note that in the United States, “[t]he more ethics regulations 
designed and implemented… the more the air has filled with news – often caustic and 
depressing news – about government ethics.”547 In the context of lobbying disclosure, 
it is conceivable that upon publication of the extent to which lobbyists have access to 
public officials in New Zealand, there may be a decline in public confidence in 
government integrity.  
Despite this caveat, it is probable that there would be a net increase in public 
confidence following the implementation of lobbying legislation. If lobbying is 
having a minimally untoward effect on government decision-making processes, then 
transparency will evince this truth and reassure the public. If unethical lobbying is 
prevalent, then transparency will bring the force of public scrutiny to bear, which will 
presumably dissuade this practice going forward.  
 (c) Rational connection – Findings 
The provisions recommended in this paper which have rights implications are 
rationally connected to their respective objectives. They are carefully designed, 
without undue arbitrariness. For the purposes of a rights limitation proportionality 
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analysis, it is appropriate to simply conclude that a lobbyist disclosure regime would 
contribute in a general way towards its stated objectives. 
2 Do the limitations impair the right or freedom in question as 'little as 
reasonably possible'? 
The original Oakes Test required that the measure chosen must impair the right “as 
little as possible”.548  This requirement evolved into the less-stringent “as little as 
reasonably possible”549 in the Canadian Courts. This approach has been adopted in 
New Zealand.
550
 In determining whether the minimal impairment requirement has 
been met, the Courts have considered “whether there was an alternative but less 
intrusive means of addressing the legislature’s objective which would have a similar 
level of effectiveness.”551 
The objectives of lobbying legislation are typically to increase government integrity 
and restore public confidence in governmental decision-making. There are a number 
of alternatives available to Parliament. These must be briefly explored in order to 
determine whether they could achieve these objectives in a manner which was less 
intrusive on the infringed rights. 
(a)  Non-legislative alternatives 
In its report on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill, the Government Administration 
Committee recommended that it should be substituted by three changes to the 
parliamentary practice. The first was that Standing Orders concerning contempt of the 
House and Bribery of MPs should be review in tandem with the development of 
guidelines for MPs on handling communications.
552
 Further to this, the Committee 
recommended that the House:
553
 
Require the regulatory impact statements and explanatory notes of parliamentary 
bills to include details of the non-departmental organisations consulted during the 
development of related policy and legislation 
Encourage the proactive release of policy papers to make the policy-making 
process more transparent. 
These measures appear wide-reaching but would almost certainly fail to meet the 
degree of transparency envisaged by proponents of lobbying legislation due to a 
general lack of transparency and legal enforceability.  
Under these rules, MPs would be encouraged to voluntarily disclose the identities of 
major lobbyists. This is unhelpful, given the reasonable assumption that those 
instances of lobbying most prone to reducing public trust or government integrity are 
also those instances where the parties involved will be least inclined to disclose its 
occurrence (due to strong political disincentives). The instances of damaging lobbying 
described in this paper stemmed partially from a reluctance felt by public officials to 
disclose the extent and nature of their dealings with lobbyists. It is unlikely that a 
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proposition for lobbying regulation which does not incorporate legal enforceability or 
vest investigatory and punitive powers in a lobbying authority will meet the 
transparency objectives of lobbying legislation. 
(b) Modified legislative alternatives  
Legislative responses to lobbying regulation invariably include some form of a 
lobbyists’ register. A register of lobbyists can only be meaningful if a number of key 
pieces of information are disclosed.
554
 These requirements form the absolute 
minimum for an effective register, and include information to identify the interest 
represented, the object of the lobbying activity, and the government institutions being 
lobbied. The provisions suggested in this paper are in keeping with these minimum 
necessities. 
3 Are the effects of the limitation of rights and freedoms proportional?  
In the influential Oakes decision, Dickson CJC explained the significance of this step 
of the test:
555
 
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two elements of the 
proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the 
deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified 
by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the deleterious effects of a 
measure, the ore important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  
To enable a full proportionality enquiry, the effects of the limiting measure on the 
integrity of the affected right must be calculated to the most accurate degree available. 
Of course, it must be remembered that “uncertainty reigns”556 over these estimations 
due to the impossibility of predicting the outcome of any future event (particularly 
those events with as many variables as legislation limiting the rights of an entire 
nation). With this difficulty in mind, the proportionality analyses for the right to 
freedom of expression and association are conducted as follows. Firstly, the impact of 
registration requirements on freedom of expression is considered. The second part of 
this analysis considers the relationship between disclosure, privacy invasions and 
collateral chilling effects on the freedoms of expression and association. 
(a) Lobbying legislation as a bureaucratic limit on expression 
It is a contention of this paper that the bureaucratic burdens imposed by the 
registration and reporting requirements of lobbying regimes do not unreasonably limit 
the variety or regularity of this type of expression.  
This argument can be evinced by way of an example. Professional lobbying is a 
resource-intensive activity. It requires a great deal of time and often necessitates 
expertise on the part of the lobbyist. This is true of both ends of the scale, including 
high-profile lobbying between corporates and ministers, and of small business owners 
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who are in regular contact with local MPs.
557
 It seems patently unlikely that this 
activity would cease due to the addition of a negligible amount of paperwork, though 
it may be reduced to a minor extent. The lobbyist is in a position to know the relevant 
information to meet disclosure requirements, which means that the filing of 
registrations and returns should be an expedient process. It is improbable that this 
would take more than a handful of minutes to finish, and the process is cost-free if 
completed online. The limited empirical research available on the effect of 
registration requirements on expression have found no evidence to suggest that it has 
had a negative impact on the amount and diversity of parties conducting lobbying 
activity.
558
 
As a counterweight to this, some lobbyists find that the bureaucratic burdens imposed 
by registers have their own rewards; namely, legitimacy. Prominent commentators 
have noted that lobbyists use registers as a “marketing tool”,559 because they give the 
appearance of status and legitimacy to the interest represented. This is particularly 
true of smaller interest groups who struggle to achieve notable publicity.  
It is reasonable to conclude that the prima facie limit on freedom of expression 
imposed by registration requirements is insignificant. By contrast, registration 
provisions stand to materially increase governmental integrity and public confidence 
in government decision-making processes. The provisions are proportional in this 
respect. 
(b) Lobbying disclosure and chilling effects 
As noted earlier in this chapter, it is possible that lobbying legislation could result in 
chilling effects on the rights to freedom of association and expression. If extant, these 
chilling effects would result from the lack of privacy inherent in disclosure 
requirements, and from the so called “self-censorship”560 effect. These limits must be 
appraised in full in order to determine their respective proportionality. This section 
concludes that these limits are negligible and justifiable in light of the beneficial 
objectives of lobbying legislation. 
(i) Lobbying disclosure and privacy of expression 
There is no provision to affirm the right to privacy in the NZBORA. However, an 
invasion of privacy can have an ancillary effect on other rights, which makes it a valid 
consideration in proportionality enquiries. It is accepted that privacy is an essential 
element of some forms of expression. For example, the secret recording of 
information may infringe the right on the basis that parties “might alter the content of 
[their] communication or might lead [parties] to decide not to impart information or 
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opinions at all.” 561  This is true of private communications between individuals, 
particularly where it involves elements of intimacy. 
It is clear that intimate or personal conversations between ordinary citizens are 
distinct from lobbying communications. However, “speech activities directed at the 
public in general or specific sectors thereof may require anonymity for the speaker in 
order to ensure full-bodied debate… without that anonymity, speech may not occur 
for fear of harassment or other adverse consequences.”562 In other words, the privacy 
of freedom of expression in the public sphere must be accorded some protection in 
order to reinforce the values of democratic integrity and truth-seeking which underlie 
the right. It is this argument that forms the basis of the allegation that the mandatory 
disclosure of lobbying communications may have a general chilling effect on this 
form of expression. 
There is no empirical evidence to suggest the existence of a noteworthy chill on 
freedom of expression in states where disclosure regimes are in place. In Citizens 
United v Federal Election Commission,
563
 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that obligations to disclose the identities of lobbyists engaged in campaign 
financing had produced no measurable chill on the right to freedom of expression.
564
  
Furthermore, it is the contention of this paper that the privacy of lobbying expressions 
should be given little weight. The right to freedom of expression does not 
automatically extend to a right to private public speech. Indeed, the values underlying 
the right to freedom of expression seem to point to a need for such communications to 
be made public. For example, it has been established that freedom of expression 
enables democratic integrity by giving access to information necessary to keep the 
public informed on matters of governance (i.e. the right to seek information as an 
aspect of freedom of expression).
565
 “The concept of an open government is the direct 
emanation from the right to know, which seems to be implicit in the right of free 
speech and expression”.566 Lobbying activity is carried out with senior public officials 
and government representatives with the intention of altering governmental decision-
making processes. This has relevance to all constituents and thus must be disclosed to 
enable informed political participation.
567
 In this sense it appears as though lobbying 
disclosure requirements might be understood as a contributor to freedom of 
expression, as well as a detractor.  
On its face, it seems possible that a reduction of privacy in lobbying activities could 
chill this form of expression, notwithstanding the issues raised in the above paragraph 
and the fact that there is little evidential foundation to support this claim. However, a 
lack of evidence indicates that if this limitation does exist in regulating jurisdictions, it 
is on a miniscule scale. This limitation would be proportionate, particularly given the 
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beneficial outcomes of lobbying legislation and the likelihood that the limiting 
provisions would also contribute towards the right to freedom of expression. 
 (ii) Lobbying disclosure and associational privacy 
There is no judicial or legislative reference to the right to associational privacy in 
New Zealand. The United States Supreme Court has held that the “inviolability of 
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to 
preservation of freedom of association”.568 In the United States context, the limiting 
provision was nonetheless justified unless it could be demonstrated that the disclosure 
of associations was “likely to cause violence or threats of violence.”569 This high 
threshold is unlikely to give pause to the disclosure of lobbyists’ and clients’ 
identities. 
In the influential text The New Zealand Bill of Rights, the authors foresee “little 
difficulty”570 in justifying the disclosure of campaign contributions where these would 
reveal associations between contributors and recipients. A similar conclusion would 
likely be met with respect to lobbying activities. 
(iii) Lobbying disclosure and self-censorship 
As noted earlier in this chapter, self-censorship may act as a limit on the right to 
freedom of expression where the law is unclear or vague. Lobbyists could act to 
protect themselves from the legal consequences of non-compliance with regulatory 
provisions by reducing their lobbying activities. This concept was well-espoused by 
Brennan J in New York Times Co v Sullivan,
571
 who believed that law which limits 
human rights but does not clearly articulate the extent to which it does so may cause 
the public to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone”,572 thus abridging the right further 
than intended. 
In the context of lobbying legislation, self-censorship could result from legislation 
which was unnecessarily complex, requiring legal comprehension and bureaucratic 
competency. It is possible that some lobbyists would avoid lobbying altogether for 
fear of unknowingly breaching the law. A reasonable extension of this line of 
reasoning leads to the conclusion that this phenomenon would affect those lobbyists 
who are less well-resourced, as they could not draw from funds and legal counsel as a 
means of clarifying their legal obligations.
573
 
In 1998 a comprehensive study was conducted by Virginia Gray and David Lowerly 
on lobbying regulations in the United States and their impacts on the diversity of 
lobbyists.
574
 At the time, the relevant statutory instruments were much more 
sophisticated (and thus harder to understand) than those suggested in the LDB or this 
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paper.
575
 It follows that if modern legislation was likely to create a self-censorship 
impingement on the right to freedom of expression, then this trend would have been 
amplified in the United States in 1998 and thus present in the results of the study 
conducted by Gray and Lowerly. The authors concluded that their null hypothesis was 
the most accurate. In other words, rigorous lobbying regulation had “little impact on 
the diversity of organised interests found within state interest communities.”576  It 
found that the effects of regulation were “negligible”577 in terms of the numbers of 
lobbyists who were not-for-profits, institutions, membership groups and associations. 
Though hardly definitive, this tends to support the view that lobbying legislation 
similar to that proposed in this paper is unlikely to precipitate a trend self-censorship, 
given that these groups would be those most affected.  
The self-censorship phenomenon can be avoided by the provision of clear drafting 
which is free of complex legal jargon. The addition of a lobbying authority charged 
with an advisory interpretation function also means that lobbyists can achieve 
certainty about their obligations under the law without resorting to paying for costly 
legal advice. It is possible that self-censorship could occur notwithstanding these 
mitigating factors. However, it is likely to amount to a very small limitation on the 
free exercise of the right to freedom of expression and would be more than offset by 
the beneficial effects of lobbying legislation. In this context, the chilling effect 
described appears to be proportionate. 
E Conclusions 
The effects of lobbying legislation on the rights to freedom of expression and 
association are overstated. There is no evidence to suggest that these limits have been 
significant in the experience of overseas jurisdictions.  
Arguments made against registration and disclosure requirements on purely principled 
bases appear flawed. Expression is augmented by disclosure in the sense that it 
facilitates the ability of the public to seek and receive information relevant to 
democratic integrity. It is unrealistic to expect privacy in associations where these are 
high-profile relationships within the public sphere.  
The provisions recommended in this paper curtail the exacerbating effects of vague or 
unduly severe legislation. The limits imposed are not arbitrary or irrational, and 
contribute towards an increase in governmental integrity and public confidence. They 
are minimal, and the detrimental effects on the rights are proportional to these 
objectives. In short, registration and disclosure requirements imposed by provisions 
such as those advocated here are justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
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XI Summary 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill was rejected by the Government and Administration 
Committee for good reason. It contained a number of drafting deficiencies which 
would have caused implementation issues and disproportionate limits on one or more 
human rights. 
The most significant shortcoming of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill arose from the way 
that it defined relevant parties. Of particular concern was the fact that it would capture 
all paid lobbyists, including those who are less likely to conduct harmful lobbying 
activity (such as small business owners). This would mean that private citizens could 
incur obligations resulting from a single encounter with their democratic 
representative, which has negative implications for civic engagement. As discussed, 
an obligation of this manner has implications for the rights to freedom of expression 
and association. Additionally, the Bill only imposed registration obligations for those 
lobbyists who carried out activities with respect to Members of Parliament and their 
staff. This definition did not give enough consideration to the relationships which 
often exist between lobbyists and other public officials. 
Other inadequacies of the Bill included the designation of the Auditor-General as the 
lobbying authority, as this role is not well suited to the office. Furthermore, the 
reporting requirements contained in the Bill were not optimised to ensure that the 
Register of Lobbyists would deliver the greatest degree of transparency in return for 
the smallest possible bureaucratic burden. Finally, the enforcement mechanisms 
(criminal and otherwise) contained in the Bill were not well-equipped to deal with the 
wealthy and influential lobbyists to whom harmful lobbying activities are often 
attributed. 
Despite these misgivings, the objectives of the Lobbying Disclosure Bill were 
commendable. Several instances of harmful lobbying activity have come to light in 
New Zealand in recent years. It is likely that this is merely the tip of the iceberg, given 
that the lobbying industry generally operates behind closed doors.  
A number of small alterations to the way in which lobbyists are defined would enable 
an instrument such as the Lobbying Disclosure Bill to dissuade harmful lobbying 
while allowing ordinary activity to continue without significant impediments. By 
creating an expanded and exhaustive list of officials with whom lobbying is a 
registerable activity, a similar Bill could cover a wider variety of influential lobbying 
activities without becoming unmanageably vague. These definitional alterations 
deliberately exclude infrequent contact with public officials and government 
representatives, which would give a clear indication to private citizens that their own 
lobbying activities would not bring them under the ambit of the law.  
In the event that lobbying law comes before Parliament once more, reporting 
requirements should be tailored to ensure maximum efficiency at minimum cost. 
Registered lobbyists should only be obliged to file reports when the nature of their 
activities materially alters. One exception to this rule should be included, which 
would require lobbyists in contact with key decision-makers (such as ministers) to 
produce reports on a more regular basis. This would allow the public to be better 
informed about instances of lobbying activity which are more likely to have a 
significant effect on the public policy landscape. 
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It is also suggested in this paper that an additional Office of Parliament could be 
created to oversee the administration of lobbying legislation. This may come at a 
significant cost, but it would avoid imposing further burdens on already strained 
offices. It would also mean that the law would be overseen by an authority with 
functions and expertise specific to lobbying regulation. This expertise could be 
utilised to create and govern a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct which is both relevant and 
enforceable. Criminal sanctions for non-compliance contained in the Lobbying 
Disclosure Bill should be markedly increased, to deter wealthy and influential 
lobbyists from deliberately circumventing the law due to a belief that the potential 
payoff would be worth the risks imposed by otherwise-miniscule fines.  
The conclusions delivered in this paper suggest that it is both possible and desirable to 
enact legislation to effectively regulate lobbyists in New Zealand. It is likely that a 
great deal of political pressure will be brought to bear on Parliament in the future, 
following the inevitable publication of instances of harmful lobbying. It is the hope of 
this author that this pressure will produce a more considered and enthusiastic 
legislative response.  
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